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Abstract
This study used Principal Component Analysis to examine factors that facilitate emergent change
in an organization. As organizational life becomes more complex, today’s dominant management
paradigms no longer suffice. This is particularly true in a health care setting where multiple
sources of disease interacting with each other meet with often-competing organizational
priorities and accountabilities in a highly complex world. This study identifies new ways of
approaching complexity by embracing the capacity of complex systems to find their own form of
order and coherence. Based on a review of the literature, interviews with hospital CEOs, and my
organization development practice experience in the health care sector, I identified nine
constructs of interest: a strategic framework; organizational culture; work structures; CEO and
executive team; leadership culture; quality control systems; accountability framework; learning
structures; and feedback processes. One hundred and sixty-two senior leaders, managers, and
staff at a hospital in Toronto, Canada, who had completed an eight-week leadership program,
completed an Emergence Survey© based on the nine constructs of interest. The survey included
Likert items representing the nine constructs, as well as opportunities to provide narrative
feedback. In the initial analysis of the survey results, the items taken as a whole would not
converge on a clear set of components. It was also clear that the mean for most of the items was
very high. I theorized that the size of the sample and possibility that they were a favorably
biased convenience sample because they had self-selected as leaders may have contributed to the
lack of convergence and high mean. I then theorized three clusters of constructs, based on what
appeared to be natural affinities. At that point I facilitated two focus groups with people who
were among the survey group. Both focus groups affirmed the importance of each of the factors
in improving organizational performance indicators such as patient satisfaction, staff
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engagement, and quality. I then completed a principal component analysis of each of the three
clusters of constructs. From this analysis, seven components emerged. Five of these, executive
engagement, safe-fail culture, collaborative decision-processes, a collaborative quality, and
intentional learning processes had reliability >.70; culture of experimentation and purposeful
orientation had reliability < .70. The electronic version of this Dissertation is at OhioLink ETD
Center, www.ohiolink.edu/etd
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1
Chapter I: Introduction
Statement of the Problem
As organizational life becomes more and more complex, today’s dominant management
paradigms no longer seem to suffice. In fact, current views can lead to “vicious cycles” (Stacey,
1996, p. 3) of fear and failure. This is particularly true in a health care setting where multiple
sources and systems of disease interacting with each other (referred to as complex comorbidities) meet head-on with often-competing organizational priorities and accountabilities.
The problem is that, while many health care leaders readily acknowledge the challenges and
limitations of traditional approaches, they have a limited range of options for dealing with a
highly complex world. This study intended to identify new ways of thinking about and
responding to complexity: not by trying to simplify it, but by embracing the inherent capacity of
complex systems to find their own form of order and coherence.
The level of complexity and unpredictable change faced by organizations today is
unprecedented. Globalization, rapidly changing technologies, unpredictable geopolitical
environments, and increasingly informed consumers bring tremendous challenges for
organizations trying to stay afloat in such “permanent white water” (Vaill, 1996, p. 1). Sadly,
many organizations are still using managerial approaches, the foundations of which were “laid
down by people like David McCallum, Fredrick Taylor, and Henry Ford, all of whom were born
before the end of the American Civil War in 1865” (Hamel, 2009, p. 91). Many of these
management theories are based on metaphors that may no longer serve. Morgan (1997)
suggested the underlying metaphor that has defined management thinking for the past century is
that of the machine. Many of us live and work in organizations designed from 300-year-old
images of the world developed by Sir Isaac Newton and others. We often see and describe the
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organization as a vast machine we manage by separating things into parts, analyzing those parts,
and then trying to put them back together without significant loss (Wheatley, 1994). Based on
this metaphor, we make the assumption that by comprehending the workings of each piece, the
whole can be understood. This traditional view of the world focuses on the standardization of
work processes and limited horizontal decentralization (Mintzberg, 1989). Noel Tichy (1997)
went so far as to embed the machine metaphor directly into one of his more popular books, The
Leadership Engine: How Winning Companies Build Leaders at Every Level. The implications
are clear: like an automobile engine, a company can be built through the appropriate and timely
assembly of parts Tichy called “leaders.” Scientific management, a term coined by Taylor in
1911, does not seem capable of supporting the complexities of a 21st-century environment. As
Kaufmann (1995) lamented, “paradise has been lost, not to sin, but to science” (p. 61). While the
machine metaphor has been used to argue in favor of the need for some level of systems theory
(Kendall & Kendall, 1993), it fails us when elements of the system are unstable, loosely coupled,
and unpredictable.
As a consequence of the machine metaphor, we engage in detailed planning exercises
fully expecting the world to be logical and predictable and we search for better methods of
objectively measuring and improving our world. This paradigm or belief in dispassionate, linear
progress now appears to be contraindicated in organizations experiencing constant,
discontinuous change where the level of residual uncertainty is extremely high, despite our best
analysis. Courtney (2001) described residual uncertainty as the degree of uncertainty remaining
after the best analysis possible.
Before we can propose new metaphors, it is important to step back and query the purpose
and use of metaphor itself. For some, “metaphor is often regarded just as a device for
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embellishing discourse, but its significance is much greater than that. The use of metaphor
implies a way of thinking and a way of seeing” (Morgan, 1997, p. 4). Reason and Goodwin
(1999) asked, “is it reasonable to apply theories which have their origins in the natural and
biological sciences to social life and to organizations? Are we simply employing metaphors,
rather than making a sound epistemological argument?” (p. 11). Reason and Goodwin provided
the argument that “social life in general, and organizations in particular can well be seen as
complex self-organizing systems, and that drawing on complexity theory to explain them, while
necessarily metaphorical, is epistemologically justifiable” (p. 2). This seems to support Morgan’s
(1997) argument that all theory is, in fact, metaphor.
If management theory and strategy are going to change, then I argue we need to begin
with new metaphors. Increasingly, organizations are described as organic: something that is
alive and constantly adapting. As Capra (1996) asked, “is there a common pattern of
organization that can be identified with all living systems?” (p. 82). While this may be true of
biological systems, as Capra believed was the case, is it too big a leap to assume that an
organization—a hospital for example—is directly analogous to a garden? Are organizations as
complex and constantly adaptive as ecosystems? The emerging construct of complexity theory,
from which complex adaptive systems theory has evolved, embraces such a shift in metaphor.
Marion and Uhl-Bien (2001), two thought leaders in the area of complexity and leadership,
argued, “complexity theory moves away from linear, mechanistic views of the world, where
simple cause-and-effect solutions are sought to explain physical and social phenomena, to a
perspective of the world as nonlinear and organic, characterized by uncertainty and
unpredictability” (pp. 389-390). Alaa (2009) seemed to go in the same direction when she
suggested, “complex adaptive systems [theory] in management contexts marks a fundamental
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paradigm shift from a mechanistic perception of an organization toward a self-organizing,
autonomous understanding” (p. 21).
If we accept the increased complexity of the environment calls for new metaphors and
new ways of thinking about organizations, then health care systems are arguably the most
complex systems in the history of human invention. The Newtonian “clockwork universe . . . [in
which] big problems can be broken down into smaller ones, analyzed, and solved by rational
deduction, has (also) strongly influenced the practice of medicine” (Plsek & Greenhalgh, 2001,
p. 871). The origins of complexity theory lie in the study of deterministic systems such as
biological units, numbers, and subatomic particles—in other words, systems that lack free will
and choice; however, the reality is health care is a human-based system and, as such, is subject to
the inherent complexity of both the human body and, perhaps more challenging, the human mind
and will.
Morrison (as cited in Begun, Zimmerman, & Dooley, 2003) argued, “the health care field
is complex, perhaps the most complex of any area of the economy” (p. 254). Focusing on the
most basic aspects of the health care system, we can infer the large amount of knowledge and
skills of multiple stakeholders required to keep the human body in good shape. When I had a
recent experience with throat cancer, I was amazed at the number of medical specialists involved
in my care: ear, nose, and throat specialists; anesthesiologists; general surgeons; oncology
surgeons; radiation oncologists; dentists; my family physician; nurses; other health care
professionals (such as radiation technicians, MRI and CT technologists, lab staff, speech and
language therapists, and social workers); alternative care professionals (such as chiropractors,
naturopaths, and spiritual care providers); and dozens of support and clerical staff. There was no
one in charge of this army of care providers who were all working in different settings and
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contexts, with very different accountability structures. Throughout my treatment, I could see
there was no clarity or certainty of the outcome, the strategies and approaches were changing,
and treatment protocols were, in some cases, relatively novel. Heifetz (1994) used a similar
example in describing the difference between technical work/leadership and adaptive leadership.
Further, Tan, Wen, and Awad (2005) argued:
It is this gap between the intricacies of the human body and the available knowledge and
skills of multiple providers that generates uncertainties and complexity in the care process.
It is this complex care process which in turn, makes it difficult, if not impossible, to plan
and standardize the health care intervention processes. (p. 39)
In contrast to mechanical systems, the processes in a health care organization such as a hospital
are invariably complex. The health care system seems to be something that continues to defy
control. Begun et al. (2003) pressed the case for a different metaphor: “it is a ‘machine’ that
appears to have a mind of its own” (p. 254). A general physician can order one of thousands of
medications, one of hundreds of clinical laboratory tests, and utilize one of several treatment
protocols for any given disease entity. Along with changing patient conditions and co-morbidity,
the sequence and timing of all these events will ultimately determine the relative effectiveness of
a selected treatment. In a recent consulting project with a team in a large intensive care unit
(ICU), I observed a shift change report between two nursing specialists. The patient, a 58-yearold male, had been admitted through the emergency department with acute heart disease. He
also had diabetes and was extremely overweight. He was ventilated and was under the care of an
experienced cardiologist, but his prospects were grim. His situation was complicated by the fact
that he lived alone in a rooming house and all attempts to contact any family members had been
fruitless. An eager medical resident had put the patient on the waitlist for a heart transplant at
another hospital; however, the recovery process for a transplant patient is long and arduous,
requiring extensive in-home care. No one could satisfy the cardiologist that this care would be
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available, so he was reluctant to push forward with the procedure. What was the best option for
this patient? Who should make the decision, as the patient is alone and unconscious? These are
clearly not simple or even complicated questions, but are truly complex. These sorts of decisions
are being made in hospitals daily, adding additional layers of complexity to the business of
disease management.
Given the inherent complexity of health care systems, a compelling argument can be
made that heath care can and should be a primary area of study for complexity researchers.
While the study of the emergence of order . . . may provide useful insights, the most
complex systems are social systems, and health care organizations are the most complex
within that subdomain. If one believes that a science is “pushed” and progresses by
studying its most complex problems and situations, then complexity science needs to
coevolve its next set of theories with a vigorous examination of health and health care
management issues. (Begun et al., 2003, p. 288)
Part of the focus needs to be on developing an increased capacity within the health care system
to anticipate future possibilities so we are not surprised by issues such as a SARS epidemic or
health service restructuring. It requires us to “re-evaluate our tendency to focus only on the
existing system. Instead, we need to question whether the system’s current structure is part of
the problem” (Morrison & Waltner-Toews, 2010, p. 27). This hints at the sort of “wicked
question” (Zimmerman, Lindberg, & Plsek, 1998, p. 271) we need to be asking. Perhaps it will
lead us away from the traditional machine metaphor that would have us fix the system by simply
finding a different way to assemble the parts. Instead, we need to view health care organizations
as complex, adaptive social systems and develop approaches that most accurately reflect what we
are learning about how organizations can deal more effectively with ever-changing
environments.
In the literature review in Chapter II, the interconnected concepts of self-organization and
emergence feature prominently. Greater attention is paid in Chapter II to both these concepts;
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thus, for the moment, it is sufficient to say that self-organization is the capacity of systems to
develop coherent patterns of behavior without being directed to do so from some external or
hierarchical force. Emergence refers to unpredicted novelty and surprise.
Complex adaptive systems (CASs) are made up of agents, like nurses and patients, that
learn and that relate to each other and the environment in nonlinear ways. A key result of
this pattern of interaction is self-organization. Complex adaptive systems organize
themselves in fairly stable patterns of relationship that are not governed by hierarchical
intent. Such a pattern could be how nursing assistants, nurses, and nurse managers
interact in a nursing home. Emergent properties are a second result of these interactions.
Emergent properties are characteristics of the system – like the well-being of patients or
infection rates – that cannot be completely understood by knowing the characteristics of
the systems parts. (Anderson & McDaniel as cited in Lindberg, Nash, & Lindberg, 2008,
pp. 74-75.)
Based on these definitions, several questions emerge. How do we recognize emergence when it
is happening? Can we only appreciate it retrospectively? Are there conditions that contribute to
or even shape the self-organization of a system? Is there a role for agency in the process or is it
simply spontaneous? Is CAS theory, which came to us initially from the physical sciences,
simply a metaphor, or is there any sort of empirical validation? Are attempts to validate aspects
of CAS incompatible with the concept itself? Is there a link between an organization’s capacity
to allow for self-organization and its actual performance? Does the nature self-organization
increase an organization’s resilience or capacity to absorb change? These questions have not
been adequately answered in the current literature and therefore formed the basis for this study.
Locating the Researcher
When I first read Gleick (1989), I struggled to understand the science of chaos theory and
complexity through the haze of my own arts-focused education; however, I began to pick up the
threads of something that electrified me. I saw the folly of the formal strategic planning
processes I had facilitated over the years and I saw the possibility of a whole new way of
thinking about how order emerges in human systems. By the time I had worked my way through
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Waldrop (1992), I was beginning to get the idea that “strange attractors” (p. 226) had a
significant role to play in reshaping organizations. Wheatley’s (1994) Leadership and the New
Science was a defining read for me. Some of my initial intuitions were being confirmed. I
stopped short when I read, “we need to be able to trust that something as simple as a clear core of
values and vision, kept in motion through continuous dialogue, can lead to order” (Wheatley,
1994, p. 174).
I have spent most of the last 15 years as an independent organization development
consultant. I provide leadership development, strategic planning, and change strategies primarily
to hospitals and other organizations in the Canadian health care setting. As I began to explore
the literature, I saw a new direction for the strategic planning engagements in which I was
involved and, of equal importance, I was beginning to develop a different way of understanding
the role of leadership in this context. Instead of developing increasingly detailed plans, leaders
need to be clearer and simpler by providing a few simple rules or guiding principles and giving
the system space to experience bounded instability (Kelly & Allison, 1998; Stacey, 1996) and
emergent change (Johnson, 2001; Lichtenstein & Plowman, 2009; Plowman et al., 2007). Then
and there, I decided I would make complexity science, as poorly as I understood it, the
differentiator of my consulting practice. I even adopted a stylized version of the three-winged
bird fractal that adorns the cover of Wheatley’s (1994) book as the logo for my business and I
began speaking about complex adaptive systems whenever and wherever I could. The concept
was new at the time, so my own limited knowledge did not appear to be an impediment. I found
health care was a sector in which the concepts seemed to find particular resonance and I was
actually recruited into the position of Vice President: Organization Development of Trillium
Health Centre in suburban Toronto, Canada, on the basis that I was somehow branded as the
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“chaos guy.” My first presentation to the board was largely framed by Craig Reynolds’ (as cited
in Waldrop, 1992) “boids” experiment (pp. 241-243). I served in this position for five years
before I went back to consulting.
As a consequence of my consulting practice, I wanted to place this study in the specific
context of Canadian hospitals. Hospitals have been described as the most complex organizations
in human history (Drucker, 1980; Glouberman & Zimmerman, 2002) and, in a previous paper
(Dickens, 2010a), I argued this is particularly true in the Canadian system where financial
incentives for different system members pull them apart structurally. For example, Ontario
hospitals are funded under a public system with incentives to manage patient volumes while
physicians, who have no formal accountability to the hospitals in which they work, are funded as
independent practitioners with the incentive to increase volumes in their particular specialization,
often to the detriment of the system as a whole. When one takes into account the nested systems
(ministries of health, local health authorities, etc.) within which a hospital must operate, the
complexity grows exponentially.
It is clear there are certain hospitals and certain hospital leaders in the Ontario system that
seem to thrive despite the system complexity, whereas there are others that consistently
underperform in terms of patient satisfaction, financial performance, and staff satisfaction. What
I wanted to understand and be able to demonstrate is the correlation between performance and
the factors that facilitate emergence based on CAS theory. As the investigator in this study, I
had a vested interest in the outcome. The results of this study could be significant in terms of my
capacity to engage in a new way with my clients. I chose a specific hospital in Toronto because I
designed and facilitated a program there called “The Foundations of Leadership” partially
framed by CAS theory. I have also been involved in different program and process interventions
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at the study site. Because participants in the study have been selected due to their involvement in
the leadership program, the participants know me and I believe that familiarity increased the
response rate; however, my history with the study site raises some issues to which I need to pay
careful attention. The study I undertook was primarily quantitative, but there was also a vital
qualitative element. I believe that the technical nature of the quantitative phase will limit my risk
of biasing my interpretation of the raw data and the survey sample size of 403 (with 162 usable
responses) was sufficient to eliminate bias. Having said that, I was particularly mindful of the
risk that my relationship may bias my interpretive efforts. The selection criteria for participants
also risked introducing bias, given the participants are either formal or emergent leaders within
the organization and may not constitute a true random sample. Despite this, I remained aware
that some of the language of the survey outweighed the risk of bias.
The focus groups also presented some risks. First, the participants knew me well and,
therefore, may have consciously or unconsciously biased their responses to support my work.
My experience with the participants in other contexts did not suggest that would be a factor.
There was also the risk that the power dynamics between the participants in the group might bias
their responses, but again, my experience with the groups in question has not demonstrated that
pattern of behavior. I was also aware of the risk of personal bias as the facilitator of the focus
groups, which is why they were taped and carefully transcribed; however, I felt that familiarity
with the study construct and results was vital to successfully linking the data with organizational
performance.
Rationale for Studying the Problem
Alaa (2009) suggested a set of intangible dynamics are at play in complex, adaptive human
systems: communication, meaning-making, and consciousness; constant dialogue that creates a
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desire to communicate and develops higher levels of trust; cooperative interaction that can be
achieved through participation, collaboration, and teamwork; the quality of interactions as a
function of diversity, density, and intensity; and individual motives and morale. Alaa also
proposed several tangible dynamics such as flexibility, simplicity, short-term orientation, smallscale change, and speed. There are tangible and intangible elements of infrastructure. The
intangible elements include management style, leadership, and work culture. The tangible
elements are organizational structure, degree of hierarchy, and the regulatory environment.
Finally, there are control mechanisms such as reflection and learning (intangible controls) as well
as feedback, continuous adjustment, and high-level rules (tangible controls). In her article, Alaa
used these factors to examine a specific organization. For me, Alaa’s work suggests the
possibility of an organizational assessment approach that help organizations better understand
where the key points of leverage might be if they are to increase their capacity for emergent
change, but such an approach has not yet been undertaken.
Alaa’s (2009) approach is not without its challenges; for example, there seems to be an
imbedded assumption that emergence is, by definition, good, but it must be argued that
emergence is neither inherently good nor bad. In my mind, Alaa’s work may point us in a useful
direction, but there is still significant work to be done in developing greater clarity regarding
specific factors and assumptions that drive them.
Lanham et al. (2009) extended the possibility of identifying factors that encourage
emergence in health care organizations (HCOs). They proposed that “quality is an emergent
property of HCOs” (p. 457) when seven specific factors are in evidence. These include: trust,
mindfulness, heedfulness, respectful interaction, diversity, social and task relatedness, and an
appropriate mix of rich and lean communication. These seven align conceptually with the
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intangible dynamics identified by Alaa (2009). The authors also made the point that these seven
characteristics “interact with reflection, learning and sensemaking (unraveling surprise events) to
influence the quality of care” (Lanham et al., 2009, p. 457). As I demonstrate in Chapter II,
although others allude to potential factors that contribute to emergence, there have been limited
attempts to formally articulate such factors and there has been very little work done to identify
organizational factors as differentiated from personal or relational factors which are the primary
focus of Alaa (2009) and the singular focus of Lanham et al. (2009) There have been no
published efforts to develop a formal assessment tool to measure the presence or absence of such
organizational factors. This study attempted to fill that gap with a proposed assessment approach
that would focus on organizational factors. In Chapter III, I demonstrate that there is a school of
phenomenological thinking that would argue that such an attempt would defy the very nature of
emergent change; however, as a scholar practitioner who puts the emphasis on enhanced practice
capacity, I would join the school that looks for more pragmatic applications of CAS theory, fully
recognizing that emergence is not “some kind of mysterious force that we can harness” (Stacey,
personal communication, 2010).
Given that my intention was to validate a survey that will allow organizations to assess
and perhaps then alter organizational factors, I focused on those. My hypothesis is that validated
instruments already exist that will allow for the accurate assessment of the personal and
relationship factors albeit based on different theoretical frameworks; however, none focus
explicitly on organizational factors. For the purposes of this study, I defined organizational
factors as those that are intentional and systemic structures, strategies and processes that increase
the likelihood of positive emergence.
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Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this two-step study was to (i) validate a summated scale of factors that
facilitate emergent, self-organization and then (ii) determine the implications of the presence or
absence of organizational factors on organizational performance and resilience in the face of
significant change. Ultimately, a deeper understanding of the relationship between emergent
change and organizational performance will enable formal leaders and organization development
practitioners to find key points of leverage if they want to enhance the capacity of their
organization to find innovative and novel solutions to the challenges that continuously emerge in
complex environments. To achieve this purpose I completed a Principal Component Analysis of
Likert-type items designed to measure nine organizational factors, based on the administration of
the survey at a Toronto-area hospital. These data were then shared with the executive team and
other leaders at the hospital in order to facilitate a dialogue about the potential correlation
between the presence, or absence, of the factors and the current organizational performance of
the hospital, as well as their assessment of the organization’s resilience.
Literature/Research Background
Chapter II provides context through a discussion of the complexity of health care in general
and then, specifically, hospitals. This particular study is located in the context of Canadian
hospitals. The focus begins with a background discussion of the development of complex
adaptive systems theory. The discussion traces the development of complexity theory from the
early chaos theorists in the fields of mathematics and physics through to the application of
complexity models to the study of social systems and organizations. As already discussed, two
key concepts in CAS theory are emergent change and self-organization so there is a full
description of these concepts as they lay the foundation for the study’s research question.
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It is important to note that, while emergent change provides the theoretical framework for
this study, the factors that are used to inform the survey at the center of the study came initially
from three sources: my own practice experience over 15 years; previous research on complexity
and health care (Dickens, 2010a) and a study of a specific case study that demonstrated emergent
self-organizing change (Dickens, 2010b); and a series of interviews with colleagues who were
able to discuss their own experience with emergent change. The specifics of each are detailed in
Chapter III. It is important to note that, while I use the term “factors” in this introduction, they
are technically only “constructs of interest” until they have been validated.
With these factors in mind, I then went back into the literature to discuss the different
schools of thought regarding the value in identifying specific, measurable factors that can
facilitate emergent change and make the case for not only identifying those factors but ultimately
going as far as developing a scale to measure their presence or absence. From there, the literature
review discussed each of the identified factors in sufficient detail to try and support the decision
to include them in the scale. Each factor could be a separate area of study, so the focus of the
review is on elements of that particular factor that contribute to emergent change, where
possible, the relevance to the health care system. The one factor that is given lengthier treatment
is the concept of “simple rules” because it is a distinct characteristic of self-organizing systems.
Several times, comments by early evaluators of the factors developed for this study have
suggested that some, if not all, of these factors are simply the characteristics of “well run
organizations.” This is a reasonable observation. What is exciting to me is that CAS theory may
provide the overarching theoretical framework to explain why some organizations thrive and
why others do not. It is this sort of theory of organizational performance that so often seems to
be missing in the literature.
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Research Questions
There are three research questions:
1. What valid components emerge from the Emergence Survey designed to measure the
constructs of interest in question?
2. What is the correlation between the presence, or absence, of these factors and
organizational performance and resilience?
3. Are the derived component scores significantly different across clinical/non-clinical and
manager/non-manager groups?
Methodology
Chapter III describes the research methodology for this study. There are eight primary
sections: (1) Design, (2) Literature Review on Survey Development, (3) Identification of the
Constructs of Interest, (4) Procedure, (5) Data Analysis, (6) Rotation, (7) Interpretation of the
Data, and (8) Limitations. The primary study design was exploratory factor analysis, using
Principal Component Analysis, of Likert-type items designed to cover the nine factors.
The Emergence Survey was developed in an online format, using Survey Monkey™. The
survey instrument consists of three parts: (1) an initial paragraph introducing the emergence
construct and giving instructions; (2) nine separate sets of items, each related to one of the
factors, with opportunities in each for additional comments; and (4) key demographic data
related to the participant’s gender, age, length of employment, role in the organization, education
level, and location of professional training. Principal Component Analysis was conducted for
each set of items. Procedures included identifying appropriate participants and getting Research
Ethics Board approval at the research site as well as an IRB approval at Antioch University to
administer the instrument, collecting the data, entering and cleaning data, using SPSS to
complete the data analysis runs, and interpreting the data. Once interpreted, the data were shared
with the executive team and other leaders at the hospital in order to facilitate a focus group
discussion. The intent of the focus group was to generate discussion about the implications of
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the data, specifically as it relates to key organizational performance measures. These
performance indicators will relate to questions of patient satisfaction and staff engagement,
organizational quality indicators, financial performance, and organizational resilience. Resilience
refers to the organization’s capacity to respond positively to both internal and externally driven
change.
Summary
The literature suggests that CAS theory has significant implications for organization
development and system design, particularly in extremely complex social systems such as
hospitals. This study will contribute to the practice application of CAS theory, providing a way
of identifying points of leverage while acknowledging the sensitivity of such systems to factors
that are not necessarily quantifiable. The factors that facilitate emergent change do not generate
a simplistic cause-and-effect solution and are not to be interpreted as simplistic solutions to
complex challenges but, just as the riverbanks shape the movement and flow of a river, these
factors can provide shape to emergent organizational change. Zimmerman (1999) has used child
rearing as a metaphor for complex, emergent change, which is apt in several ways. One that is
relevant here is that, as every parent likely knows, there are factors that contribute to the positive
emergence of that child such as good nutrition, consistency, education, and a loving
environment. While these factors certainly do not guarantee that the child will develop as the
parent might hope or even expect, they certainly are positive mitigating influences. In the same
way, the factors identified in this study will not ensure a high performance organization, but they
can increase the likelihood.
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Chapter II: Literature Review
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to first locate the study within a specific context, the
Ontario hospital system, in order to provide a rationale for the study design. I will then explore
the general concept of complexity theory and CAS theory as well as the concept of
organizational resilience before looking more deeply into each of the nine constructs of interest
that initially informed the survey. I again emphasize that the relationship between each of these
constructs of interest and CAS theory could be a study unto itself, but it is consistent with CAS
theory to see the constructs as an interdependent pattern of interaction, not as isolated elements.
Setting the Context: Health Care
As with any field or discipline, terminology is vital and can be confusing to those outside
the system. In this regard, health care presents its own share of challenges. The “system” is
described broadly in terms of four categories. Primary care principally occurs in a physician’s
office. It accounts for 75- 80% of the actual health care activity and is increasingly turning to
multiple care provider models that integrate physician care with advanced practice nursing as
well as a range of other health care professionals such as physiotherapy, occupational therapy,
and nutrition as care providers embrace a more holistic view of human health. Primary care also
includes nursing home or long-term, residential care. Secondary care occurs in a communitybased hospital and is generally taken to include a defined range of health care activity, including
emergency services, maternal/newborn, general surgery, medicine, and some level of intensive
and critical care. Tertiary care has historically been located in academic teaching hospitals and
includes advanced cardiac care, including bypass surgery, advanced neurosciences, etc.
Increasingly, as technologies advance and there is a desire for these services in a community
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setting, the distinctions between secondary and tertiary care have become blurred. Finally, there
is quaternary care, which includes such specialized services as heart transplantation and
extremely complex trauma care. In Canada, there are typically one or two tertiary care facilities
in a region as large as Greater Toronto, where there is a population of 6.5 million.
Our modern health care system evolved during the industrial age of the late 18th and
early 19th century. As a result, the health care system “imported” many industrial ways of
thinking and models that were built on linear processes meant to reflect the assembly line. In
addition, models of organizational hierarchy, characterized by well-defined reporting and
authority structures (Wiggins, as cited in Lindberg et al., 2008), not unlike the Catholic Church
and the military, which are, in fact, among the founding “parents” of our modern health care
system. The inevitable result was that the patient was seen as an assembly of parts, and the
repair or replacement of broken or defective parts could return the “vehicle” to working order.
Now, the challenge for health care leaders is to move away from the mechanistic
worldview that has served them for so long because the reality is that patients are people.
“Health is an emergent property that arises from the non-linear interdependent interaction of
each patient’s unique genetic, personal, social, and environmental factors, which affects health
directly and by influencing behavior” (Thygeson, Morrissey, & Ulstad, 2010, p. 1010). As we
begin to understand the implications of emotional intelligence (Boyatzis & McKee, 2005;
Goleman, 1995) in terms of how it may dictate human responses, we also begin to understand
that people are themselves not necessarily rational and that rational structures and approaches
may actually get in their own way. “Nurses in practice have long known that linear thinking
does not reflect the intricate web of interactions embedded in patient care” (Gambino, as cited in
Lindberg et al., 2008, p. 52). These webs of interaction begin with the various systems of a
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patient’s body (cardiac, neurological, limbic, gastric, etc.) and extend out to the web of
relationships between the care providers at the bedside, and from there to the web of social
support structures beyond the places where health care is provided. The complexity of patient
care, especially with the ever-increasing evidence of complex comorbidities, is that it is
impossible for any one person, whether the nurse or the physician, to control the processes and
outcomes of care for any of their patients. It is also impossible to predict with any degree of
certainty what the particular course of treatment may be for all but the most technical of healthrelated issues.
While traditional conceptions of interventions emphasize careful construction and crafting,
complex adaptive systems theory begs that we broaden our conception of interventions
beyond core actions and outcomes. We must consider dynamic patterns, interrelated
processes and relationships, and be open to unintended as well as unpredicted
consequences. (Jordan et al., 2009, p. 5)
As a consequence, “when health care organizations are seen as complex, adaptive systems (CAS)
it becomes clear that sense making and learning play a critical role in intervention success”
(Jordan et al., 2009, p. 7). In this context, sensemaking is described as “a diagnostic process
directed at constructing plausible interpretations of ambiguous cues that are sufficient to sustain
action” (Jordan et al., 2009, p. 7). This would seem to clearly point to a very different way of
looking at and thinking about health care systems, one that is less reliant on structure and formal
rules and protocols and toward one that acknowledges and, indeed, embraces, the emergent
nature of the health care process.
One thing that is emerging is an increased emphasis on partnerships, often described in
terms of interprofessional collaborative care models that emphasize “the importance of
relationships where members of the partnership are seeking mutual outcomes” (Wiggins, as cited
in Lindberg et al., 2008, p. 14). Vitally, these partnerships extend beyond the clinical care
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providers to include the patient and the family as well as others within the patient’s social and
economic framework. Partnership is key to achieving change at what is referred to as the clinical
microsystem: the place where patient, family and the full range of care providers meet. In the
clinical microsystem: information is continually being measure and integrated; the care team is
interdependent, has the support of the larger system, and has a constancy of purpose; is a
resource to the larger community; and invests in improvement and continuous learning in a way
that is aligned to the full scope of practice (Mohr & Batalden, 2002). The essential elements of
the microsystem include “(a) a core team of health professionals; (b) the defined population they
care for; (c) an information environment to support the work of caregivers and patients; and (d)
support staff, equipment, and a work environment” (Mohr & Batalden, 2002, p. 46); however,
the support for relationships goes beyond the formal structures of the microsystem to informal
approaches such as daily huddles in which information is exchanged and learning opportunities
are shared across disciplines, departments, and even organizations.
Much of the literature on effective, high quality care puts a significant emphasis on
importance of relationship. “Multiple and various relationships are key to effective selforganization” (Piven et al., 2006, p. 296). CAS theory also recognizes the centrality of
interdependence and connectivity (Jordan et al., 2009). The relationships among members
become key levers of performance (Lanham et al., 2009). Ruth Anderson and her colleagues
have identified three critical “system parameters” that facilitate the quality of relationships: good
connections among members of the care team, appropriate information flow, and cognitive
diversity (Anderson, Corazzini, & McDaniel, 2004; Anderson, Issel, & McDaniel, Jr., 2003;
Anderson et al., 2005; Piven et al., 2006). “When appropriate information flow and sufficient
cognitive diversity are present, the stage is set for effective self-organization and innovation”
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(Anderson et al., 2005, p. 174). In this context, cognitive diversity means that there is
intentionality about bringing together people who see things very differently meaning, “the
system will have more ‘new’ information available to it” (Anderson et al., 2005, p. 104). These
characteristics begin to reveal some of the key factors that facilitate emergence, which are the
basis of this study particularly when it comes to the importance of collaborative work structures
that seek out opportunities to enhance connections and ensure cognitive diversity and access to
accurate, timely data that supports appropriate information flow.
The Specific Context for This Study: The Ontario Hospital System
In order to place the theoretical discussion of complexity theory within the specific
Canadian hospital context I identified in Chapter I, Introduction, it is necessary to have an
overview of the Ontario health care system. This will enable a reader from outside the system to
have a better understanding of the complexity of this particular system.
In Canada, provincial governments are constitutionally responsible for the delivery of
health care based on the Canada Health Act. Each province determines how it will structure the
delivery mechanisms and there have been several attempts at regional health authorities. Ontario
created Local Health Integration Networks (LHINs) to coordinate and integrate services
regionally while maintaining the authority of hospital boards and CEOs (Brown, Alikhan, &
Seeman, 2006).
LHINs get their authority to manage their local health systems through the Local Health
System Integration Act, 2006. The legislation places significant decision-making power at
the community level and focuses the local health system on the community’s needs. April
1, 2008, marked the first full year of the LHINs’ authority in both funding a wide range of
health service providers as well as managing the majority of service agreements with them.
The government continues to provide stewardship of Ontario’s health system, setting
direction, strategic policy and system standards and delivering provincial programs and
services. (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2006, para. 4)
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Unlike health authorities in other provinces, the LHINs do not provide direct clinical services
and, while they fund community-based services, the ultimate authority over hospital funding
remains with the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MoHLTC). Each of Canada’s
provinces has legislation governing the administration of a single-payer system known as
Medicare for all “medically necessary” services. In order to qualify for federal monies to
subsidize the delivery of such services, public insurance plans must abide by the five criteria of
the Canada Health Act: public administration, portability (i.e., across provincial boundaries),
universality, comprehensiveness, and accessibility. In addition to funding hospitals, the province
of Ontario, like other provinces, sets the rates of remuneration for physicians through fee
schedules negotiated between the Ontario Medical Association and the Ontario Health Insurance
Program. Individuals and families do not currently pay anything toward the medical health
services that fall within the payment plan. As a consequence, health care consumes 46% of the
provincial budget and there is tremendous pressure to control the cost curve (Brown et al., 2006).
In addition, recent legislation has been introduced in the form of the Excellent Care for All Act
that requires formal structures in each hospital to ensure the quality of care (MoHLTC, 2010).
As a consequence, hospitals face the dual pressures of cost containment and improved quality.
In the Ontario health care system, tension exists as the responsibility for establishing
system strategies and allocating funds rests with the provincial government, while determining
organizational strategies rests with the hospitals. It falls on hospital managers to try to predict
how government regulations and planning, as well as the responses of other hospitals, could
potentially circumscribe management’s ability to develop and implement a coherent strategic
plan (Brown, Alikhan, & Sandoval, 2005). For example, when media and public pressure builds
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up about a specific issue such as extended wait times in emergency departments, the political
response is to direct funds to “solve the problem.”
Glouberman and Mintzberg (2001) provided a cogent explanation of the inherent tensions
within the hospital system based on their “four worlds” view.
Some people manage primarily down, directly into the clinical operations—that is, focused
on the treatment of patients. Others manage up, toward those who control and/or fund the
institution. Moreover, some management is practiced in, to units and people under clear
control of the institution, while other management is practiced out, to those involved with
the institution but technically independent of its formal authority. Put these together and
you end up with four quadrants of activity in the hospital—the four worlds to which we
have referred. (p. 59)
These four “worlds” emerge in a matrix based on: the trustees, representing the community, who
manage up and out; managers, who must manage up and in; nurses who provide care and
manage in and down; and physicians focused on cure, who manage out and down (Glouberman
& Mintzberg, 2001, p. 60). This matrix is reflected at a societal level as well as with elected
officials and advocacy groups managing up and out; ministry and LHIN officials who manage up
and in; community and primary care practitioners, who manage in and down; and acute care
hospitals who manage down and out (Glouberman & Mintzberg, 2001, p. 61). The authors’
contention is that:
To the extent that these four remain as disconnected worlds, in the hospital as well as
society at large, the system rightly called health care and disease cure will continue to
spiral out of control. Put differently, no matter how necessary these divisions of labor may
be, in our view it is the associated division of organization and of attitude, or mindset, that
renders the system unmanageable. (p. 61)
These four quadrants help to explain the unique tensions and complexities of the Canadian health
care system. Attempts have been made over the years to ease these tensions, but the efforts have
largely been various generally unsuccessful forms of re-engineering. The hypothesis
underpinning the current study is that a mechanistic, redesign-oriented approach has
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demonstrated limited efficacy. What this study, as with others (Glouberman & Mintzberg, 2001;
Glouberman & Zimmerman, 2002; Zimmerman, 1999, 2010; Zimmerman et al., 1998) suggests
is a different way of seeing and interacting with the system, a way of seeing that is grounded in
complexity science and CAS theory. Unlike others, however, this study goes further to suggest
specific structural and process interventions that could, in fact, draw the parts of the system
toward the same attractors or sense of purpose.
Introduction to Complexity Science
The purpose of this section is to provide an orientation to complexity theory. Waldrop
(1992) presented an extremely comprehensive overview of the history of complexity theory.
Others, such as Gleick (1989), Hall (1991), and Kauffman (1995), offered much more detailed
explanations of the biology, mathematics, and physics behind complexity theory, respectively. I
will begin this section with a brief historical review of the science in order to better understand
the defining attributes of a CAS. In this pursuit, I have focused on three key specific theorists
and their constructs because they metaphorically suggest ways in which we might reframe our
thinking about social systems. Reframing the science of complexity into organizational theory is
challenging since “much of the work on complexity and the development of complexity theories
has been undertaken in the context of the natural sciences and there has been relatively little
work on developing or applying such theories in the social science” (Alaa, 2009, p. 23);
however, it has been argued that “on metaphoric and epistemological grounds that these
principles that describe complex emergent wholes can be applied to social and organizational
life” (Reason & Goodwin, 1999, p. 1).
The roots of complexity theory lie in the work begun by Einstein in the early part of the
20th century when the development of quantum physics pushed the science community to go

25
beyond its traditional emphasis on reductionism (Capra, 1982). Quantum theory determined that
particles could only be understood in terms of their movements and the resulting dynamics that
occur as molecules interact. Capra, ever the poet-scientist, expressed this in these terms: “As we
penetrate into matter, nature does not allow us any isolated basic building blocks, but rather
appears as a complicated web of relations between the various parts of a unified whole” (Capra,
1982, p. 81). While the focus is clearly on the science of matter, there is a metaphoric resonance
with the world of organizational behavior. For 100 years, organizational theory has borrowed
from classical Newtonian physics and tried to “manage” the organization by breaking it into
separate, definable parts and then focusing on the parts (Morgan, 1997; Olson & Eoyang, 2001;
Wheatley, 1994). Just as quantum physics pointed the natural sciences toward a radically new
way of thinking, so complex adaptive systems theory points social science in a related direction.
Einstein suggested that the real lessons of science might be pointing us in a very different
direction. Arguably, an organization “is more than the sum of its pens, paper, real estate and
personnel” (Coveney & Highfield, 1995, p. 330). This implies that, in seeking to understand
organizational dynamics, we need to shift our focus from individuals and departments to the
interaction among all the various elements of an organization.
Complex, adaptive systems are composed of a diversity of agents that interact with each
other, mutually affect each other, and in so doing generate novel behavior for the system as
a whole. If complexity scientists are right in arguing that complex adaptive systems of all
kinds – in the natural world and in the world of business – share fundamental properties
and processes, then the science offers something that most management theories do not.
The argument here is that most management theories are really not theories at all, but
rather techniques for managing in a certain way. (Regine & Lewin, 2000, pp. 6-7)
The interaction of the agents to which Regine and Lewin (2000) alluded may be of far more
interest to the organizational change practitioner than the individual agents themselves.
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A second major contributor to complexity science was Nobel Prize-winning physicist
Ilya Prigogine, who demonstrated that the second law of thermodynamics suggesting inevitable
entropy was countered by a second, equally universal principle of self-organization. When
atoms and molecules receive enough energy from outside the system, the tendency to degrade is
partially reversed and, indeed, a new pattern of complex structures will spontaneously organize
(Capra, 1996; Waldrop, 1992). Prigogine identified four specific mechanisms for selforganization: spontaneous fluctuations that initiate new order; positive feedback loops that
amplify and reinforce these fluctuations; coordinating mechanisms that stabilize the emerging
order; and recombination of existing resources that help construct the new order (Chiles, Meyer,
& Hench, 2004, p. 500). When we think about Prigogine’s four mechanisms in the context of
social systems, we see the potential for situations in which organizational members or lower
level participants interact, exchange information, and act without coordination from a central
decider, resulting in unintended changes at higher levels within and beyond the organization
(Lichtenstein & Plowman, 2009). This suggests that, in thinking about developing a culture in
which self-organization can occur, “the important social construction factors are communication,
collaboration, interaction, trust and morale” (Alaa, 2009, p. 24). Thus, when organizations
choose responses that are consistent with the characteristics of complex adaptive systems,
They choose to absorb the variety and complexity of the environment into the organization.
This means they hold “multiple and sometimes conflicting representations of
environmental variety, retaining in their behavioral repertoire a range of responses, each of
which operates at a lower level of specificity” (Boisot & Child, 238). Such organizations
would likely recognize multiple and emerging goals inside organizations and emphasize
the importance of working out conflict that is created in part by the pursuit of multiple
goals. Connections, especially rich connections, transmit information and enable meaning
creation among subunits, thus providing the systems with increased capacity to learn.
(Ashmos, Duchon, & McDaniel, 2000, pp. 578-579)
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Building on Prigogine’s work on non-equilibrium thermodynamics and the principle of selforganization, others noticed the unique characteristic of self-organization identified by
Lichtenstein and Plowman (2009) as it relates to organizational change: no external designer or
manipulation from a central source of control directs these patterns (Olson & Eoyang, 2001;
Plowman et al., 2007; Stacey, 1996).
This principle is aptly demonstrated in the curious behavior of slime mold (Dictyostelium
discoideum) that is described in Johnson (2001). Slime mold has long been noted for its ability to
move across the soil but in 1968 Evelyn Keller and Lee Segel (as cited in Johnson, 2001, pp. 1214) demonstrated that slime mold displays an incredible capacity for self-organization. Slime
mold spends much of its life as thousands of distinct single-celled units, each moving separately
from its comrades; however, under the right conditions, those myriad cells will coalesce into a
single, larger, organism that then is able to move across the ground more quickly, consuming
leaves and rotting wood as it goes. When the environment is less hospitable, the slime mold acts
as a single organism; when the weather turns cooler and the mold enjoys a larger food supply,
the “it” once again becomes a “they.” What had eluded scientists for centuries was an
explanation of the “how.” Until Keller and Segel’s work, the conventional belief of the scientific
community had been that slime mold swarms formed at the command of pacemaker cells that
ordered the other cells to begin aggregating. This seemed like a perfectly reasonable explanation
because “we’re naturally predisposed to think in terms of pacemakers whether we are talking
about fungi, political systems, or organizations” (Johnson, 2001, p. 14). The problem with the
theory, however, was that no one could ever find the pacemaker cells. Drawing on the work of
Alan Turing, Keller and Segel went in a radically different direction. In his work on
photogenesis, Turing had sketched out a model wherein simple agents following simple rules
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could generate amazingly complex structures (as cited in Johnson, 2001). The reality is that each
cell in the slime mold sends out signals based on their assessment of the local conditions they are
experiencing and these signals are picked up by other nearby cells and then by larger cell
clusters, causing the overall aggregation. This phenomenon is of particular interest to someone
trying to understand the nature of change in a living system because it suggests two important
concepts: the lack of central control or authority in a self-organizing system and the bottoms-up
organization that can occur when individual agents within the system provide information on
their localized conditions which is then amplified through feedback loops with other members of
the system. While the slime mold is clearly a deterministic system in which the individual cells
lack the conscious ability to choose, it does provide a metaphoric frame of reference for the
emergence of coherent behavior in a large group with a common need.
A third element of our understanding of what he termed chaos theory surfaced in the
work of Edward Lorenz, a meteorologist at MIT who demonstrated the impact on the overall
result of changing only a few decimals in weather modeling. His discovery was characterized by
the notion that small changes in the initial characteristics of an active system can dramatically
affect the long-term behavior of the system: what is often referred to as the “butterfly effect.”
This is a term credited to meteorologist Edward Lorenz who presented a paper in 1972 entitled,
“Does the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set off a Tornado in Texas.” By Lorenz’ own
account, however, the term has a “somewhat cloudy history” (Lorenz, 1993, p. 14), but has
nevertheless entered into the popular language of chaos theory, with both the butterfly and the
tornado situated in a wide range of locations. Put another way, “for the system to catch fire…
some of the molecules must act as catalysts” (Kauffman, 1995, p. 63). The key is that it is not a
specific agent or molecule that must act—just some of them, somewhere. This is significant in

29
the context of organizational change in that it suggests that such change does not have to rely on
formal leadership for its initiation. Rather, catalysts can use specific expertise to “increase the
rate of change within a specific business or team context” (Lichtenstein & Plowman, 2009,
p. 618). In one way, it liberates both formal and informal leaders within the organization from
the idea that change must start at the top. Instead, leaders have learned that the important issue is
not what part of the organization starts the self-organizing process, but that the process is
“engaged somewhere [emphasis added] within the existing structure” (Connor, 1998, p. 57).
This begins to open up the discussion of agency within the system, which will be explored in
greater detail in the section on distributed leadership.
Schools of Thought in the Current Literature
Capra (1982) identifies two schools of thought related to systems theory within the early
scientific community. John Von Neumann developed a sophisticated but mechanistic theory
focused on input and output. The other school, led by Norbert Wiener, started from the concept
of self-organization and seeing organizations as living systems. As Marion and Uhl-Bien (2007)
pointed out,
The science is further complicated by the fact that there are two schools of thought among
complexity theorists on how emergence occurs: the American school centered in the Santa
Fe Institute and the European school centered around the work of Nobel Prize winning
physicist Ilya Prigogine. The American school is more oriented to the internal, interactive
dynamics of complex networks, and is particularly applicable to ecology or to economics.
The European school focuses on the build up of tension and resultant destabilization of a
system, which eventually dissipates the tension with nonlinear, unpredictable phase
transitions. (p. 294)
Both of these schools of thought on emergence have relevance to the study of organizational
change. We need to understand the internal dynamics of all the interacting elements of the
system but also need to understand the internal and external pressures that can lead to
unexpected change. For example, when the Ministry of Health and Long-term Care (MoHLTC)
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responds to public and media pressure by announcing new funding aimed at reducing emergency
room wait-times it can have a significant destabilizing effect on a whole hospital as funds are
drawn from other resources to the center of the perceived “problem.” This can also have a
disruptive influence on other systems, such as ambulance services, as the system itself is open
and interacts with the other systems within which it is interconnected.
Richardson and Cilliers (2001) expanded on the different schools by identifying “at least
three themes, or communities, that characterize the research effort directed to the investigation of
complex systems: a hard one, a soft one, and something in between. The first is strongly allied
with the quest for a theory of everything (TOE) in physics, i.e., an acontextual explanation for
the existence of everything” (p. 5). In reference to what they call the “hard” school, Richardson
and Cilliers suggested that this school of thought seems to be based on a “seductive syllogism:
Premise 1: There are simple sets of mathematical rules that when followed by a computer give
rise to extremely complicated patterns; Premise 2: The world also contains many complicated
patterns; Conclusion: Simple rules underlie many complicated phenomena in the world, and
with the help of powerful computers, scientists can root these rules out” (p. 6). A further
discussion of the concept of simple rules appears later in this study but Richardson (2008) is not
alone in his perception that this can lead to a simplistic or what he later calls a new reductionist
school of thought in terms of how organizational change actually occurs. Richardson (2008)
expanded on his ideas of different schools of thought as they relate to organizational theory.
The three schools/themes/divisions that I identify and discuss are: the neo-reductionist
school which seeks to uncover the general principles of complexity; the metaphoric school
which suggests that complexity has not only been seen as a possible theory of
organizations but also as powerful metaphoric tool; and the critical pluralist school which
focuses more on what we cannot explain, rather than what can be explained – it is
concerned with limits, and how we take those limits into account when trying to
understand the world around us. As such, it leads to a particular attitude towards models,
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rather than privileging one sort of model over all others. The keywords of this school might
be pluralism, open-mindedness, and humility. (p. 21)
Capra’s distinction discussed earlier seems to have taken organizational theorists in two
directions, with some looking for more mechanistic or simplistic approaches to leverage
complexity theory. This might include practitioners such as Brown and Eisenhardt (1998),
Connor (1998), and Kelly and Allison (1998), all of whom wanted to provide specific
mechanisms for “harnessing complexity” (Kelly & Allison’s term). These approaches seem to
defy one of the fundamental premises of the theory: emergence. That being said, “neoreductionism is the easiest as it simply adds a new collection of analytical tools to the decisionmaker’s tool set” (Richardson, 2008, p. 21). Stacey (2010) directly challenged this view on the
basis that the neo-reductionists try to use complexity language to make their ideas more
appealing, but he rejected the idea that human behavior can be reduced to a few simple rules
(p. 310) despite the fact that at one time he highlighted this characteristic of CAS (Stacey, 1996).
Richardson and Cilliers (2001) frame it very simply when they suggest that “we cannot have
descriptions of complex systems that are simpler than the systems themselves” (p. 12).
This exposes one of the more challenging paradoxes of complexity science. A “cardinal
rule of theory building is to provide a model that simplifies the phenomena and thus provide a
window into their understanding” (Wergin, private correspondence, 2011). While this may be
true in simple and even complicated systems, it seems to lose its efficacy in truly dynamic
complex systems. This is the heart of the challenge that Stacey (2003) identifies. Richardson
clearly favored what he called the critical-pluralist school, as it does not try to provide tools so
much as “it leads to a particular attitude toward models, rather than privileging one sort of model
over others” (Richardson, 2008, p. 21). I believe that my study, while it supports the concept of
specific factors that facilitate emergent change, does so from a perspective that suggests we can
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predict the outcomes of that self-organization. This is an approach that is supported by
organizational theorists at the other end of the philosophical spectrum such as Olson and Eoyang
(2001), Oshry (1995), Richardson (2008), Richardson and Cilliers (2001), Stacey (2003),
Westley, Patton, and Zimmerman (2007), Wheatley (2005), and even Morgan (1997) with his
work on organizational metaphors. This group is trying to help us simply “see” organizations in
a very different way: one that is framed by complexity theory. They do not try to prescribe so
much as guide organizational leaders and theorists into a new way of engaging with their
organizations and in so doing, to develop a whole new set of metaphors to describe the systems
in which they work.
Stacey (2010) is generally very critical of most schools of thought as they relate to the
application of complexity science to social systems. He sees three schools of thought: the
scientific, which seeks to directly apply the concepts developed by the natural complexity
scientists, using modeling techniques; the metaphoric, which seeks to draw on the images of
complexity to make claims about the nature of organizations; and the analogical, which “seeks to
develop abstract insights into the implications and consequences of micro interaction between
large numbers of agents” (Stacey, 2010, p. 73). Stacey’s (2010) primary criticism is that all of
these schools of thought rely on a formative causal framework that is rationalistic and has as an
underlying ideology a desire to increase control and predictability. Stacey (2010) argues that
instead of talking about complex, adaptive systems, we need to talk about complex response
processes.
Since humans do not always adapt to, or fit in, with each other, it is useful to think of
human relating not as adaptive but as responsive and not as a system but as a temporal
process. I therefore claim that the human analogues for complex adaptive systems are
complex response processes of relating in organizations. What is to be gained by drawing
analogies between complex adaptive systems and human interactions is a clearer
understanding of self-organization and emergence and a strong argument that coherent,
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population-wide patterns can emerge from many, many local interactions. Other insights
of importance have to do with unpredictability, the importance of diversity, and conflicting
constraints and the paradoxical dynamics in which novelty can occur. (p. 134)
While I appreciate Stacey’s perspective, it seems to be based on a rather narrow definition of the
concept of adaptation, limiting it to that adaptive behavior which results in “fitting it” to an
existing structure or process and what is implied, in my view, is some sort of sublimation or
submission to a dominant worldview or organizational culture. In my experience, all adaption
results in submission and a broader definition of the term can include simply adjusting to or
acknowledging the presence of other influences and perspectives. From a pragmatic perspective,
health care is consistently described in the literature in terms of a system, as suggested by
McDaniel and colleagues, who studied primary care systems at length and argued that they
“chose a CAS perspective, as opposed to a complex responsive processes perspective, because
we believe a CAS (systems) perspective provides a more suitable structure for studying
relationships in health care organizations” (Lanham et al., 2009, p. 487). For me, it is an
unhelpful irritant to try and shift that terminology. This study aligns with McDaniel’s view,
arguing that we are, in reality, dealing with a system, nested within systems, that has as its
primary point of focus the human system and all its complex microsystems. As a consequence,
the system of systems has to constantly adapt to meet the changes in the health status of the
people it serves. When a patient’s conditions shifts from symptomatic to chronic, both the
patient and the system have to shift into new ways of thinking and engaging in health service
delivery. Should the condition of the patient deteriorate, then the concept of palliative care
requires a whole new set of adaptive responses.
Stacey does make a vital point, however, in examining the role of formal leadership.
“Instead of thinking about the manager or leaders as the analogue to the [computer] programmer,
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I would like to consider the consequence of the manager/leader participating in the complex
response processes of interacting with others” (Stacey, 2010, p. 134). In practice terms, two
organizations in which I have been directly involved, trying to use CAS as a way of thinking
about organizations, the role of the CEO as a participant rather than programmer was evident. In
one, the site for my study, there has been significant success in utilizing the concept of “positive
deviance” (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004) to deal with in-hospital infections. As part of the
process, the external facilitators engaged in a large-scale social mapping exercise. To their
surprise, the CEO was at the very center of the map, suggesting a high level of informal
connections. This aligns with one of the constructs of interest in this study: CEO and executive
team engagement.
Making the Shift to New Metaphors
One thing that is clear from the literature is that the concept of metaphor is key to any
discussion of complexity theory. As discussed in Chapter I, the metaphor of the machine has
dominated managerial science for the past 100 years. Complexity theory begins to suggest that if
we are going to change the way we think about organizations we need to start with rethinking the
frame (Bolman & Deal, 2003) or underlying metaphors that shape our thinking.
A recent article in a popular magazine argues that we need to distinguish complexity
researchers who use the theory from those who use the metaphor. What that statement
misses is that all theory is metaphor, as Gareth Morgan argues. It is metaphor that shapes
our logic and perspective. Metaphor influences the questions we ask and hence the answers
we find. A powerful metaphor becomes deeply rooted in our ways of understanding, and it
is often implicit rather than explicit. In biological terms, a metaphor is the schema by
which we make sense of our situation. (Zimmerman et al., 1998, pp. 17-18)
I think it is reasonable to accept the view that metaphors are an important tool in thinking about
organizations and systems because of the shift in perspective that they can engender. Given that
position, Eoyang (2010) raised an important point when she makes the distinction between
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descriptive and explanatory metaphors. According to Eoyang, descriptive metaphors inform
shared narrative and suggest reasonable options. They allow us to develop a shared story of
what might be happening. If, for example, a group of us enters into a crowded room and we each
embrace the metaphor that the room is a sardine can, we may all decide that a reasonable strategy
would be to leave. An explanatory metaphor invites qualitative analysis and supports
interpretive theory building, testing, and adaptive action. Neo-reductionists would seem to favor
the explanatory approach and accept that organizations are de facto complex adaptive systems.
For example, Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) simply assumed that molecules, birds, people, and
companies can all be described by the same model simply because they are made up of multiple
interacting agents (p. 18). Kelly and Allison (1998) suggested rather simplistically that “your
business comprises self-organizing systems whether you know it or like it” (p. 4). Lichtenstein
(2000b) suggested that “the first source [of response to the problem of management’s role in
directing organizations through transformational change] is a set of metaphors from non-linear
dynamic systems theory that helps explain the dynamics of new and small organizations
undergoing major changes” (p. 128), assuming that the lessons from the science of complexity
can be drawn directly into organizational strategy with no mitigating filters. If we see metaphors
as descriptive, to use Eoyang’s term, we use the metaphor to “see” the complexity that seems to
be inherent in socio-technical organizations (Richardson, 2008). This approach does not then
immediately jump to the conclusion that the lessons of complexity science are directly
applicable, with no critical evaluation of their efficacy. As Richardson (2008) said, “Metaphors
are being imported left and right with very little attention being paid as to the legitimacy of such
importations” (p. 20).
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Complexity theory does, however, suggest that if we are to continue to draw from science
to produce the metaphors that enable us to create and lead organizations, we must begin to
express very different language. Many of the neo-reductionists discussed earlier simply transfer
the metaphor directly into organizational theory. Alternatively, a more nuanced question might
be “is the metaphor of a complex, adaptive system a more compelling guide to thinking about…
business, society and government?” (Ackoff, 1999, p. 30). In other words, does the metaphor
shift our ways of seeing and being?
One of the most frequently used metaphors employed to describe a CAS is that of an
organic entity: something that is alive and constantly adapting. As Capra (1996) asked, “Is there
a common pattern of organization that can be identified with all living systems?” (p. 82). While
this may be true of biological systems, and Capra says that this is indeed the case, is it too big a
leap to assume that an organization, a hospital for example, is directly analogous to a garden?
Marion and Uhl-Bien (2001), two thought leaders in the area of complexity and leadership did
not think so. “Complexity theory moves away from linear, mechanistic views of the world,
where simple cause-and-effect solutions are sought to explain physical and social phenomena, to
a perspective of the world as nonlinear and organic, characterized by uncertainty and
unpredictability” (pp. 389-390). Alaa (2009) would seem to have gone in the same direction
when she suggested, “complex adaptive systems [theory] in management contexts marks a
fundamental paradigm shift from a mechanistic perception of an organization toward a selforganizing, autonomous understanding” (p. 21). It would seem that this explanatory use of
metaphor can be helpful, but within limits when applied to organizations. It also aligns with
Richardson’s (2008) view of the metaphoric school but, as he pointed out, “[the metaphoric
school] represents the greatest source of creativity of the three schools classified here. But as we
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well know, creativity alone is not sufficient for the design and implementation of successful
managerial interventions” (p. 20). This suggests that we need to approach the organic metaphor,
or any other metaphor for that matter, with a sense of inquiry tempered by reasoned skepticism
that allows us to accept its limitations.
Stacey (2010) argued that the dominant discourse continues to be very mechanistic in
which it is assumed “that small groups of powerful executives are able to choose the ‘direction’
their organization will move in, realize a ‘vision’ for it, create the conditions in which its
members will be innovative and entrepreneurial, and select the ‘structures’ and ‘conditions,’
which will enable them to be in control and so ensure success” (p. 1). This discourse is framed
by what he called “causalities of uncertainty” (p. 67). The realities of everyday organizational
life reveal the presence of causalities of uncertainty in which there is movement toward a future
that is perpetually constructed by the movement itself as continuity and transformation, the
known and the unknown, all at the same time. This movement occurs in order to express
continuity and transformation of individual and collective identity. The process of
movement/cause is local interactions forming and being formed by population-wide patterns.
The nature of variation and change reveals diverse micro interactions and escalation of small
changes and both freedom and constraint arise in diversity of micro interactions under
conflicting constraints (Stacey, 2010, p. 67). This is the essence of emergent change.
As Morgan (1997) pointed out, when metaphors are taken to an extreme the insights they
provide can have severe limitations. “Any given metaphor can be incredibly persuasive, but it
can also be blinding and block our ability to gain an overall view” (p. 347). We likely use
metaphors more frequently then we realize, and often without being conscious of the process.
Because they structure our thoughts and actions, we have a difficult time seeing any aspects of
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reality that do not fit those metaphors. This study is consciously framed by an organic metaphor
but tries not to be blinded by its limitations.
Organizational Ecocycles and Resilience
Several attempts have been made to expand on an organic metaphor as a way of
developing new, potentially useful ways of meeting the challenge of organizational change. This
is particularly true in terms of the resilience and agility needed to meet the challenges of everincreasing levels of residual uncertainty (Courtney, 2001). I believe that one of the more useful
applications of an organic metaphor lies in the study of organizational ecosystems.
The sudden collapse of large, mature, seemingly impregnable organizations and even
countries has been a feature of the political and economic landscape for the last thirty years.
While events such as the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, the near-collapse of the big three
U.S. automakers, and the reversal in fortunes of organizations as large as IBM and Microsoft
seem to catch us by surprise, they may be better understood when examined through their
metaphoric similarity to mature ecosystems. One conceptual framework that should be useful in
making sense of these unexpected shifts is that of a life cycle (Kimberley & Miles, 1980; Quinn
& Cameron, 1983). “The life cycle concept, whether applied to a product, a process, an
organization or an industry has always had enormous intuitive appeal” (Hurst & Zimmerman,
1994, p. 339). Complex systems do seem to go through an evolutionary S-curve from birth
through growth to maturity and decline. The major problem, in the view of Hurst and
Zimmerman (1994), is that “the life cycle is not completely systemic. That is, when applied to
organizations, it has usually been based on the life cycle of a single, reified organization without
taking into account either internal processes or external interactions” (p. 340). Taleb (2007)
argued that these “black swans” occurred because conventional management thinking, such as
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the life cycle, are “inapplicable to our modern, complex, and increasingly recursive
environment” (p. xxi). By recursive, he means an environment characterized by an “increasing
number of feedback loops, causing events to be the cause of more events” (p. xxii). Rather than
thinking in terms of an S-curve, or a series of S-curves, Holling (1987) envisaged an ecocycle
that differs from the life cycle via the addition of a “back loop” that links with the original Scurve to form an endless loop that has the potential to be far more resilient.
Resilience seems to be a key factor in healthy, adaptive systems (Sutcliffe & Vogus,
2003). Resilience is the capacity to “absorb large amounts of disruptive change without a
significant drop in quality or productivity” (Connor, 1998, p. 67). While Connor (1998) may be
resorting to metaphoric hyperbole, others have been more circumspect. Resilience has been
described as the capacity to “experience massive change and yet still maintain the integrity of the
original” (Westley et al., 2007, p. 65). In biological terms, this is referred to as autopoiesis, or
“the characteristic of living systems to continuously renew themselves and to regulate the
process in such a way that the integrity of their structure is maintained” (Jantsch, 1980, p. 7).
Resilience is not about balancing change and stability. It is not about reaching an equilibrium
state. Rather, it is about “how massive change and stability paradoxically work together”
(Westley et al., 2007, p. 65). The Resilience Alliance makes the link to emergent change explicit
when they suggest that resilience has three characteristics: (1) the high level of change the
system can undergo and still retain the same controls on function and structure, (2) the degree to
which the system is capable of self-organization, and (3) the ability to build the capacity for
learning and adaptation (http://www.resalliance.org).
In his work on natural ecosystems, particularly forests, Holling (1987) argued that
“theories of evolution, whether biological or social, are not predictive ones—they are
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retrospective and historical” (p. 145). He went on to suggest that an evolutionary approach “can
investigate the conditions for organizational evolution and can attempt to define designs that are
adaptive” (p. 145). This would seem, from a biological perspective, to support the value in
identifying organizational factors that can contribute to this organizational evolution and
resilience.
In describing this phenomenon in more detail, Holling (1987) described a sequential
interaction between different ecosystem functions that others have then transferred to
organizational evolution (Hurst, 1995; Hurst & Zimmerman, 1994). Those processes that are
responsible for the rapid colonization of a disturbed ecosystem represent the first function,
exploitation. The characteristics of this function include a reliance on r-strategy, which
emphasizes the reproductive capability of a specific species, particularly those that are more
opportunistic. Hurst (1995) described this as the “ecological equivalent of an immediate return
economy—the kind in which hunters thrive, for the resources are readily available and
harvesting them requires little investment” (p. 98). In a similar way, a CAS typically has many
niches, each of which can be exploited by an agent adapted to fill that niche (Holland, 1995).
Over a period of time, however, plants in the ecosystem begin to interfere with each other and
the connections between the different species increase. Holling (1987) described this as
increased “connectance,” which tends to accompany an increased level of organization and the
emergence of hierarchies.
The second function, conservation, is one of “resource accumulation that builds and
stores energy and material” (Holling, 1987, p. 145). This function relies on consolidation and
what Holling refers to as a K-strategy, where the emphasis is on sustainability. If limited to
these two processes, however, the system becomes increasingly brittle and vulnerable. Hurst
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(1995) draws a parallel between the conservation function and “a delayed return economy in
which considerable effort is now needed to generate a return” (p. 99). So-called climax forests
are “a relatively stable and undisturbed plant community that has evolved through stages and
adapted to its environment characterized by their steady state and, viewed at a distance, look
quite impressive” (Hurst, 1995, p. 99). As it ages, the conditions for disaster become more
favorable as “the elaborate hierarchy of niches that has developed under the umbrella of the
larger, stronger structures [i.e., the trees] is exposed to the full variability of the environment”
(Hurst, 1995, p. 99). Fortunately, forests and, arguably, organizations do not function in terms of
life cycles but rather ecocycles.
The analogies between the growth of a climax forest to maturity and the development of
a successful human organization are compelling. From a product and technology perspective,
the transition is marked by the emergence of so-called “dominant design” (Lee, O’Neal, Pruett,
& Thomas, 1995). This design “embodies all the features now regarded as basic requirements.
As such, its emergence often signals the end of radical product innovation in an industry (or
organization) and moves toward improvement in production processes [K-strategies]” (Hurst &
Zimmerman, 1994, p. 344). This study intends to identify and quantify those factors that can
prevent the loss of such innovation while still ensuring the system maintains its basic coherence.
The loss of innovative capacity is what Gunderson and Holling (2002) described as a
“rigidity trap.” This can occur when social-ecological systems become highly connected, selfreinforcing, and inflexible. The crisis forest is one example, a mature organization another. In
such systems “resource management [is] organized around fixed economic production targets
seek[ing] to reduce variation in resource dynamics because natural variability is problematic for
industries that depend on the resources” (Carpenter & Brock, 2008, p. 40). From an
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organizational perspective, command and control management reduces diversity while issues of
power and short-term profit dominate. Zimmerman described the rigidity trap as the point
“when organizations or individuals are unwilling to let go of something or someone, hanging on
for all it is worth—or used to be worth” (Lecture presentation, 2011).
In an ecocycle, when the forest becomes too vulnerable, the result is abrupt change.
Holling (1987) argued that while disasters do destroy existing structures, they also release
trapped resources and nutrients for new life. This has the net effect of breaking through the
rigidity trap. For instance, if all the water and nutrients in a region supported existing trees,
burning down those trees released those nutrients to feed new growth (p. 145). Economist
Joseph Schumpeter coined a term to describe this same idea in economics in the 1940s: creative
destruction (as cited in Westley et al., 2007, p. 67). This is a term that Holling has borrowed to
describe the beginning of a reverse S-curve. During the creative destruction phase, the
ecosystem enters far-from-equilibrium conditions, a term that occurs frequently in complexity
theory literature (Capra, 1996; Gleick, 1989; Olson & Eoyang, 2001; Stacey, 2003; Waldrop,
1992; Zimmerman et al., 1998). When a system is far from equilibrium, it is acutely sensitive to
small changes in the inputs to the system. Small inputs to the system can eventually produce
large changes in outcomes. This is the “butterfly effect” described earlier.
Despite the creative destruction, “the capital of energy, nutrients and biomass that has
been accumulating, are not immediately available for renewal” (Hurst, 1995, p. 145). There is
therefore a fourth and final ecosystem function, mobilization, during which resources are
retained, creating the capacity for re-birth or a new period of exploitation. “This is the most
ephemeral of the stages in a eco-cycle, and the dynamics are hard to observe… [because] it is
often very difficult to distinguish the organization from its environment: the boundary that
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separates and defines the system has disappeared” (Hurst, 1995, p. 101). To paraphrase Stacey
(1996) the system has temporarily lost the capacity for bounded instability that allows for
innovation and self-organization and enters into a state of unbounded instability or apparent
chaos.
In order to move back into the birth, growth, and maturity phase of the ecocycle, an
ecosystem or organization must break through the poverty trap. While the term is used frequently
in sociological terms (Bowles, Durlauf, Hoff, & Russell Sage Foundation, 2006), the use here
draws from resilience literature. It is a term that is used when the connections and resilience are
low and the potential for change is not realized (Gunderson & Holling, 2002). Ideas and raw
materials may be abundant when systems are caught in poverty traps, but there is no capacity to
focus resources on a promising idea and move the system forward (Westley et al., 2007). In
social systems, for example, the manic behavior of individuals is characterized by the rapid
generation of ideas. Highly creative teams can generate prototype after prototype, but in the
absence of a mechanism to move it into production, the team is caught in the poverty trap
(Carpenter & Brock, 2008). “If the system is to survive, some death is required at this stage too”
(Westley et al., 2007, p. 70).
Poverty and rigidity traps impair capacity and these traps have opposite characteristics in
several important dimensions, as outlined by Carpenter and Brock (2008).
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Table 2.1
Characteristics of Traps
Characteristic

Poverty Trap

Rigidity Trap

Heterogeneity of entities
Network connections
Capacity to focus
Capacity to explore
Average stress
Capacity to dissipate stress

High
Low
Low
High
Low
High

Low
High
High
Low
High
Low

Adapted from Carpenter and Block, 2008, p. 40
Zimmerman (2010) suggested that these traps can be avoided, in part by demanding new
leadership capabilities such as one of distributed leadership, as well as new and often different
kinds of collaborative structures and relationships.
Holling (1987) argued that healthy ecosystems experienced all four stages continuously,
even simultaneously, at different scales because they are adept at recognizing or at least
minimizing the length and durability of the two traps. The healthy forest is resilient in that it
uses each stage as input for the next just as the adaptive organization is in a constant process of
challenging assumptions and perceived limitations throughout its version of the ecocycle.
Change of this kind can be difficult, based as it is on the need to accept the reality that renewal
requires destruction. It may mean stopping doing something a group or organization has done
for years. It may mean ending a program or abandoning an approach or a system that has served
us well under different circumstances.
An example of this is currently occurring in the health care system. Over the past several
years there has been an increased move toward interprofessional care models in which all care
provider work in a collaborative structure centered on the patient. This is a significant shift away
from the traditional medical model that is more focused on individual and independent health
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disciplines where communication between care providers and with the patient could easily be
disjoined and contradictory. While early results of interprofessional collaborative care models
support the change in terms of enhanced care and patient satisfaction, as well as efficiency, there
is often widespread resistance based on a feared loss of identity (D’Amour & Oandasan, 2005).
This study seeks to demonstrate that such collaborative work structures are an example of a
construct of interest that contributes to emergent change, which is consistent with the ecocycle
model.
The adaptive cycle tells us that unless we release the resources of time, energy, money,
and skill locked up in our routines and our institutions on a regular basis it is hard to create
anything new or to look at things from a different perspective. Without these new perspectives,
and the continuous infusion of novelty and innovation into our lives, our organizations, and our
systems, there is a slow but definite loss of resilience in the system.
A hypothesis of this study was that emergent change is a key attribute of the resilience
and innovative capacity of an organization. Identifying the underlying factors that facilitate
emergent change, which is what is happening at the birth stage, increases the capacity of the
system to engage in all aspects of the ecocycle fully.
Accepting Complexity for What It Is
Regardless of the metaphors we use, or perhaps because of them, we have to be aware of
the propensity of some leaders to want to simplify problems so that they appear solvable
(Heifetz, 1994, p. 12). This can result in trying to apply simplistic solutions to what are, in fact,
highly complex problems. To deal with this, Stacey (1996) proposed a matrix based on the level
of agreement and the level of certainty within a group in terms of a specific issue or challenge.
Zimmerman et al. (1998) developed what they refer to as a simplified model of the Stacey matrix
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using “only four categories of issues – simple, complicated, and complex issues, which were all
manageable to some extent, and anarchy, which was to be avoided” (Zimmerman et al., 1998,
p. 141). The distinction between simple, complicated, and complex has been extended through
the use of creative metaphors that suggest that following a cooking recipe is simple, launching a
rocket is complicated, while raising a child—particularly a second child—is complex
(Zimmerman et al., 1998; Glouberman & Zimmerman, 2002; Westley et al., 2007). The key
difference among the three metaphors seems to be one’s view of success. When baking cookies,
one takes careful note of the quality and nature of the parts as well as the timing of their
assembly. The assumption is that if you follow the recipe very carefully, you will get good
cookies each and every time. This would seem to align with Heifetz’ Type I problem: both the
problem and the solution are clear (Heifetz, 1994) and a successful outcome can be achieved.
Putting a rocket into space is clearly more complicated, but it is a linear progression from simple.
The difference is in the number of “recipes” or protocols and the level of expertise required;
however, success can be reasonably predicted if you have a blueprint that both directs the
development of the parts and specifies the relationship in which to assemble them. This would
seem to align with Heifetz’ Type II problem: The problem is clear, get the rocket launched, but
not all of the solutions are clear to all participants. Raising children is a quantum leap from
complicated. What does it mean to successfully raise a child? When does one think the
parenting is finished? When do you measure success? The challenge, as with any complex
situation, is that every child is unique and you cannot separate the child from its context. There
is a constant state of uncertainty based on relationships between different people, experiences,
and moments in time. This is the essence of complexity and the outcome is uncertain
throughout. Like Heifetz’ Type III problem, where both the problem and solutions are uncertain
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and constantly changing, this calls for a highly adaptive mindset that challenges the notion that a
complex situation will ever be static or “finished.” Zimmerman (2010) applied this concept
specifically to health care when she suggested that:
Simple contexts are known a priori and hence are well suited to consistent applications of
“best practices”; while complicated contexts are knowable a priori but often require more
rigorous analysis and investigation than a simple context. Because simple and complicated
are inherently knowable, there is a sense of being able to fully understand and potentially
to control the system. Holman and Lorig (2000) argue this is the case with acute illness
wherein the health care provider can normally identify the cause and address it. They
contrast this with chronic disease that, in the language of this Handbook, represents an
inherently complex context for intervention; chronic diseases frequently have multiple
causes, co-morbidities and morph or evolve over time. There is a sense of inherent
unknowability in these complex contexts that require approaches which incorporate more
than just the knowledge and skill of health care providers and needs to include knowledge
and skills from the patient, their families and the communities in which they reside. This
contingency framework of simple, complicated and complex can be applied to policy and
organizational issues of health care in addition to clinical ones. (p. 41)
Broad Definitions of Complex, Adaptive Systems
This brief review of the “science” behind complexity science and the metaphoric
implications begins to reveal some of the defining attributes of complex, adaptive systems. By
developing a clear understanding of these key attributes, many of which have been hinted at
already, I hoped to frame my thinking about organizational change more clearly. The following
is a sample of different attempts to define the attributes of a CAS. Plsek and Greenhalgh (2001)
defined them as:
A complex, adaptive system is a collection of individual agents with freedom to act in
ways that are not always totally predictable, and whose actions are interconnected so that
one agent’s actions changes the context for other agents. Examples include the human
immune system, a colony of termites, the financial markets, and just about any collection
of humans… Complex systems tend to have fuzzy boundaries. Membership can change
and agents can simultaneously be members of several systems. (p. 625)
Holden (2005) described the attributes of a complex, adaptive system as one in which: a large
number of elements interact in a dynamic way with much exchange of information; interactions
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are rich, non-linear, and have limited range because there is no over-arching framework that
controls the flow of information; systems are open with feedback loops that both stimulate and
inhibit certain responses; complex systems operate far from equilibrium, which means that they
are constantly changing and adapting; the system is embedded in the context of its own histories;
and complexity in the system is a result of the patterns of interaction between the elements.
Another definition suggests that a complex, adaptive system is “an identifiable collection of
interacting elements characterized by dynamic and non-linear (non-proportional) interactions
where small changes in one element can have large results and vice versa” (Osborn & Hunt,
2007, p. 320). For Plowman et al. (2007),
Some of the characteristics of complex adaptive systems include: (1) they are made up of
many agents who act and interact with each other in unpredictable ways; (2) they are
sensitive to initial conditions; (3) they adjust their behavior in the aggregate in
unpredictable ways; (4) they oscillate between stability and instability; and (5) they
produce emergent actions when approaching disequilibrium. (pp. 342-343)
Another definition focuses on the diverse nature of CASs, which are “embedded” systems, in
that each CAS is made up of, and is part of, other CASs. The following definition is
contextualized to a health care environment, but is relevant to all complex environments.
CASs are made up of interconnected, interdependent, adaptive, and diverse elements .
Diversity enables the system to adapt or change when confronted with a challenge. We
have all experienced change triggered by a new idea introduced into a conversation or the
view of professionals from another field and the difference it can make in a complex
patient challenge. (Lindberg et al., 2008, p. 350)
Finally, in examining the nature of large group intervention processes from a complexity
perspective, Arena (2009) has observed that a system draws on three primary processes during
self-organization:
The first is self-referencing, in which the system draws on its own intrinsic elements for
survival or growth. Referencing systems history and experiences emphasizes principles,
values, core competencies, existing capabilities and other accumulated learning. Another
crucial process for self-organization is the increased capacity for generating something new
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from that which already exists. The third process, interdependent organizing, is the delicate
balance between structure and informal organization. Self-organization is optimized at high
levels of interdependence, with high levels of connectiveness to allow for the proliferation
of new innovations. (p. 54)
Finally, Zimmerman (2010) defines these attributes as: emergence or the appearance of
unpredictable outcomes; self-organization, which is order created internally rather than by an
external force; distributed control as demonstrated by the slime mold; minimum specifications or
the few guiding principles that determine the design of the system; connectivity or relationshipcentered or interdependence; feedback, which is the reciprocal effect of one subsystem on
another subsystem or the larger system; sensitive dependence on initial conditions; fractals or
scalar invariance across the system; and embedded or nested systems.
These various descriptors of various attributes of CAS are central to the factors that this
study identifies as key to enabling emergent change. What this study will do is take this
discussion of attributes further by trying to assess the presence or absence of such factors.
Emergence and Self-Organization
As indicated in Chapter I, two central concepts of complex, adaptive systems are
emergence and self-organization, but these two concepts can be difficult to understand. Writing
in the context of emergence, Waldrop (1992) noted that, “like clouds emerging from the physics
and chemistry of water vapor, concepts are fuzzy, shifting, dynamic things. They are constantly
recombining and changing shape” (p. 184). Stacey (2010) affirmed this challenge when he
suggests that, “It is easy to misunderstand the meaning of self-organization and the emergent
collective order it produces” (p. 64). He defined a complex, adaptive system as one that
“consists of a large number of agents, each of which interacts with some of the others according
to its own evolved principles of local interaction. No individual agent, or group of them,
determines the local interaction principles of others and there is no centralized direction of with
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the patterns of behavior of the system as a whole or of the evolution of those patterns. This local
interaction is technically called self-organization, and it is this which produces emergent
coherence in terms of interaction across a whole population of agents. (Stacey, 2010, p. 64).
Stacey’s comments also raise a secondary question: Are the two concepts separate or related?
Does self-organization produce emergence? Lindberg et al. (2008) also linked the two when
they suggested that, “the result of self-organizing processes may be evolution to a completely
novel state. Scientists term the outcome of self-organizing processes emergence” (p. 39).
Jackson (2003) also made the link when he suggested that, “order is an emergent property of
disorder and it comes about through self-organizing processes operating from within the system
itself” (p. 115).
In discussing the work of Chris Langton, Waldrop (1992) proposed that, “instead of
being designed from the top down, the way a human engineer would do it, living systems always
seem to emerge from the bottom up, from a population of much simpler systems” (p. 278). This
begins to define emergence as a property of living systems. Emergent properties are ones that
“exist at one level of the organization that cannot be explained by understanding properties at
other levels of the organization” (Lanham et al., 2009, p. 91). Zimmerman (2010) defined
emergence as “the appearance of outcomes in the form of new structures, patterns or processes
that are unpredictable from the components that created them. In healthcare, emergence has
been crucial in recognizing the role of uncertainty and surprise—from a clinical, organizational
or policy perspective” (p. 17).
It is important to recognize that conceptually, emergence is neither positive nor negative:
it simply is. The literature on such a distinction is surprisingly limited. It is my belief that we
can distinguish positive emergence in a social system because it contributes to the mutual
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purposes of both leaders and followers who intend real change (Rost, 1993, p. 102). This would
suggest that there are ethical factors that determine whether or not emergence is positive, but this
is a question that deserves greater study.
In terms of the second factor, self-organization, many researchers have suggested that it
is, in fact, the key concept to be drawn from complexity theory (Arena, 2009; Capra, 1996;
Lichtenstein, 2000b; Olson & Eoyang, 2001; Plowman et al., 2007; Zimmerman et al., 1998).
Self-organization is a characteristic of all social systems that operates whether we
recognize it or not. By recognizing it, however, can begin to influence it to facilitate
better outcomes. Self-organization is the process by which people mutually adjust their
behaviors in ways needed to cope with changing internal and external environmental
demands. (Anderson & McDaniel, as cited in Lindberg et al., 2008, p. 13)
Self-organization is a process whereby the organization or coherence of a system spontaneously
increases, without this increase being controlled by the environment, formal directive, or an
external system. This spontaneous increase in order is a construct that would stand in marked
contrast to the concept of entropy described in classic Newtonian physics. It is a process of
evolution where the effect of the external environment is minimal, i.e., where the development of
new, complex structures takes place primarily in and through the system itself. Zimmerman et al.
(1998) described self-organization as a process whereby new structures, patterns, and properties
emerge in the system without them being imposed externally (p. 270). In other words, order
does not come about as a result of careful planning and effective execution but rather there seems
to be an inherent capacity of living systems to find new forms of order or, as Kauffmann (1995)
put it, order for free. These changes are fundamental to the system, not just superficial, and they
can be transformative (Chiles et al., 2004). It is important to recognize that self-organization is
happening all the time and at multiple levels. Our minds continually self-organize information,
data, impressions, and experiences: there is a master neuron in the brain doing the work. In the
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same way, groups, organizations, projects and even whole economies continually self-organize.
In his article on the Obama presidential campaign, Shachter described self-organization as “game
changing” (2008) while others described self-organization as the “anchor point phenomena” of
complexity theory (Chiles et al., 2004, p. 502). Capra (1996) saw the pattern of self-organization
as “key to understanding the essential nature of life” (p. 26). Clearly there is an enormous
potential for real systemic change inherent in the observable phenomenon of self-organization.
Stacey argued that it is easy to misrepresent self-organization.
It is easy to misunderstand the meaning of self-organization and the emergent collective
order it produces. In the context of a human organization, people tend to equate selforganization with empowerment or worse a free-for-all in which anyone can do anything,
leading to anarchy… self-organization is not a free-for-all, in fact it is the opposite of a
free-for-all. (Stacey, 2010, p. 64)
Note that Stacey (2010) once again links the process of self-organization with emergence.
The two together seem to suggest an important phenomenon demonstrated through complexity
theory: the idea of emergent change. This refers to change that is ongoing, continuous, and
cumulative. Weick described it as “the realization of a new pattern of organizing in the absence
of explicit a priori intentions” (as cited in Beer & Nohria, 2000, p. 226). This definition suggests
a natural link between the processes of self-organization and the phenomenon of emergence.
Hence, the two are intentionally linked in this study. In discussing the “radical” views of
Koffman and Goodwin, which he clearly supports, Stacey (2003) suggests that “selforganization, rather than random mutation, plays the central role in the emergence of new forms”
(p. 290).
Given the apparent importance of emergent change and self-organization, there is value
in examining some more formal definitions of the phenomenon. Stacey (1996) described it as
“the product of global patterns of behavior by agents in a complex system interacting according
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to their own local rules of behavior, without intending the global patterns of behavior that come
about” (p. 287). There are several things worth inferring from this definition. First of all, the
patterns of behavior are global in that they are observable across the system and at every level of
the system. Secondly, the behavior is observable in agents who are the active participants in the
system’s behavior. This behavior is not limited to specific agents but there is the potential for
the behavior change to be universal. Agents are interactive but their behavior is governed by
their own local rules. This suggests that the agents might exhibit behaviors that are at once
globally governed in some way and yet adaptive to local conditions. In practice, I have observed
this in organizations that are deeply committed to a common set of organizational core values.
Behaviors across the organization are aligned with those values yet at the departmental level, the
values are interpreted to meet the specific context. A common value of outstanding patient
service will mean different things to the finance department than it will to a nursing unit and yet
will be aligned with the organization’s overall intent. There is the suggestion in the last part of
Stacey’s definition that this may be a bottom up phenomenon (Meyer & Davis, 2003). The
behaviors at a local level can actually aggregate into what appears to consistent, global behavior
without any form of predetermined intentionality.
A second definition of emergent change suggests that
a complex adaptive system acquires information about its environment and its own
interaction with that environment, identifies regularities in that information, condenses
those regularities into a kind of ‘schema’ or model and acts in the real world on that
schema. There are various competing schemata and the results of the action in the real
world feed back to influence the competition between those schemata. (Gell-Mann, 1994,
p. 17).
This suggests a process of ongoing feedback loops that lead to self-regulated behavior that then
leads to a form of order; however, emergent change does not unfold in a linear way (Capra,
1996, p. 82) as the agents within the system are constantly giving and receiving feedback and
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adapting their behavior in response to that feedback. Capra (1996) suggested that this process of
adaptation must occur when the system is far-from-equilibrium and therefore unpredictable,
thereby contributing to the non-linear nature of the change.
Inherent in the term self-organization is the absence of a central design or control
mechanism, a phenomenon exhibited by the slime mold described earlier. In self-organizing
systems “order comes from the actions of interdependent agents who exchange information, take
actions, and continuously adapt to feedback about others’ actions rather than from the imposition
of an overall plan from a central authority” (Plowman et al., 2007, p. 343). The search for new
order is not imposed from outside the system’s boundaries nor is it imposed hierarchically from
within the organization (Arena, 2009, p. 54). “Emergent order is holistic in the sense that it is a
consequence of the interactions between the component elements of the system and is not coded
in or determined by the properties of a privileged set of components” (Reason & Goodwin, 1999,
p. 5).
Some would argue that there is enormous benefit to organizations that can develop the
capacity for self-organization. “The more self-organized the change [in an organization] the
higher the whole systems performance will be” (Lichtenstein, 2000b, p. 133). In terms of its
practical application, Ashmos et al. (2000) provided a useful analysis of the implications of selforganization on the performance of organizations operating in highly complex environments.
They studied eight organizations in the hospital sector. One group chose internal organization
arrangements that were consistent with complexity theory, reflecting a managerial view that
organizations are complex adaptive systems and should be organized accordingly—with multiple
and conflicting goals, a variety of strategic priorities, increasing connectivity among people, as
well as structural variety intended to maximize the flow of information and meaning in the
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organization. The other chose what the researchers called complexity-reducing behaviors that
tried to simplify the number of goals and initiatives, increase the codification of policies,
centralize decision-making, and minimize the number of interactions and connections necessary
for decision-making. What the researchers found was that:
Organizations that are more informal with more decentralized structures are more capable
of changing and rearranging themselves because of the attention to important issues by a
greater number of people and by people at many levels of the organization. Wider
participation by multiple stakeholder groups puts more information and interpretations into
play, which creates more opportunities for self-organization and co-evolution. The
organizations we observed to be managing their systems in ways consistent with the
characteristics of complex adaptive systems seemed to be acting as if design were a
continuous process, more of a means to an end, and as the desired end changes, so too does
the design. (Ashmos et al., 2000, p. 590)
Stacey (2003) and others cautioned that the edge of chaos dynamics that result from the constant
adaptation and change implied by emergence is by no means a guarantee of “success” or even
survival. “In addition to the new [survivors] there are a few extinctions” (Stacey, 2003, p. 298).
This is a central concept in “poverty trap” in an ecosystem described earlier. Self-organizing
systems are inherently difficult to manage because order is neither intended by the lower level
agents that create it nor is order imposed by a central authority; however, the risk seems worth it
when seen through Kauffman’s eyes. “Order, vast and generative, not fought for against the
entropic tides but freely obtained” (1995, p. 25).
At this point, I think it is vital to reflect at length on Stacey’s discussion of the role that
control parameters play in causing certain patterns of behavior.
Chaos theory shows how particular control parameters cause its behavior to move
according to a particular pattern called an attractor. Attractors are global patterns of
behavior displayed by a system. For example, the control parameter might be the speed of
energy or information flow through the system. At lower rates of energy or information
flow, the system follows a point attractor in which it displays only one form of behavior,
namely, a stable equilibrium pattern. At higher rates of energy or information flow the
system may switch to a periodic attractor. This too is a stable equilibrium pattern in
which behavior cycles between two forms. Then, at very high rates of energy or
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information flow, the system displays patterns of explosive growth or even random
behavior. In other words, the behavior takes highly unstable forms in which the system
may disintegrate. Furthermore, at some critical level of control parameter, between the
levels that lead to equilibrium attractors and those that lead to unstable attractors,
behaviors display strange attractors, reflected in patterns, that is, shapes in space or
movements over time, which are never exactly repeated but are always similar to each
other. In other word, strange attractors are paradoxically regular and irregular, stable and
unstable, predictable and unpredictable at the same time. We can begin to understand
that complexity is a dynamic, a pattern of movement which is a paradox of stable
instability or unstable stability, of predictable unpredictability or unpredictable
predictability. (Stacey, 2010, p. 59)
It is important to note that in describing “control parameters,” Stacey (2010) is specific in
using the term to describe deterministic systems—systems that have no capacity for choice;
however, even on a metaphoric level, this points to the heart of my research question: What
control parameters or factors might facilitate emergent change in complex social systems and
what is the “critical level” of these factors that emerged from my previous research, interviews,
and focus group supported by the literature? Is there a form of complex response process that
possibly occurs between the constructs themselves, as well the human participants within the
organizational dialogue?
Given the lack of clarity of these definitions, a key question that remains for those
interested in the explanatory capacity of the complexity metaphor is, how does emergence
actually occur? Is there a role that formal or even informal leaders can play in creating a set of
conditions that can facilitate emergent change? The purpose of this study was to explore the
literature to see if a key set of factors facilitates such emergence. For this purpose I define
emergence as unexpected outcomes, novelties, and surprises that occur at different levels of the
organization.
As discussed in Chapter I, Alaa (2009) and Lanham et al. (2009) have suggested that
there are several personal factors that contribute to emergence; however, given that my intention
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is to validate a survey that will allow organizations to assess and perhaps then alter
organizational factors, this study will focus on those. It is my hypothesis that there are already
validated instruments that will allow for the accurate assessment of the personal and relationship
factors. For the purposes of this study I am defining organizational factors as those that are
intentional and systemic structures, strategies and processes that increase the likelihood of
positive emergence. The identification of these factors (technically called constructs of interest
until validated) was, itself, a process of emergence and is described in full detail in Chapter III.
Suffice to say here that they emerged out of my own practice experience, were reinforced
through a series of interviews, and given clearer theoretical support through the research for the
following section of this literature review. What follows is fuller discussion of each of these
factors. The question that hangs over them and this study will continue to be whether one can
meaningfully influence such systems without somehow subverting the very capacity of the
system to truly self- organize. I would side with Boal and Schultz (2007) who argued,
“influencing complex adaptive organizations can be accomplished through intervention in the
maintenance and modifications of the structure of agent interactions [emphasis added] and of the
context” (p. 312).
Self-organization is not a free-for-all; in fact, it is the opposite of a free-for-all.
Agents…cannot do just anything: they must respond and they must do so in particular
ways so that agents are constraining and enabling each other at the same time…In their
local interaction, human agents constrain and enable each other, which is what power
means, and these patterns of power constitute social control and order. (Stacey, 2010,
p. 64)
While Stacey would likely disagree with doing so, I wanted to explore whether or not the factors
that I have described influence the way that agents constrain or enable each other. In fact, Stacey
(2010) debunks the concept that emergence can be shaped or leveraged in any way, arguing that,
when take to the notion that emergence is “some kind of force to be deliberately brought about

58
by managers creating the right conditions, people and their ordinary activities simply disappear”
(p. 81); however, he provides no actual evidence for this disappearance, but simply states it as a
fact. That has not been my practice experience. When self-organization and emergence are
valued, it is people and their ordinary activities that become the dominant narrative of the
organization. I do not suggest that we can control or predict with certainty the changes that will
occur, but simply influence. It is also not intended to suggest that there is any single strategy or
process that will dominate. “Self-organization is about the patterns of relationship and
connection and therefore is not dependent on any single management practice or organizational
process” (Anderson et al., 2004, p. 379).
Construct 1: A New Strategic Framework or Simple Rules
Wheatley (1994) suggested that “we need to trust that something as simple as a clear core
of values and vision, kept in motion by continuous dialogue, can lead to order” ( p. 147). This
begins to suggest a different way of thinking about an organization’s strategic framework or
high-level organizational commitments. This framework creates the “bounded instability”
(Kelly & Allison, 1998; Stacey, 1996) that allows for innovation and self-organization.
Opinions vary on how these simple rules actually contribute to emergence and what those rules
might be. Wheatley (1994) referred to such organizations as “self-referencing” and suggests that
a “business that focuses on its core competencies… can respond quickly to new opportunities”
(p. 93). This implies a linguistic framework that will help guide and shape a system’s response
to external fluctuations and change. Wheatley (1994) went on to suggest that “in human
organizations, a clear sense of identity—of values, traditions, aspirations, competencies, and
culture that guide the operation—is the real source of independence from the environment”
(p. 94). Arena (2009) used similar language to describe the process of self-referencing “in which
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the system draws on its own intrinsic elements for survival or growth” (p. 54). Connor (1998)
also spoke to the paradox of how continuity can thrive despite significant change. “The capacity
to remain the same while changing is called ‘self-referencing’…new strategies and procedures
are engaged, yet they reflect self-referencing in that they evolved from the organization’s own
history, culture, remaining assets, and accumulated learning” (p. 56). Waldrop (1992) described
the “complex, life-like behavior [that] is the result of simple rules unfolding from the bottom up”
(p. 329). This seems to be the basis of Reynolds’ “boids” experiment that mimicked the
behavior of a flock of birds or school of fish by generating order out of chaos through the
application on three simple rules to a computer simulation (as cited in Waldrop, 1992).
Drawing on the physics of complexity, astrophysicist John Gribbin described “seeming
complicated systems [that] can be produced or described by the repeated application of a simple
rule” (2004, p. 95). Like Gribbin, several theorists have used the term simple rules to define this
process of self-referencing. Citing Stacey, Alaa (2009) suggested “simple high-level rules are a
way to achieve a balance of dictation and freedom enabling team members to interact with each
other guided by these rules” (p. 25). She went on to describe “heterogeneous agents [that]
exhibit various behaviors that can be defined in terms of ‘simple rules’ where they adapt and
evolve through their interactions and by changing their rules through learning as experience
accumulates” (Stacey, 2010, p. 37). Boal and Schultz (2007) described this as a mutual
agreement that causes the agents [in the system] to tend to “stick together” (p. 3). In their
analysis of the shift from mathematics to biology as the dominant metaphor for the economy,
Meyer and Davis (2003) suggested that “agents are the decision-making units of the system and
they have rules that determine their choices. Software agents have rules that are generally clear
and simple. People’s rules are more complex” (p. 33). This seems be a crucial point that hints at
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the danger of directly importing the language and constructs of mathematics into social systems:
People are extremely complex and that complexity is exacerbated by conditions of uncertainty
and stress which cause people to rethink and reframe any “simple” rules through their own
mental models and assumptions in ways that are highly unpredictable.
In their attempt to develop practical strategies that would enable change agents to
facilitate organizational change, Olson and Eoyang (2001) described simple rules as:
The minimum set of guidelines or norms that circumscribe behavior in a system. If all the
agents in the system follow the same simple rules, then each one of them adapts to his or
her immediate and local circumstances effectively, while remaining part of the larger
systems. Each makes independent and adaptive responses, yet the system as a whole
generates complicated patterns of coherent action. (p. 106)
They then utilized the concept quite effectively by suggesting that these “simple rules” can be
part—but only a part—of the container that defines the system that is in the process of selforganizing. Zimmerman et al. (1998) borrowed Morgan’s term “minimum specifications” or
“min-specs” to describe this phenomenon. “These processes can include such elements as
mission statements, guiding principles, boundaries, creative challenges and so on” (p. 209). Note
that the language is not limiting or prescriptive but rather it begins to frame simple rules as part
of a more complex whole.
The challenge lies in the injudicious application of this concept and trying to codify it as
the only strategy required to initiate organizational change. Like many of the neo-reductionists,
Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) took the idea of simple rules as a given and transferred them
directly into organizational theory:
It is the simplicity [of the simple rules] that creates the freedom to behave in complicated,
adaptive, and surprising ways. Further, the rules are associated with the system, not with
an individual agent (i.e. there is no “lead” agent). Systems that exhibit this type of
leaderless yet orderly behavior are said to be self-organizing because the agents
themselves figure out how to organize the change. (p. 38)
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This would lead the change practitioner to believe that all they need to do is have a group of
people co-create a set of rules for themselves and order will naturally flow. Kelly and Allison
(1998) took the concept to the extreme by suggesting three simple rules of their own devising
that will ensure organizations gain the “complexity advantage.” According to them, a business
need only exchange collaborative energy through trust, exchange information through open
learning, develop commitment by aligning choices, and coordinate co-evolution. While these
certainly contribute to emergent change, they do not seem to do full justice to the true
complexity of social systems. Lichtenstein (2000b) seemed to exemplify the danger inherent in
the over-enthusiastic application of complexity concepts to organizational strategy when he
suggests that “a compelling mission triggers a series of activity domains [that] will emerge, pull
in resources, and allow the organization to achieve its goals” (p. 133). In other words, the
selective application of one concept, a simple rule or point of self-referencing, will allow the
organization to move in a linear manner toward a predetermined set of goals or outcomes, which
completely defies the concept of emergent change that is central to complex, adaptive systems.
As has already been pointed out, there are several theorists who take exception to an
overly simplistic application of the concept of simple rules to organizations based on
Richardson’s (2008) seductive syllogism. As Richardson (2008) himself pointed out, “the
recursive application of simple rules is certainly not the only source of complex behavior, and
should not be seen as the only legitimate way to study complexity in human organizations”
(p. 19). In his early work, Stacey (1996), seemed to embrace the idea of simple rules.
Complex, adaptive systems consist of a number of components, or agents, that interact
with each other according to a set of rules that require them to examine and respond to
each other’s behavior in order to improve their behavior and thus the behavior of the
system they comprise. In other words, the system operates in a manner that constitutes
learning. (p. 10)
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Stacey (2003) now rejects the simplicity of simple rules on the basis that even trying to articulate
those rules is deterministic and implies a role for the “manager” that is external to the system in
which they function. He cited Gell-Mann (1994) who said that “in an astonishing variety of
contexts, apparently complex structures or behaviors emerge from systems characterized by very
simple rules” (p. 100). Stacey then responded that “self-organization as a process of following
simple rules makes it very easy to assimilate what Gell-Mann says into the orthodoxy of
organizations” (p. 102). This seems to be the trap that many in the neo-reductionist group have
fallen into: Clearly define the rules and order will emerge within the system; however,
potentially self-organizing questions begin to emerge. Who defines the “rules”? How many is
enough? Can you have too many? Too few? What is the process around which they are
formed? Is there a role for management in the process? Stacey said that it is the risk of thinking
in such managerial terms that has him downplaying the role of simple rules.
Where then does that leave us? Neither Richardson (2008) nor Stacey (2003) would
seem to have suggested that there is no value in exploring the implications of simple rules or
min-specs in shaping how an organization responds to changes in its environment. The caution
they provided is that it is not the only consideration. One needs to more carefully examine the
dynamic nature of the system and the implications of the idea that agents within the system may
in fact be defining their own rules based on local conditions and experiences, which means that
the system will constantly be in tension between the order that results from the overly zealous
application of a single set of rules and the chaos that comes from no rules at any level. This is the
state suggested by Kaufmann (1995).
I suspect that the fate of all complex adaptive systems in the biosphere—from single cells
to economies – is to evolve to a natural state between chaos and order, a grand
compromise between structure and surprise. Here, at this poised state, small and large
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avalanches of coevolutionary change propagate through the system as a consequence of
small, best choices of the actors themselves, competing and cooperating to survive. (p. 5)
The importance of a clear mission and values as a factor in emergent self-organizing social
systems was largely derived from the organization development literature rather than from the
literature related to CAS, although Olson and Eoyang (2001) straddled the two and suggest that
mission and values could form part of the “conceptual container” (p. 12) within which a system
self-organizes, thus suggesting that they are an example of simple rules. Wheatley (1994) also
asserted the importance of vision and values in bringing some level of order to a system. “We
need to be able to trust that something as simple as a clear core of values and mission kept in
motion through continuous dialogue, can lead to order” (p. 147). While this study was not
intended to be an exhaustive study on the potential importance of a clear framework of mission,
vision, and values, a few reflections are worth noting. Schein (2004) suggested that a mission
defines “what justifies our continued existence” (p. 90), which could, in fact, describe a central
ethos of any living system. In her work on Drucker, Edersheim (2007) noted “it has been proven
time and again that individuals achieve their greatest successes when they work with others
toward a common goal that they are passionate about reaching” (p. 169). Drucker (1992)
himself suggested that the best organizations devote a great deal of time defining their mission
(p. 205). Henein and Morissette (2007) argued, “the million-dollar question that organizations
and nations struggle with is, what to put at the core?” (p. 242). Mintzberg (1989) described the
“missionary organization” as one that is driven by a clear, focused, inspiring, and distinctive
mission as well as one that is coordinated through the standardization of norms [values]”
(p. 223). In their discussion of clinical microsystems in a health care setting, Mohr and Batalden
(2002, p. 47) emphasized that “an important characteristic of the microsystem is that the aim [or
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mission] is consistent with the aim of the larger system and guides the work of the microsystem”
(p. 47).
Anderson and her colleagues put significant emphasis on what they refer to as “system
parameters that are the fuel of self-organization” (Anderson et al., 2003, p. 2). They described
these parameters as: (a) the nature of connections, which is central to the discussion of
collaborative work and decision-making structures; (b) the rate of information flow, which is the
rationale for rapid, data-based feedback mechanisms; and (c) the degree of cognitive diversity,
which is a key element of collaborative work and decision-making structures.
This brief sampling of significant voices in the literature suggests the importance of
mission, vision, and values as a coordinating framework for organizations dealing with high
levels of complexity.
Construct 2: Safe-Fail Organizational Culture
Schein (2004) defined organizational culture as “the climate and practices that
organizations develop around their handling of people, or to the espoused values and credo of the
organization” (p. 7), thus suggesting that culture is an abstraction of the espoused mission,
vision, and values of an organization. As a practitioner, I use the term strategic brand integrity to
describe a culture that consistently reflects the organization’s strategic framework. Bolman and
Deal (2003) argued that “culture is both a product and a process. As a product, it embodies
wisdom accumulated from experience accumulated from experience. As a process, it is renewed
and re-created as newcomers learn the old ways and eventually become teachers themselves”
(p. 269). This description of culture as the integration of an organization’s history and its
capacity for adaptive change is consistent with CASs.
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The idea that organizations need to create safe spaces to foster innovation has been in use
since organizations began to talk about innovative cultures (Galbraith, 1982, as cited in
Dombrowski et al., 2007, p. 194), however, historically these safe spaces have been segregated
and given terms like “skunk works” (Dombrowski et al., 2007, p. 194). Today, it would appear
the pace of change facing every function of an organization does not often allow for the luxury
of such separateness. Organizations need to create and support “holding spaces” (Heifetz,
Grashow, & Linsky, 2009): “Holding environments [that] give a group identity and contain the
conflict, chaos, and confusion often produced when struggling with complex problematic
realities” (p. 304). Taking a different action in an attempt to influence a self-organizing process
inherently involves a degree of risk-taking because one can never know what reactions such an
action will trigger. Holding places, these safe-fail environments, may reduce the degree of risk
and thus foster a more experimental orientation. “Safe-fail” is a term first suggested to me in a
conversation with Dr. Brenda Zimmerman, deliberately counterbalancing the better-know
environment of fail-safe, where multiple redundancies are intended to ensure high reliability
organization. These have been defined as organizations that “experience extremely long periods
of safety and organizational smoothness” (Provera, Montefusco, & Canato, 2010, p. 1058).
Ironically, the key to a fail-safe organization or system may, in fact, be a safe-fail or no blame
culture. Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) reported that such a culture has three elements. The first is a
reporting structure in which managers actually encourage and reward widespread reporting of
errors and near misses. Individuals signaling these situations are not afraid of incurring
organizational blame or punishment. The second element is a debriefing process that
immediately analyzes the possible explanations, based on the complex interrelations between
different organizational elements such as people, processes, technologies, and external
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variations. Individuals and groups experiencing these errors are actively involved in the process
of investigation. Finally, a narrative enactment identifies corrective actions and guidelines
including the communication and testing of responsive actions. This sort of response allows
individuals, groups, and the organization as a whole to experiment and allow for emergent
change, knowing that it has the processes and structures in place to assess and alter such actions
quickly, effectively, and in a way that is communicated to other agents within the system. It also
suggests a critical link between a fail-safe culture and factors of rapid, data-driven feedback
mechanisms and collaborative work and decision-making structures. In their study of nursing
home care, Anderson et al. (2003) found that “managers who promote communication openness,
therefore, will increase the rate of useful information flow among people in the organization
leading to better resident outcomes” (p. 3). This openness and information flow is central to the
safe-fail culture of an organization.
Construct 3: Collaborative Work and Decision-Making Structures
Holman, Devane, & Cady (2007) suggested that “what keeps [a] system whole over time
is a commitment to collaborative meaning making” (p. 12). The opportunities for such
collaboration can happen by chance, but the organization itself has a role in creating
collaborative works structures. Tekell et al. (as cited in Holman et al., 2007) described
collaborative work systems arising from “a holistic design process that creates the framework for
successfully changing the organization to support collaboration and improve business results”
(p. 437). Martin and Eisenhardt (2010) described modular business units (BUs) as one of the
most significant business innovation in some time. “Our emergent theory unexpectedly
emphasizes that a BU-centric process led by multi-business teams of general managers leads to
better collaboration than a corporate-centric process” (p. 265).
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Zohar (1997) explored the origins of different work structures and their effect on organizations,
once again exposing the risks in imposing reductionist scientific models to organizations.
The particle model of self, so important to Western management theory, is modeled on
Newtonian science. This Newtonian self, like the science that inspired it, is seen as
atomistic, determined in its behaviors, fragmented into separate parts circumscribed by
rigid boundaries. Newtonian organizations are rule-bound, they exclude private,
unpredictable aspects of the self, they divide functions and structures, and they, too, are
isolated from their environment. (p. 119)
Note the emphasis on rigid boundaries, attempts to tame the unpredictability of human behavior,
and the sense of a closed system that has served organizations for more than 100 years. The
“diametrically opposed model” (Zohar, 1997, p. 119) is:
The Eastern, wave model of self, lying at the heart of Asian organizations, is modeled on
the complex patterns made by many waves. Like waves, the networked self is seen as
essentially relational and contextual. A person is his or her relationships. The boundaries
of this self are elastic and ambiguous, and relationships between self’s are governed by
local customs, habits, and tradition. Networked organizations rely on personal contacts,
trust instead of rules. (Zohar, 1997, p. 119)
The emphasis on relationship, and arguably the structures that facilitate those relationships, is a
theme that is consistent in the CAS literature (Richardson, 2008; Stacey, 2003; Westley et al.,
2007; Wheatley, 1994).
Because of the far-from-equilibrium nature of a CAS, a collaborative structure alone is
not sufficient to generate the “creative tension” (Senge, 1994) that keeps an organization
adapting successfully. Holbrook (2003) described a “coevolutionary dance of competition and
collaboration” (p. 231) that exists in a CAS. This “dance” is a frame of reference with which
many organizations, including those in health care, struggle.
The power struggles between all health care providers, physicians, nurses, therapists,
dieticians, social workers, and house keepers [competition] continue to displace the goal
of a community of health care providers learning to live in a world of increased
complexity where goals transcend power struggles [collaboration]. It is ironic that the
nursing profession continues to empower nursing and gain autonomy, and yet one of the
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greatest challenges in health health care is to develop collaborative processes as the
means to better patient care. (Porter-O’Grady & Malloch, 2007, pp. 71-72)
Health care is clearly one sector in which the drive to collaborative structures takes on
added significance because of the significance that it has for quality and safety. “We consider
conversation to be a collaborative process in which meaning and organization are jointly
created” (Jordan, et al., 2009, p. 2). Such conversations, which are a phenomenon emerging
from iterative reciprocal intentional approaches, such as daily huddles, well-structured shift
changes, interdisciplinary rounds, etc. It is through these strategies and structures that create the
opportunities for information exchange, provided it occurs within a safe-fail culture. “Good
connections exist when there is latitude to interact and freedom to share information with others
who can best use that information” (Piven et al., 2006, p. 296).
Because self-organization relies on connection and nonlinear interaction, the nature of the
communication processes in the organization will be important to patterns of selforganization. Managers may influence communication patterns by promoting or
discouraging vertical and horizontal communication networks, thereby changing the rate
of information flow between people and parts of the organization. (Anderson et al., 2004,
p. 379)
Charns and Smith Tewksbury (1993) described a continuum between differentiation and
integration, both of which are characterized as essential to performance in health care
organizations. Differentiation “allows each type of work to be performed most effectively” (p.
23) while integration focuses on the interdependence of the different types of work. “The
traditional health services organization, with each different department [nursing, medicine,
laboratory, diagnostic imaging, etc.] representing a different function, emphasizes differentiation
by function at the cost of coordination of functions” (p. 25). At the traditional end of their
continuum, they described the functional organization while at the other end they describe the
program organization. “In the pure program organization, each division is a ‘mini-hospital’” (p.
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79). This shift can be observed where the organizational design refers to health systems, rather
than departments. For example, a cardiac care system would include cardiology, cardiac
surgery, designated health professionals such as physiotherapy and occupational therapy,
cardiology-trained nursing, cardiac rehabilitation, as well as specifically assigned pharmacies,
lab technicians, and dietitians. In some hospitals, even support services such as human
resources, finance, decision support, and housekeeping are aligned to a health-specific system.
As has been previously noted, increasing emphasis is now being put on interprofessional
education and practice. “Interdisciplinarity wishes to reconcile and foster cohesion to the
fragmented knowledge of numerous [health] disciplines” (D’Amour & Oandasan, 2005, p. 9).
Interprofessional teams (doctors, nurses, social workers, physiotherapists, occupational
therapists, etc.), like the cast and crew of a movie, come together in different combinations to
meet the unique needs of each patient. In their discussion of effective clinical microsystems,
Mohr and Batalden (2002) stressed that “microsystems with a high degree of interdependence
are mindful of the importance of the multidisciplinary team approach to care” (p. 47).
Diversity is critical in the context of collaborative work and decision-making structures
and systems. “Sufficient cognitive diversity refers to having access to others with diverse ideas
that, when exchanged, lead to different decision-making. Cognitive diversity may arise from
different training, sociocultural and educational backgrounds, belief systems, and work
experiences” (Piven et al., 2006, p. 296).
Construct 4: CEO/Executive Commitment and Visible Support
Traditionally, organizations seek order and leaders are expected to achieve stability by
reducing complexity through codification, solving problems using reductionist rather than
holistic thinking, understanding critical cause and effect linkages, and engaging in
complex planning for a world they believe is predictable. From this view, leaders try to
control the future by acting now to reduce complexity and uncertainty and directing
followers towards a highly prescribed future state. (Plowman et al., 2007, p. 343)
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The importance of commitment and support from senior leadership is almost counterintuitive
when thinking in terms of CASs, where the emphasis tends to focus on a more distributed model
of leadership (Lichtenstein & Plowman, 2009; Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001; Plowman et al., 2007;
Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2008; Weick & Sutcliff, 2007); however, previous research indicates the
significance of senior-level support (Dickens, 2010b). As one interviewee in that study said, “I
know it sounds a bit silly, but it was almost as if we needed, or wanted, mom and dad’s
permission to experiment” (p. 20).
When the practitioner literature speaks about senior management’s contributory role,
there is some level of support for its importance. While there is general recognition that “no one
external designer or manipulation from some central source of control” (Holden, 2005, p. 653)
controls the patterns of emergence in a CAS, there is far less discussion about what formal
leaders actually do. Despite this, it is clearly important to understand that “while selforganization in organization lacks empirical indicators, management practices are empirically
observable. Thus, in this study, we examine the relationship between management practices and
resident outcomes, understanding that the mechanics for each relationship is through selforganization” (Anderson et al., 2003, p. 3).
Herein lies a central question. What is the role of the leader? “If leaders cannot envision
and predict the future state of a system, if they do not direct change in complex systems because
it emerges from the interactions among people throughout the system, what, then, do leaders
do?” (Plowman et al., 2007, p. 343).
There is a growing body of knowledge available to suggest that management practices
can be employed to achieve better outcomes, but these practices are not based on top
down, authoritative, management styles. Management practices that change how people
relate to one another, such as communication, participation in decision-making, and
relationship-oriented leadership, result in better outcomes. (Anderson et al., 2003, p. 2)
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Olson and Eoyang (2001) identified three specific foci that senior leaders can play to
facilitate the three elements that facilitate organizational change: setting the container, focusing
on significant differences, and fostering transformative exchanges. They then articulated three
specific roles that formal leaders can play: sponsorship, design of collaborative work structures,
and focusing attention on the organization’s preferred future (p. 46). From my practice
experience, the capacity of senior leaders to create clarity of focus and then supporting
collaborative work structures to move toward that focus cannot be underscored. Martin and
Eisenhardt (2010) ascribed the responsibility for creating BU-centric business models to the
senior executives. These BU-centered structures create the container for collaboration. Boal and
Schultz (2007) also saw an important role for senior leadership in designing structures that
facilitate emergence. “Influencing complex adaptive organizations can be accomplished through
the intervention in the maintenance and modification of the structure of agent interactions and of
the context in which their behaviors occur” (p. 412). In arguing for a more informal, relational
approach to leadership, Anderson et al. (2003) suggested that:
Relationship-oriented leadership will foster interconnections and embrace information
flow… Formalization [of leadership] is a form of centralized control whereby job
descriptions, surveillance, and procedures and rules are used to ensure predictability of
performance. Formalization likely suppresses system parameters because when rules exist
there is no need to talk to decide what actions to take and everyone is encouraged to think
and act in a similar manner. Thus self-organization is likely to be devoid of the
information, connections and diversity of thought needed for effectiveness and better
resident outcomes. (p. 4)
Jensen (2000) put a priority on the senior leaders’ role in establishing focus in highly
complex environments by clarifying the critical few (or simple rules) that should guide decisionmaking. Gamble (2008), in his discussion of developmental evaluation, which Patton (2010) has
established as highly compatible with emergence cited Eoyang’s model of “what?,” “so what?,”
and “now what?” as a frame through which senior leaders need to engage their organizations in
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highly complex environment. The three process elements would have the leader asking: What
are we seeing, noticing, or learning now? What do we think it means and what alternative
meanings might it have? What does it suggest we might do now?
Leaders must also see organizational climate as central to their role. Without using the
terms emergence or self-organization, Schein (2004) implied it in his initial definition of culture:
Culture is both a dynamic phenomenon that surrounds us at all times, being constantly
enacted and created by our interactions with others and shaped by leadership behaviors
and a set of structures, routines, rules and norms that guide and constrain behavior. (p. 1)
Others support the role of management in setting the tone for the culture. “Climate is a
set of management practices that are part of organizational processes that interact to create the
whole” (Anderson et al., 2004, p. 379).
Another role that can be ascribed to senior management is the intentional interjection of
disequilibrium into otherwise highly stable, non-adaptive environments—organizations caught in
the rigidity trap. A complexity theory perspective suggests that leaders play a role in
destabilizing systems by disrupting existing processes or patterns of behavior, thereby pushing
the systems toward chaos (Regine & Lewin, 2000) or regions of complexity. “Strategic
leadership pushes organizations to the ‘edge of chaos’ and out of stasis: without it no significant
change can emerge” (Boal & Schultz, 2007, p. 412). This action helps create the “fluid
responsiveness of innovative and creative organizations” (p. 412).
Olson and Eoyang (2001) emphasized the role of senior leadership in surfacing
significant different differences and allowing them to shape the emerging patterns of the
organization. Plowman et al. (2007) took it even further and suggest that a key role for senior
leaders is to actually create, as well as surface, conflict. This suggests that executive support and
encouragement do not come from “laissez faire” leadership (Avolio, Bass, & Jung, 1999), but
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rather come from recognition of the risks of complacency and stasis inherent in the maturity and
conservation stage of the life cycle and push their organizations out of the rigidity trap.
Plowman et al. (2007) emphasized the role of senior leaders in encouraging innovation.
“Complex leaders become enablers of emergent, self-organization by encouraging innovation
through simple rules, non-linear interactions, and swarm behaviors” (p. 347). Further
recognizing the importance of leadership support, Zimmerman (1999) described a situation in
which a senior nursing executive focused on a very common challenge: the delay between triage
and the first administration of treatment in an emergency department.
A more experimental procedure was suggested by [the health care executive’s] studies in
complexity science. Rather than working against the obvious resistance to change, she
created an idea that was to act as an “attractor” for interested people. The idea—“how a
patient can be admitted in one hour or less”—attracted people because it was clear,
radical and was headed by a senior manager. The work was completely voluntary and
open to anyone interested. People chose to participate because they were attracted to
solving the problem and were willing to experiment with alternative solutions. (p. 42)
As important as the role of a formal leader is, the nature or disposition of that leader is
equally so. It begins with seeing leadership as less about power and authority and, for some, even
a calling in the traditional sense of the word. “Leadership is not a position. To my knowledge, a
promotion never made anyone a leader. Leadership is a fiduciary calling” (DePree, 1989, p. 3).
In a health care setting, there can be significant power issues at play, which I have discussed in a
previous study (Dickens, 2010b).
We find it extremely useful to see leadership as a practice, as an activity that some people
do some of the time. We view leadership as a verb, not a job. Authority, power and
influence are critical tools, but they do not define leadership. This is because the
resources of authority, power, and influence can be used for all sorts of purposes and
tasks that have little or nothing to do with leadership, like performing surgery or running
an organization that has long been successful in a “stable market.” (Thygeson et al., 2010,
p. 1010)
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The notion that leadership, particularly formal leadership, is a verb is useful. It suggests to me
that it is the personality of the leader and the accompanying behaviors that are more important
than the tasks.
Construct 5: A Distributed Leadership Strategy
Given the less directive role of leadership in a CAS, the presence and nature of leadership
outside the executive suite needs to be carefully examined. If order emerges out of the pattern of
behavior of agents at every level of the system and is not a result of any external agent or control
mechanism and, therefore, if the formal leaders and managers of an organization cannot predict,
plan for, and control its future, what do leaders do? For Stacey (1996), the question became,
“How is one to understand the nature of management and the process of organisational change
when the long-term future is unpredictable at the required level of detail?” (p. 275). This study
intends to address this question from a new perspective and shift our understanding of the nature
of management in terms of intentionally creating the conditions for emergent change without
being drawn into the temptation to make the outcomes predictable.
Some would argue that complexity theory opens the door for a radical redefinition of
leadership. Shachter (2008), for example, suggested that Barack Obama proved to be one of the
most radical management innovators in the world because of the way he “combined the virtues
of both [vertical and horizontal] organizations through the game-changing power of selforganization. [His campaign team] was spherical, with a tightly controlled core, surrounded by
self-organizing cells of volunteers, donors, contributors, and other participants at the fuzzy
edges” (p. A19). The academic literature would suggest that there is a wide range of responses
to the question of leadership in complex, adaptive systems. Connor (1998) rejects the notion of
externally leadership-driven change not being valid. This view is supported by Zimmerman et al.
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(1998) who recognized that while “traditional management theories have focused on the
predictable and controllable dimensions of management [and] are critical in organizations, they
provide only a partial explanation of the reality of organizations” (Connor, 1998, p. 7). For
Connor (1998) “the important issue is not what part of the system starts the self-organizing
process, but that the process is engaged somewhere within the existing structure…selforganization is contagious” (p. 57). At one point, Lichtenstein (2000b) argued, “long-term
organizational success is based on optimizing resource flow and continuous learning. A
manager’s emphasis is on supporting structures that accomplish these goals” (p. 129). Several
years later, however, he seems to take a very different view, suggesting “leadership of the
creation and re-creation of organizational systems may be better explained by the dynamics of
emergence than by specific directives from managers who are designated organizational leaders.
In this vein, we propose a leadership of emergence: Rather than leadership ‘being in’ a specific
manager or CEO, it emerges throughout the organization as positive influence, novelty, and
outcomes” (Lichtenstein & Plowman, 2009, p. 618). In this sense, they did not see a specific
role for a “leader” but rather that “leadership” is somehow the whole system that “instantiates
emergence” (p. 618). This is a view supported by Begun and Whyte in Lindberg et al. (2008):
Theoretically, in a simple and hierarchical organization or community, these leadership
tasks [providing direction, inspiring commitment, and facing adaptive challenges] can
readily be accomplished by individuals in positions of formal authority. Leadership can
be personal or an individual activity and followers can abrogate key decision-making
activities to the leader. In a more complex setting, leaders need to influence others so that
the system as whole can work toward the same tasks of direction, inspiration, and facing
challenges. Leadership is interpersonal, and the person who has the most influence
becomes the leader. In even more complex settings, accomplishing the tasks of leadership
requires leaders to facilitate the process whereby members or units of the system
construct direction themselves, build their own commitment, and confront and overcome
complex challenges together. Leadership becomes collaborative and facilitative. It
becomes the responsibility of everyone, and the tasks of leadership are realized through
emergent, relational dialogue among diverse agents and organizations. It is this concept
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of leadership that is most difficult to obtain, yet most necessary for complex systems to
adapt and sustain. (pp. 240-241)
This provides a compelling argument for the need to be very intentional about developing the
capacity of individuals at all levels of the organization to not only handle specific tasks but to
support their ability to think at ever increasing levels of mental complexity (Kegan & Lahey,
2009). This is not something that happens by accident but rather requires an intentional strategy.
Marion and Uhl-Bien (2001) introduced the term complexity leadership and appear to be
at the forefront of this area. Their complexity leadership theory focuses on identifying and
exploring the strategies and behaviors that foster organizational and subunit creativity, learning,
and adaptability. In other words, they are defining a theory that allows organizations to take full
advantage of the creative potential that exists on the edge of chaos. For them:
“Complexity leadership” involves creating the conditions that enable productive, but
largely unspecified, future states. From the perspective of complexity theory, effective
leadership is about learning to capitalize on interactive dynamics (correlation,
randomness, and interaction) among and with organizational ensembles (defined as sets
of individuals such as departments or other work groups) that are characterized by
common, direct interrelationships. (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001, p. 394)
This definition suggests that, while organizations may not be as controllable or predictable as a
mechanistic perspective might imply, their direction and how they evolve can be influenced.
This means that the role of leaders, whether in formal managerial roles or not, is to play a role in
creating the conditions in which emergent, self-organization can occur and the organization’s
flexibility can be optimized. Several researchers have tried to describe how that might occur.
Regine and Lewin (2000), for example suggested that the leaders “work organically with their
organizations by entering the existing processes; that is working with people from where they are
rather than imposing where they should be” (p. 10). This means being at risk in the process and
it requires courage and trustworthiness as well as a high level of comfort with ambiguity and
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paradox. In fact, such leaders will push their organization into a degree of chaos by creating
uncertainty and ambiguity. They can do this because they have faith in the capacity of the system
to reorganize itself and they let the issues organize the structure rather than imposing a structure.
For Westley et al. (2007):
Control is replaced by a tolerance for ambiguity and the “can do” mentality of “making
things happen” is modified by an attitude that is simultaneously visionary and responsive
to the unpredictable unfolding of events. The successful social innovator is, intentionally
or not, a part of the dynamics of transformation rather than the heroic figure leading the
charge. (p. 20)
Several writers have tried to articulate specific leadership approaches or strategies that
align with complexity theory. Alaa (2009), citing Milton-Kelly, suggested that:
The complexity approach to management is about fostering and creating enabling
conditions, which will permit an organization to explore the space of possibilities and
facilitate the creation of new organizational forms that will be sustainable in a constantly
changing environment… and emphasize the need to instill into organizations habits and
dynamics that improve their emergent properties instead of leaving them to happen by
chance…The important social construction factors are communication, collaboration,
interaction, trust and morale.” (pp. 22, 24)
Meyers and Davis (2003) offer six memes for management.
1. Self-organize: manage your organization from the bottom up and influence the rules
that affect individual choices rather than the overall behavior of the organization.
2. Recombine: Proliferating connections make recombination easier. Turn your business
into an open system to capture value and innovation of diversity.
3. Sense and Respond: Sensors help us filter and act on new information and even
abandon forecasting altogether. Equip your business to sense change and respond
immediately, accurately and appropriately.
4. Learn and Adapt: After getting feedback on what happened when you sensed and
responded, learn from that experience and incorporate the new information into your
repertoire of responses.
5. Seed, Select, and Amplify: Test many diverse options and reinforce the winners.
Experiment, don’t plan.
6. Destabilize: The rate of environmental change demands internal instability for
survival. Disrupt the static elements of your organization. (p. 99)
Olson and Eoyang (2001), who see leaders as active change agents, described three
conditions that leaders need to pay attention to in order to create conditions for self-organization.

78
They include creating the container, or framework for the entity that is to self-organize; focusing
on the significant differences within the system, not to neutralize them but rather to pay attention
to them because they shape the primary patterns of the system; and generating transforming
exchanges through continuous dialogue. In his analysis of innovation-resisting and innovationproducing organizations, Shepard supported the importance of allowing space for significant
differences to emerge. He suggested “for the generative phase of innovation, the organization
needs a quality of openness so that diverse and heterogeneous persons can contribute and so that
alternatives can be explored” (Shepard, 1967, p. 476). Plowman et al. (2007) used a fascinating
case study about organizational change to highlight the difference between traditional leadership
roles such as planning, directing, organizing, and controlling and the leadership of emergence.
They proposed that leaders need to disrupt existing patterns by creating and highlighting conflict,
and acknowledging uncertainty, which is consistent with Olson and Eoyang’s emphasis on
focusing on significant differences. Leaders also need to encourage novelty by establishing
simple rules, encouraging swarm-like behavior, and promoting non-linear interaction. This
suggests that there is an active role for leaders in the organization although I would challenge the
suggestion that leaders are the ones to “establish” simple rules. The generation of these rule sets
within an organization can itself be a facilitated yet self-organizing process. Uhl-Bien and
Marion (2008) tied complexity leadership to Heifetz’s adaptive leadership construct:
Complexity leadership theory will add a view of leadership as an emergent, interactive
dynamic that is productive of adaptive outcomes (which we will call adaptive leadership).
It will consider leaders as individuals who act in ways that influence this dynamic and the
outcomes. (p. 299)
Despite the title of her book, Leadership and the New Science, Wheatley (1994) actually
only made two references to leadership and in so doing she seems to downplay the role of
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leadership in emergent organizations; however, when she does mention it, she actively linked
leadership to the concept of simple rules:
These ideas [about complexity] speak with a simple clarity to the uses of effective
leadership. They bring us back to the importance of simple governing principles: guiding
visions, strong values, and organizational beliefs—the few rules individuals can use to
shape their own behavior. The leader’s task is to communicate them, to keep them ever
present and clear, and then allow individuals in the system their random, sometimes
chaotic-looking meanderings. (p. 133)
This speaks to the vital role that leaders seem to have in the process of communicating key
concepts and language across the organization without trying to dictate the implications.
Plowman et al. (2007) added to this understanding of leaders as “sense-makers” who create
correlations and connections through the language they use. This is very much in line with the
school of thought that sees leadership as largely a narrative process (Baskin, 2008; Boje, 2008).
Boal and Schultz (2007) argued:
Storytelling gives life to the knowledge being generated and shared among organizational
members… By virtue of their narrative structure, stories tend to sort information into
coherent patterns… Stories make history available and help organizations learn from
their past. Stories capture culture and informal learning, and as such, are the “soft”
repository of knowledge. (p. 419)
My sense is that the story telling role of leadership needs further exploration. Experientially, I
have found that the challenge of a simple rules approach to human systems is that people
themselves are extremely complex. When we hear simple rules, whether they have been
established by others or through a collaborative process in which we are active participants, our
individual “narrative brains” (Rock & Page, 2009) begin to filter and interpret those rules in
ways that often seem to offer us the best advantage. To add to the complexity, when we are in a
situation of high stress or anxiety, we reconstruct these narratives over and over. As a
consequence, there is often very little consistency in how individuals within a group will
interpret the rules. Reynolds’ boids may all respond instantly to the three simple rules imbedded
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in them, but that is because they are computer blips that have no narrative capacity. If the boids
were people, they would instantly want to challenge the interpretation of the rules. Thus it
becomes the role of leaders, wherever they are in the organization, to develop, share and
promulgate illustrative stories that help shape collective understanding in a way that is neither
coercive nor manipulative.
Construct 6: A Localized Quality Framework
The primary rationale for the inclusion of this factor comes from Wergin’s (2003) study
in which he reported on the findings of an extensive Pew Charitable Trust study conducted in
1998 (Wergin & Swingen, 2000). In this study, the researchers wanted to identify the necessary
conditions for quality in a post-secondary education environment. They invited 5,000
institutions to participate if they felt they were doing something innovative around quality. Four
hundred and fifty responded, of which 140 showed evidence of a systems approach to quality.
Wergin and his research partner conducted interviews with the 140 and identified eight they felt
were at the leading edge. These included major research universities like University of Southern
California as well as small colleges and community colleges. What they found was that quality
occurred at the departmental level and that academic chairs were the key. The degree of
turnover at the VP Academics/Dean/Provost level suggested that, while they often initiated
change, they were not always there to see it through. It can be argued that the same is true on a
hospital setting, where the average tenure of a CEO or senior nursing executive is less than five
years. As a consequence of the turnover of senior leadership, quality issues fell to the
departmental heads. Wergin (2003) found six necessary conditions for quality.
Leadership of engagement. “The leaders were able to frame issues clearly, put clear
options before faculty, and be open to negotiating about what will inform these decisions. Of all
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the elements of organizational climate, this one was the most important” (Wergin, 2003, p. 33).
This aligns with the previously discussed factor related to senior leadership engagement and
support as well as clarity around the high level simple rules. In the research site used in this
study, quality improvement initiatives are framed by what they call a “tight-loose-tight”
approach. The senior leader(s) clearly define the current situation and the expected outcomes
(tight), then they leave a lot of space for those tackling the problem, those who are also those
impacted most by the outcomes, to work out the “how” (loose), but the leaders are very clear on
the timelines for completion (tight).
Engaged departments. There was a rich culture of engagement and critical reflection on
practice and processes. “Departments ask very basic questions about themselves—‘What are we
trying to do? Why are we trying to do it? Why are we doing in that way? How do we know it
works?’ In essence, these departments have created a climate for reflection” (Wergin, 2003,
p. 33). This aligns with three of the other factors that contribute to emergence: collaborative
work structures, distributed leadership, and intentional learning structures.
Culture of evidence. Decisions were evidence-informed but the quality of the decisions
was unrelated to the amount of evidence. “The key lay in what the institution did with the
information collected” (Wergin, 2003, p. 33). This aligns with the factor related to rapid, databased feedback.
Culture of peer collaboration and peer review. This was distinguished from the
culture of privatization that can be quite common in an academic setting. This collaboration was
consciously held in tension with the need for academic autonomy. The key was “how a
collection of individuals created a coherent whole” (Wergin, 2003, p. 34). This aligns with the
factor related to collaborative work structure and a fail-safe environment.
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Respect for differences. In language that echoes the movement toward higher levels of
interprofessional collaboration in the health care sector, Wergin (2003) describes the concept of
differentiation as key contributor to quality.
Faculty roles are differentiated, leading to a shift in focus from work that is judged by
standards external to the unit (merit) to the contribution of the faculty member to the
mission of the unit (worth). This merit/worth distinction is the key to understanding the
difference between the rampant specialization that has plagued academic departments in
the last century, and true role differentiation, which takes the departmental context into
consideration. (p. 34)
The hospital sector in Ontario is constantly trying to navigate between Ministry of Health and
Long-Term Care directives that are based on merit, and often driven by the most recent media
pressure on the government, and strategies that serve their local communities (worth). This
again argues for the factor of clear, but differentiating high-level rules.
Evaluation with consequence. While this may seem obvious, there are frequently no
consequences of a formal evaluation process; however, “consequence has its limits: The process
can’t be so consequential that it turns into a high-stakes political exercise” (Wergin, 2003, p. 34).
This aligns with the factor related to rapid, data-based feedback and clear criteria, based on highlevel rules. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in a safe-fail environment, the consequences are
for structure and process, not individuals.
While Wergin (2003) found that these were necessary conditions, they were not
sufficient. One other factor differentiated the really high quality departments: Evaluation
policies were flexible and decentralized. Each department defined what quality meant in their
context and then were held accountable for meeting that standard. “The only institution-wide
requirement was that departments include in their study an analysis of how they contribute to the
mission of the institution” (p. 35). This reflects the importance of the factor related to a clear
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strategic framework, but there is more to this concept. It is interesting that this approach was
initially criticized by some as allowing weak departments to avoid scrutiny of their problems but:
It turned out that the opposite was true: the strong departments were those that opted for
the focus approach, because they had a clearer sense of collective mission and saw in the
new policy an opportunity to collect information that would help them become stronger.
(Wergin, 2003, p. 35)
Wergin found that six necessary conditions have to exist before there is sufficient trust to
embraced decentralized evaluation. Based on this, a localized quality framework is deemed a
distinct factor unto itself in this study.
Others have also argued for an emergent view of quality in a health care setting. “When
quality is treated as a property arising from relationships within HCOs, then different
contributors of quality can be investigated and more effective strategies for improvement can be
developed” (Lanham et al., 2009, p. 457). In their review of two case studies of physician
practices, Miller, McDaniel, Crabtree, & Stange (2001) found that “the practices differed from
each other in critical ways that seem to be at odds with traditional ‘best practice’ thinking” (p.
876). This is consistent with the emerging literature on positive deviance (Spreitzer &
Sonenshein, 2004), which also puts to question the concept of best practices. “Viewing quality as
an emergent property provides health care professionals with an alternative way to make sense of
successes and failures” (Lanham et al., 2009, p. 458).
Construct 7: A Clear Accountability Framework
Patton (2008) argued that early attempts at formal accountability only really began when
the evident failure of massive federal programs such as the War on Poverty and the Great Society
led to a “watershed [of demand for greater accountability] flowing at every level—national, state
and local; public sector, not-for-profit agencies, and the private sector” (p. 21); however, the
consequence was “to make providers and practitioners compliance-oriented rather than results-
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focused. Programs were rewarded for doing the paperwork rather than making a difference”
(Patton, 2008, p. 21). Subsequent accountability models, not unlike the corresponding theories
of leadership, tend to focus on accountability to achieve clear, pre-defined goals and objectives
(Northouse, 2007; Yukl, 2006). While arguably an improvement over previous attempts to instill
some level of accountability, goal-achievement accountability becomes less valid when the goal
is unclear, a “Type III” problem (Heifetz, 1994). As the degree of residual uncertainty
(Courtney, 2001) continues to expand, such measurements lose much of their value. The
question becomes: If we cannot predict the future, how, or perhaps for what, then do we hold
people accountable?
Accountability is a state of, or process for, holding someone to account to someone else
for something—that is, being required to justify or explain what has been done…the
ways in which evaluation is used for accountability are frequently so poorly conceived
and executed that they are likely to be dysfunctional for programs and organizations.
(Rogers, 2005, p. 2)
Accountability became an even more significant concern for business management in the
United States after the ratiﬁcation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (also known as the Public
Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002). The lived experience of
many organizations having to work within this very restrictive framework has been a significant
drag on corporate productivity. The challenge that inappropriate accountability structures and
processes can actually hinder organizational performance is significant but it would seem to be
equally ineffective to return to a time of zero accountability. The risk is that the organization
could enter a zone of “unbounded instability” unlike the “bounded instability” that characterizes
that allows for innovation and self-organization (Kelly & Allison, 1998; Stacey, 1996). Several
attempts have been made to shape new forms of evaluation and accountability in response to this
challenge, including what Patton (Westley et al., 2007) referred to as developmental evaluation.
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Developmental evaluation integrates creativity and critical thinking. It involves long-term
partnering relationships between evaluators and those seeking innovative initiatives and
development. Developmental evaluators ask probing questions and track results to
provide feedback. This can be especially important in the explorative, reorganization
phase of social innovation that looks and feels chaotic and is characterized by many false
starts, dead ends and trial-and-error experimentation. (p. 83)
The explicit link between developmental evaluation and emergence was made clear in Westley et
al.’s (2007) examination of emergent, self-organization change in pursuit of social innovation.
Lin and Chang (2009) developed a flow model of accountability that focuses on the
resolution of adverse events, an issue that is significant in health care organizations where such
events can cause significant harm to the patient. This is another form of accountability
agreement.
When a problem occurs in a service system, the problem should be recognized, the
original causes should be identiﬁed and resolved, and the players that are responsible for
the faults should take appropriate remedy actions. The key phases of accountable
computing thus include Detect, Diagnose, Defuse, and Disclose as shown in Fig. 1. Each
phase has its goals and artifacts. As the executions of the phases are conducted in
sequence, the artifacts of the phases are continuously elaborated. In this way, a service
system may be continuously improved. (p. 435)
The difficulty of this model is that it is reactive in nature, responding as it does to a problem, but
it does demonstrate the importance of data-driven feedback as key to problem resolution. In the
language of complexity, such problems might be framed as examples of negative emergence:
change that is inconsistent with the organization’s higher purpose.
Eoyang (2010) described clear containers as one of three conditions required for selforganization to occur. In that context, accountability is explicitly linked to the simple rules that
put high-level boundaries around the organization’s activities. Agents in the system are held
accountable for making decisions based on that framework. This approach is central to the
organizational culture of a highly adaptive environment such as Disneyworld (Lee, 2004) who
also advocated it for a hospital environment. When thinking in terms of a CAS, there is a need
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to reframe the traditional management paradigm that would argue for a direct link between
accountability and authority. Block (1993) suggested that when we think in terms of
stewardship, “we can be accountable and give control to those closer to the work, operating from
the belief that in this way the work is better served” (p. 18). The efficacy of this approach was
clearly demonstrated in a service improvement initiative I studied at a major Toronto hospital
(Dickens, 2010b). In this case, a proactive approach was taken to creating a project-specific
framework that clearly defined outcome measures such as reduction in the average number of
admitted patients in the ED waiting for beds in a medical unit, a key performance indicator for
any hospital as it requires a high level of collaboration between a large number of departments
and individuals. Improvement in this area of service is highly complex. The project-specific
accountability framework cascaded naturally from the organization’s overall accountability
framework that, in turn, is explicitly framed by the hospital’s mission, vision, values, and critical
success factors. This strategic framework is itself framed by the accountability agreement signed
between the hospital and the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, their primary funder.
Effective accountability agreements are “nested” one within the other in the same way that CASs
are nested within other, often larger CASs.
Construct 8: Intentional Learning Structures
Vaill (1996) described the current environment in which organizations operate as
permanent white water and suggests that:
Chaos theory [that some would describe as the prolegomena to complexity theory]
concerns the same phenomena, but the descriptions and explanations in chaos theory are
about the white water itself, not the feelings and reactions of those experiencing it
directly. Chaos theory might eventually provide guides to action for social systems, but it
has not yet done so in detail. (p. 10)
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His comments about the usefulness of chaos theory were appropriate at the time but much has
been done in the intervening 15 years to change that, and this study is intended to add
significantly to the “guides.” In a personal conversation we had in 2009, Vaill noted that CAS
theory was fundamental in our emerging understanding of how to deal with permanent white
water. Vaill’s description of permanent white water clearly resonates with the concept of
emergent change: conditions that are full of surprises, novel problems, and events that are messy
and ill-structured.
Learning is a central element of a CAS capacity to adapt and change (Olson & Eoyang,
2001; Oshrey, 1995; Richardson, 2008; Stacey, 1996; Westley et al., 2007; Wheatley, 2005).
Even the simplest adaptive system has some purpose, namely, to perform some task. It
follows that, unlike agents in deterministic systems, agents in all adaptive systems adjust
their behavior in light of its consequence for their purpose. In other words, adaptive
systems learn, at the very least in a simple single-loop manner, whereas a deterministic
system does not. (Stacey, 1996, p. 72)
A great deal of attention is rightly placed on the capacity of the individual agents to learn and
adapt (Argyris, 1992; Mezirow, 1991) and for those same agents to engage in opportunities for
shared learning (Senge, 1994); however, this study is focused on the organizational factors that
contribute to emergence, so the focus here will be on structures. From that perspective, the
question becomes whether or not the agents of the system are intentionally aligned to teams and
groups that will facilitate learning. “From a CAS perspective, groups are characterized by
nonlinear, recursive interactions that create and adjust structure as groups adapt to their
embedding contexts” (Arrow & Cook, 2009, p. 46).
Argyris and Schön (1978) distinguished between espoused and in-use schemas, that is,
between the behavioral rules and assumptions that people publicly proclaim they use and the
rules and assumptions that observation of their behavior indicates they are actually using. The
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schema applies to any schema, but, importantly, it applies to the schema of interest in this study:
learning. They identified a popular, espoused model of learning that they call Learning Model II.
The rules in this model are that people should cooperate and participate in a search for win-win
solutions, gather facts, generate options, and hold them all up for public discussion and testing.
They should then be willing to adapt in light of that testing and not use power or hierarchical
position to obstruct the cooperative process. In other words, act like an emergent, selforganizing system and contemplate shared double-loop learning; however, what Argyris and
Schön found was that, although this is almost always the espoused model, another model is
actually employed. They called this Learning Model I. According to the in-use model, people
engaged in group interactions in order to win or at least not lose, retaining unilateral control of
any situation to avoid embarrassment and to contain the fear of failure. Opportunities for
participation are restricted as much as possible. The result is that people get trapped in singleloop learning. This reality is demonstrated consistently in a group activity called “Tops, Middles
and Bottoms,” based on the work of Oshrey (1995), in which the participants are explicitly given
Learning Model II and yet the behaviors follow Model I. We have worked with over 200 teams
in hospitals who complete an action-learning project as part of a larger leadership development
process and have observed the same pattern of negative in-use schemas in many of the teams.
Yet when the activities and outcomes of the team are consciously and consistently linked to the
larger purpose and values of the hospital, we have also seen a consistent application of Model II.
This suggests that an intentional link between learning and the strategic framework is an
important interdependency.
Yeo (2005) examined the efficacy of problem-based learning (PBL) in a professional
setting that makes the link between the learning structure and some form of accountability
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framework. While his focus was on engineering education, health professions also use PBL
frequently and are structured to generate and capture the learning that occurs.
PBL is predicated upon the belief that learning is most effective when learners are
actively involved and learn in a context where knowledge is to be used for a specific
purpose. In other words, PBL is learning with a particular relevance to prior objectives
set—as opposed to conventional spoon-feeding rote learning, evident in teacher-designed
didactic settings. (Yeo, 2005, p. 507)
Yeo (2005) described PBL as a postmodern approach to learning in that “the notions of
knowledge acquisition, learning and assessment are all integral to the learner’s social context”
(p. 508). Effectively designed action-learning teams are a workplace model of learning that
would seem to have a great deal of efficacy.
Construct 9: Rapid, Data-based Feedback Mechanisms
Like learning, feedback is a central concept in CAS theory. Complex systems are open
systems with feedback loops that can both enhance and stimulate positive emergence and detract
or inhibit negative emergence. Both kinds are necessary (Holden, 2005, p. 654).
Complex adaptive systems are often described as dissipative structures—systems that
respond to increasingly complex environments by importing greater resources from
outside and exchanging more resources within their boundaries to achieve greater degrees
of fitness. As opposed to their physical counterparts…[there is] an emphasis on
information rather than energy resource flows as a key characteristic of complex adaptive
social systems. (Boal & Schultz, 2007, p. 415)
This clearly argues for a steady flow of real-time information so that the agents within the system
can adapt to change. A system must not only receive, process, and retain information; it must
also respond and produce some form of output or new data to which other elements of the system
can then respond. The difference between the sorts of feedback mechanisms needed in complex
adaptive organizations is that the organization needs to be able to “hold multiple and sometimes
conflicting representations of environmental variety, retaining in their behavioral repertoire a
range of responses, each of which operates at a lower level of specificity” (Boisot & Child, 1999,

90
p. 238). In other words, the organization would likely “recognize multiple and emerging goals
inside organizations and emphasize the important connections among parts of the system”
(Ashmos et al., 2000, p. 578). Change in a CAS is encouraged by increasing information flow to
all parts of the organization and then pushing the authority to do something with that information
as far out into the organization as possible (Lichtenstein, 2000b).
McDaniel, Lanham, and Anderson (2009) proposed that the information and data
gathered through formal research needs to be done in such a way that different methodologies
can work together, and that “because the phenomena of interest are dynamic and unfolding in
unpredictable ways, we would be helped if we treated research design as a verb” (p. 192). Thus,
information and data gathering must cover the full range of options from the pure data to the
phenomenological experience of participants in the system because a research design that
includes multiple perspectives and processes is more likely to anticipate change than a process
that is limited to a single perspective and is often retrospective. Health care organizations have
historically used data that can be as much as a year old, which severely limits the system’s ability
to respond in real time. If the organization is going to be able to respond with agility, it demands
mechanisms that are multidimensional and virtually instantaneous. A positive example of this is
a strategy to call all surgical patients at home within 24 hours of discharge in order to assist with
any issues, provide information on recovery, and generally check on the patient’s status. While
the initial intent was to improve the patient experience, staff conducting these calls soon
discovered and acted upon multiple opportunities to make small changes in their processes and
protocols. The result was not only operational improvement including reduced readmission rates
but also increased patient satisfaction. In the past, that same hospital would have relied on
generalized patient satisfaction data that could well have been months old. This example
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demonstrates the link between real-time data and intentional learning structures, as well as clarity
of a shared commitment to the high-level rule of patient-centered care.
Data-gathering must be precise and accurate. In examining the effectiveness of a
Resident Assessment Inventory (RAI) in a nursing home context, Piven et al. (2006) noted that
the “Resident Assessment Inventory (RAI) does not guarantee good decision-making,
conscientious care, or even high quality care. The effectiveness of the RAI depends on the
reliability, specificity and comprehensiveness of baseline and follow-up assessment of residents’
status” (p. 296). They go on to say that “new information of good quality provides knowledge
that the staff can use to adjust their work behavior” (p. 296). This puts the emphasis on using the
data within a collaborative work and decision-making structure as well as the importance of a
safe-fail culture in which people are willing to seek out data, even when it may force them to
change beliefs. In my own practice experience, I have noted on several occasions where longheld mythologies could be removed with clear, unassailable data. This is the positive side of the
rationalistic diagnostic training of clinicians. “In comparing physician practices to a jazz
performance, Miller et al. (2001) note that “when good jazz players hear something unexpected,
they make sense of it and improvise” (p. 876). In the same way, an interprofessional care team
must also make sense of new data in a collaborative environment that is focused on
improvisation and improved quality, not assigning blame.
Finally, it is important to note the specificity of the data to its context and to link the data
that are gathered to the quality framework of clinical microsystem. “Part of the work of the
microsystem becomes the development of a set of measures that are appropriate to the goals of
the microsystem” (Mohr & Batalden, 2002, p. 47).
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In summary, I argue that one of the ways that complexity science can be useful to
organizational leaders is if it informs the strategic decisions they make about their organization.
“In the context of management thinking, continuous transformation and emergent order is a
natural state of affairs. The burden of trying to plan, organize and control everything can be laid
aside” (Jackson, 2003, p. 119). According to Anderson and McDaniel (as cited in Lindberg et
al., 2008), there are three factors, or system parameters that have a strong influence on selforganization are: rate of information flow; number and nature of connections; diversity of
cognitive schema (pp. 76-77). Enhancing both the qualitative and quantitative ate of
information flow is the intent behind two of the constructs of interest: intentional learning
structures and rapid, data-based feedback mechanism. Learning structures create the space
where information can be passed between colleagues and feedback mechanisms provide the data
needed to make decisions in a timely manner. Enhancing the number and nature of connections
is the intent behind five of the constructs of interest: collaborative work and decision-making
structures; CEO/executive commitment and engagement; a distributed leadership strategy; a
localized quality framework; and a clear accountability framework. The whole intent of
collaborative work structures such as daily huddles and collaborative care models is to increase
the number of connections. When the whole organization feels they have an opportunity to
engage with the senior leadership, it is can provide a dramatically different type of connectivity
that may not be experienced in a more hierarchical structure. Distributed leadership provides all
members of the organization to engage in a range of projects and opportunities that would not be
available otherwise. This point was made frequently in my practice experience at the study site.
When people feel like they are valued as leaders, are given the opportunity to learn and deploy
leadership skills, they form connections that often lead to surprising results. Moving decisions
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about quality metrics to the people who are doing the work creates a very different dialogue
among staff, and between staff and management. Clear accountability, both within a formal
structure and between peers creates opportunities for more open and honest conversations, freed
from assumptions and misunderstandings. Finally, a safe-fail culture that puts a premium on
accepting new ideas clearly puts a premium on the diversity of cognitive schema. The one
construct of interest that does not immediately fit into Anderson and McDaniel’s (as cited in
Lindberg et al., 2008) model is the importance of a clear strategic framework, and the research in
this study did not support its inclusion in the end.
Summary
What emerges from any discussion of factors or constructs of interest that facilitate
emergence is that, like the complex adaptive organizations they are intended to influence, no
single factor stands alone but rather it is the interdependence or combinatory nature (Arthur,
2009) of all of the factors that seems significant. This is an area that will require a great deal
more study. During the focus groups that were an important part of this study, there was
considerable discussion of the vital links between the constructs and an affirmation that it was
the combination of all of them that ultimately led to positive outcomes. What also seems
intuitive is that, while the factors may all be significant, they are also extremely contextual.
Actual outcomes and changes are highly influenced by the larger systems in which a specific
system is nested.
A review of the nine constructs of interest related to emergence surfaces the delicate
nature of complex, adaptive systems. Excessive emphasis on any one construct or the rigid
application of any or all of the constructs runs the risk of adding to the literature of well-run
organizations but risks missing the opportunity to truly contribute to a fuller understanding of the
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potential value of CAS theory as a way of rethinking how we influence change in organizations.
The intent of this study was to examine the presence or absence of these constructs or factors in a
highly complex hospital environment. This was done through a quantitative analysis using a
survey employing a Likert-type scale; the focus group following the survey was asked to explore
this combinatory question in greater detail. A full description of both research phases is given in
the next chapter.

95
Chapter III: Methodology
Research Study Problem
At the heart of the research question is the debate over whether emergence can be shaped.
Stacey (2003) would hold that emergence is so phenomenological in nature that it defies
definition and prediction and certainly quantifiability. I would argue that, if raising children
were an apt metaphor for complex, emergent phenomena, as I believe it is, then while the
outcomes of a child’s development will continue to be unpredictable and highly contextual,
certain factors contribute in a positive way to that process. While the factors may have changed
from the “spare the rod and spoil the child” philosophy of the Old Testament to new lessons
being learned from the field of positive psychology, there are still critical factors at play. In the
same way, the factors that contribute to organizational performance under conditions of
relatively high predictability will be different from the factors that contribute to agility,
adaptability, and performance under conditions of unpredictability or higher levels of residual
uncertainty (Courtney, 2001). This study intended to identify those factors in an empirical
manner in the hope that I could draw correlations to actual organizational performance. A
semantic point needs to be made here in order avoid confusion. The term “factor” is used here to
mean any condition that influences a course of events; however, until validation of the factor is
confirmed, it is technically referred to as a “construct of interest.” To add to the confusion,
SPSS© refers to a factor as a “component.” Hereafter, I use the term construct of interest in
describing the work of this study until I completed the PCA, at which point the term component
will be used.
The research regarding factors or constructs of interest that contribute to emergence is
limited. It is addressed directly by Alaa (2009) and Lanham et al. (2009), but in both cases the
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focus was on personal and relational factors (their term), and not those that were developed at a
more strategic or organizational level. The research methodology used in both cases was based
on a case study and did not involve the development of a more formal measure to quantify the
presence or absence of such factors. The development of such a quantifiable measurement
instrument in the form of a validated scale was the intent of the current study.
This was a mixed methods study, the purpose of which was to: (i) develop a scale, or a
group of subscales, of potential constructs of interest that facilitate measurement of the
phenomenon of emergent, self-organization using a sample group within a hospital; (ii) through
focus groups, explore the relationship between the presence or absence of the constructs of
interest and perceived organizational performance and resilience and; (iii) determine if
significant differences in the results were evident across organizational positions, age, gender
and education levels. I initially intended to complete step iii prior to the focus groups so that it
could form part of the focus group discussion, but scheduling issues at the study site meant that I
had to accelerate the focus groups.
Ultimately, a deeper understanding of the relationship between emergence and
organizational performance will enable formal leaders and organization development
practitioners to find key points of leverage if they want to enhance the capacity of their
organization to find innovative and novel solutions to the challenges that continuously emerge in
complex environments. While I had not yet completed a Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
of Likert-type items designed to measure the presence or absence of the proposed organizational
constructs of interest, I was able to share the constructs of interest with senior and middle
management leaders at the hospital in order to facilitate a dialogue about the potential
relationship between the presence, or absence, of the constructs of interest and the current
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organizational performance of the two hospitals. I then completed the PCA as well as a
comparison by two distinct demographic sub-groups, clinical and non-clinical as well as
manager and non-manager.
Research Question and Hypothesis
Research question 1: What valid factors emerge from factor analysis of items on the
Emergence Survey?
Research question 2: What is the relationship between the presence, or absence, of these
factors and organizational performance?
Research question 3: Are there significant differences from the derived component
scores for clinical/non-clinical and manager/non-manager groups?
Research Design
The quantitative aspect of this mixed methods study design was a PCA of Likert-type
items designed to cover the proposed constructs related to emergence. The Likert items were
included in the Emergence Survey in an online format. The survey instrument consisted of three
parts: (1) an initial paragraph introducing the emergence construct and giving instructions; (2)
nine separate sets of items, each related to one of the proposed constructs, with opportunities in
each area for additional comments; and (4) key demographic data related to the participant’s
gender, age, length of employment, role in the organization, education level, and location of
professional training. The population consisted of managers and staff, at a hospital in Toronto,
Ontario, Canada.
PCA was conducted for all the items taken as a whole in order to determine if the
resulting components do, in fact, represent the nine theoretical constructs of interest defined from
the literature review and other conversations. If the global assessment of all items resulted in the
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same nine theoretical constructs, then I would have proceeded with reliability analysis with the
sub-groups as defined by the survey questions; however, the global assessment showed a
different configuration, so the reliability analysis was done on these newly defined constructs.
Additional comparative analysis was completed using t-tests to determine if there were
significant differences in the derived scores across two sub-groups, clinical/non clinical and
manager/non-manager.
The qualitative aspect of this mixed methods study followed upon the analysis of the
quantitative data. The qualitative aspect consisted of two focus groups conducted at the research
site. One focus group consisted of one member of the executive team and four director level
staff. The second consisted of one manager and four nursing practice leaders (the equivalent of
nurse educators in other environments). The intent of the focus groups was to generate
discussion about the implications of the data, specifically as it relates to key organizational
performance indicators. These performance indicators initially related to patient satisfaction and
staff engagement, organizational quality indicators, and financial performance. These
performance indicators were proposed and articulated in consultation with the study sponsor.
Additional indicators, such as safety and patient flow data were also discussed. Procedures
included email invitations coordinated through the sponsor, the administration of informed
consent to all participants prior to the focus groups, facilitation of the focus groups, synthesizing,
correlating, and interpreting the data from the two groups, and soliciting feedback on the
interpretation from the study sponsor at the hospital.
Procedures for the survey administration included identifying appropriate participants
and getting Research Ethics Board approvals at the study site as well as an IRB approval at
Antioch University to administer the instrument. All related research materials such as
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transcriptions of the focus groups, the researcher’s notes, and the Informed Consent are being
kept in a secure file cabinet. Computer files were transferred to a flash drive and stored in the
same cabinet. The focus groups were a conversation among all of the participants, so people
were invited to comment on each other’s experiences. Following a brief description of the survey
results and a clarification of key terminology, the conversation was framed by the following
questions:


Do the factors that have been identified resonate with your own experience of emergent
change?



Which factors do you think correlate with key organizational performance metrics (e.g.,
staff engagement, patient satisfaction, NQI, etc)?



Why do you think that correlation exists?



What specific strategies or ideas for organizational change emerge from this discussion?



What do you see as the role for senior leadership in moving these strategies forward?

Mixed Methods Research
In a mixed methods design:
Although the names differ for the types of designs, two characteristics emerge that are
common to many classifications: either the purpose of the design is to merge (bring
together) the qualitative and quantitative data in a parallel or concurrent way, or to have
one type of data (quantitative or qualitative) build on or extend the type of data
(qualitative or quantitative) in a sequential way. (Berman, 2008, p. 9)
A mixed methods approach to the research design provided the right balance between
quantitative and qualitative methods that should have improved the depth, scope, and
dependability of the findings. In a mixed methods study, investigators
Look to quantitative methods for standardized, replicable findings on large data sets.
They look to qualitative methods for elucidation of the [study’s] cultural context,
dynamics, meaningful patterns and themes, deviant cases, and diverse impacts on
individuals as well as groups. Qualitative reporting methods are applied to bring the
findings to life, and make them clear, persuasive, and interesting. (Stufflebeam &
Shinkfield, 2007, p. 188).
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Key advantages of using both qualitative and quantitative methods are that:
They complement each other in ways that are important to the evaluation’s audiences.
Information from quantitative methods tends to be standardized, efficient, and amenable
to standard tests of reliability, easily summarized and analyzed, and accepted as hard
data. Information from qualitative approaches adds depth; can be delivered in interesting,
story-like presentations, and provides a means to explore and understand the more
superficial quantitative findings. (Stufflebeam & Shinkfield, 2007, p. 190)
A mixed methods design also provided me and the study site the opportunity to engage in
a dialogue about the implications of the data in terms of the strategic decisions that the data
suggest. I felt that this approach increased the degree of confidence in and ownership for the
results. “By using quantitative and qualitative methods, the evaluator secures cross-checks on
different subsets of findings and thereby instills greater stakeholder confidence in the overall
findings” (Stufflebeam & Shinkfield, 2007, p. 189).
Mixed methods designs are not without their problems. There is such a plethora of
designs in existence that it is difficult to sort them into any sort of typology (Leech &
Onwuegbuzie, 2009). Leech described a useful “three-dimensional typology that examines: (a)
level of mixing (partially mixed versus fully mixed); (b) time orientation (concurrent versus
sequential); and (c) emphasis of approaches (equal status versus dominant status)” (Leech &
Onwuegbuzie, 2009, p. 268). Fully mixed methods design represents the highest degree of
“mixing research methods and research paradigm characteristics” (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009,
p. 267).
This class of mixed research involves using both qualitative and quantitative research
within one or more of the following or across the following four components in a single
research study: (a) the research objective (e.g. the researcher uses research objectives
from both quantitative and qualitative research such as the objective of both exploration
and prediction; (b) type of data and operations; (c) type of analysis; and (d) type of
inference. (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009, p. 267)
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In a partially mixed design, “both the qualitative and the quantitative elements are conducted
either concurrently or sequentially in their entirety before being mixed at the data interpretation
stage” (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009, p. 267). In this study, the two methods were used
sequentially. Berman (2009) identifies several issues in sequential design that have been
addressed in this study. The first is sampling, which can be challenging when it comes to having
a balance across the two methods. I used a smaller subset of the quantitative group to discuss
and interpret the results through the focus groups. Secondly, care must be paid to the selection of
participants. Bergman (2009) suggested the use of specific criteria. In this study, the participants
were all employees at the same hospital and have completed a leadership development program
designed and facilitated by me. The third challenge is the selection of results. Bergman (2009)
suggested the use of quotes as part of interpretation of the qualitative data, which is what I have
done. The fourth challenge is the risk of contradictory results, which did occur in this study and I
identified and addressed them with the focus groups. The fifth challenge was a legitimate
concern for me as mixed methods requires the researcher to have skills in both methods. While I
have facilitated and analyzed data from many focus groups, the design and interpretation of the
data from a quantitative study was new to me and it was definitely a significant area of personal
learning. The final concern is the length of time for the data collection. I kept access to the online
survey open for 34 days, and sent three reminders, each of which resulted in a spike in response.
I then conducted the focus groups shortly after I had completed a preliminary data analysis to
ensure that the overall time scale was manageable.
In this study, quantitative data and analysis were the dominant design because the
qualitative data was used to interpret the quantitative. In summary, this study was a partially
mixed, sequential design with a dominant quantitative study and a subordinate qualitative study
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because the quantitative phase has the greater emphasis (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009). Morse
(1991) developed a notational system for use in mixed methods design. Based on that notation,
which allows the reader to quickly understand the three elements that Leech and Onwuegbuzie
(2009) have described, this was a QUANqual study, indicating that it is sequential () and
that quantitative methods, noted by the capitalized “QUAN,” came first and had the dominant
status over the qualitative methods, noted by the lower case “qual.” This typology was chosen
because I was trying to use an “explanatory design in which the quantitative data and results are
followed up through qualitative data and results, in order to inform the interpretation” (Bergman,
2009, p. 10).
Literature Review on Survey Development
The development of meaningful scales is a complex task that must be approached with a
great deal of respect for previous scholarship. In an extensive review of the organizational
behavior literature, Hinkin (1998) found that “inappropriate domain sampling, poor factor
structure, low internal consistency, reliability and poor reporting of newly developed measures
continues to threaten our understanding of organizational phenomena” (p. 104). In order to
prevent these types of errors, it was important to understand the underlying concept of classic
test theory that provides the rationale for “repeated, summated measurement” (Spector, 1992, p.
10). Classic test theory differentiates the true score from the observed score. The true score is a
value that each respondent has on the constructs of interest, whereas the observed score is the
score actually revealed by the measurement process. True scores cannot be directly observed but
can be inferred from the observed score.
Scaling has been defined as “the process of setting rules for assigning numbers in a
measurement” (Cohen & Swerdlik, 2010, p. 237). In his compendium of available scales to
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measure various aspects of the work environment, Fields (2002) identified the factors that he
considered necessary for a useful scale, and the basis for inclusion in his book. They include: the
measure is based on sound theoretical foundation and clear conceptual definition; the instrument
demonstrates evidence of internal reliability, such as coefficient alpha, and empirical evidence of
convergence validity, such as correlation with appropriate variables; the measure uses at least
three items to operationalize perceptions and attitudes; and the items used in the measure were
available from a published source (Fields, 2002, p. xix).
In order to meet all but one these criteria, I identified nine initial constructs of interest
and developed six to eight items for each factor. The evidence of internal validity for seven
components emerged from the PCA. The second characteristic is that each item must measure
something that has an underlying, quantitative measurement continuum. I will now provide a
fuller description of the procedures used.
Procedure for This Study
I worked sequentially through the following steps:
(1) Selected participants for inclusion in the study
(2) Sought Research Ethics Board approval for data collection from the study site and
Institutional Review Board approval from Antioch University
(3) Made arrangements to collect data from participants
(4) Developed survey and scale
a. Defined constructs
b. Designed the scales
c. Conducted pilot study
(5) Collected data
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(6) Entered and cleaned the data
(7) Completed analysis
a. .....Item analysis
b. .....Component analysis
c. .....Reliability analysis
(8) Made arrangements for the focus groups
(9) Conducted two focus groups to discuss the data
(10) Reviewed the focus group feedback
(11) Conducted Comparative Analysis
(12) Interpreted findings
(13) Summarized quantitative and qualitative findings
Each of these steps is described below.
1. Selection of participants for inclusion in the study. Over the past six years, 480
managers, staff, and physicians at the hospital study site have completed a program called
Foundations of Leadership that, in part, is framed by CAS theory. This program was made
available to all staff, physicians, and managers. Approximately 80%, or 403, of the participants
were still currently employed at the hospital at the time of my study. These individuals
represented the diverse hospital staff. They were all invited to participate in the study in the
hope that their familiarity with the language and with me personally would increase the response
rate.
2. Research site REB and Antioch IRB approval. A preliminary expedited Research
Ethics Board for the research site was received, with the approval of my dissertation chair. This
was required by the study site in order to commit to the study and on the understanding that

105
substantive changes during the proposal stage of the study could necessitate a review of the
approval granted. The REB at this particular location requires that the principal investigator be
an employee of the hospital, so the vice president of patient programs and chief nursing
executive was named as such and I was named as a co-researcher. Prior to the launch of the
study, however, the individual named as the sponsor left the hospital. I received permission from
the REB Committee to replace her as sponsor with another employee, who was a senior director.
The Informed Consent and Protocol required for the REB are attached as Appendixes A and B,
respectively. Following the approval of this proposal, an application was filed with the Antioch
University Institutional Review Board. The site REB approval required no further changes and
was submitted to the IRB as supporting data.
3. Made data collection arrangements. The Organizational Learning and Change office at
the hospital maintains the database of Foundations of Leadership program participants and I was
provided with e-mails for each of these participants so that I could connect each of them to
Survey Monkey™. The survey was printed to a PDF for the purposes of the proposal and this
dissertation only. No paper copies were distributed. A copy of the survey is attached as
Appendix C.
4. Developed survey and scale. Spector (1992) laid out a five-step process for the
development of a scale that was consistent with a similar model outlined in Hinkin (1998).
Spector (1992) defined these steps as; defining the construct of interest; designing the scale;
conducting the item analysis; validation; and establishing reliability and norms. Norms are
typically best established based on the results of several survey groups. Since this is an
exploratory factor analysis, the final step was not conducted as part of this study.
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4a. Defined the constructs of interest. The first step in developing a scale, according to
Spector (1992), is to define the constructs of interest. As Hinkin (1998) pointed out, “The key to
successful item generation is the development of a well-articulated theoretical foundation that
would indicate the content domain for the new measure” (p. 105). I attempted to meet this
criterion based on an extensive literature review that is discussed in Chapter II. This review
included interviews related to complex adaptive systems theory, dialogue with my colleagues,
and a focus group. In doing this I took a deductive approach (Hinkin, 1998) because I believed I
had sufficient understanding of the phenomena to be investigated. This theoretical underpinning
worked in parallel with the rational or logical approach proposed by Worthington & Whittaker
(2006) that relied on “the scale developer’s judgments to identify or construct items that are
obviously related to the characteristic being measured” (p. 809).
The defining of the constructs of interest actually began in my own practice experience
several years ago when I had a leadership role in the merger of two hospitals. My responsibility
as vice president of organization development was to help shape a common culture defined by
innovation, agility, and distributed leadership, all in the service of enhancing the patient
experience. The outcome was national recognition of the organization. My frame of reference at
the time was complexity theory, although I did not have a deep knowledge of the area. In
retrospect, all of the factors in question came into play but without a great deal of intentionality.
We tried several different approaches, but we were quick to abandon ideas that clearly weren’t
working, adapt those that showed promise, and increase our commitment to those that were
having a positive impact. The change in culture was continuous and incremental, but the end
result was transformational. I was then able to leverage that experience into consulting work that
applied the same ideas to a range of hospitals as well as private sector organizations. I had not
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specifically categorized factors or tried to create an overall framework, but was beginning to
develop a growing understanding of what helped create deep culture change in complex
organizations. I therefore came to my doctoral studies with 15 years of practice experience but
with limited theoretical support for my approach.
In preparation for a major study on hospitals as complex, adaptive systems that I
completed in partial fulfillment of my Ph.D. under the supervision of Dr. Brenda Zimmerman,
herself a recognized expert in the area of complexity theory and health care, I conducted
interviews with hospital CEOs in Greater Toronto. While I was not explicitly looking for
common factors, in a later review of the interview notes clear examples of seven common factors
surfaced. When I read Alaa’s (2009) article, the idea of developing a factorial framework begin
to take shape in my mind. I then completed a second study as part of my doctoral studies that
was primarily looking at issues of power in a specific hospital context. In this case, it was a very
effective process improvement project that resulted in a dramatic improvement in the time
required to transfer patients from the emergency room to a medical bed. I interviewed each
member of the team, as well as the senior leaders who had supported the team. What was clear
was that, while power was not an issue, the presence of the seven factors was evident. Through
the interview process, two more factors emerged: the concept of a localized quality framework
and the vital need for accurate, real-time data so that the system would adapt quickly. Based on
a belief in nine constructs of interest, I then went to the literature to find support for, or negation
of, any of the constructs but did not identify anything that I considered a significant issue.
As the literature review continued, and in order to more formally identify potential
organizational constructs, I engaged in what Isaacs (1999) calls dialogic leadership to describe a
process that is emergent and iterative. This mindset seems to honor the very nature of the
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phenomena under study, so before turning my hand to formally defining the constructs, I
engaged in a series of conversations with colleagues who are conversant with complex, adaptive
systems theory. Initially, these conversations were based on each of them having read the Alaa
(2009) article. Immediately, the question of positive and negative emergence surfaced, causing
me to reflect on how one might separate the two. In one conversation, we spoke at length about
this and finally agreed that positive emergence had, in some way, to contribute to a higher
purpose. It also led me to want to better understand both positive and negative emergence in
terms of factors that might contribute to one or the other, or both. Alaa seems to assume that
emergence is by definition positive, which is a potential weakness in her approach.
Another important early discussion centered on whether emergence is the outcome or the
process. Initially, my feeling was that it was a process. One colleague, who supported the idea
that it was a process, related a useful metaphor she attributed to Barnett Pearce at The Fielding
Institute. Are we interested in studying snowflakes (a phenomenological study as each is
different and produces a unique outcome) or the process of making snow (something we can
understand and describe, even though the outcomes will be unique each time we do it)? In this
context, the factors could be what we can understand in terms of the process, while accepting
that the outcomes may or may not be what we expect or even want; however, as the
conversations proceeded, I began to focus on the language in the literature that is typically
framed as “emergent outcomes” or “emergent phenomena,” suggesting that emergence is really
the end rather than the means. This is a view supported by Dr. Zimmerman, who was part of this
dialogue.
As conversations unfolded, I began to ask people to simply reflect on times when they
had experienced emergence, which I defined as a time when people were willingly embracing
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uncertainty, living with surprise and co-creating of novelty. One interviewee identified five
specific times when the organization experienced the phenomenon and from that distilled five
elements that suggested that things were aligned for emergence. These elements included
timing, the importance of senior level support, a willingness on the part of senior management to
embrace the role of organization development in driving a change agenda, encouraging people to
be in an innovation mode, and identifying early innovators willing to embrace change (Milligan,
personal correspondence, 2011).
One of my Antioch colleagues described a community-based initiative that had all of the
indications of a self-organizing, emergent phenomenon (Lyshall, personal correspondence, 2011).
She identified five elements that contributed. First was what she described as authorized
leadership. The team that led the initiative had the support of the state legislature and the
governor. While neither was involved in the specifics of the project, their public support was seen
to be vital, which aligns with my previous comments about the importance of executive level
support for emergent change. The second element was the presence of strong relationships and
mutual trust. Participants represented a broad diversity of interests and were each seen as leaders
in their areas of expertise and they built a strong sense of mutual trust that contributed to a sense
of camaraderie. This very much aligned with Alaa’s (2009) intangible dynamics. The third
element was fascinating to me: the chance to be part of something big. This was the largest and
most publicized environmental effort ever conducted in the region. Everyone with any ties to the
environmental community wanted to be a part of it, and when my colleague asked each person to
be a part of the core team in the region, there was no hesitation and each accepted and devoted
significant amounts of time. They were being given a leadership role and a voice. Fourth, there
was a palpable sense of passion. As my colleague pointed out, there is always a significant
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amount of passion within the environmental community, but because of the priority placed on this
issue by the governor, passion was at an all time high. Finally, history and rhetoric played a
significant part. Protecting and restoring the specific area has a long history of failed efforts and
the initiative to which my colleague was referring was touted as the last chance.
One of the more significant issues that emerged in these conversations was the
recognition that self-organization and emergence are both extremely sensitive to initial
conditions.
Sensitive dependence on initial conditions (or the butterfly effect) is a property of a
complex system in which small changes can have a disproportionate or nonlinear impact.
Hence the past is crucial part of understanding the trajectory of a system. In health care
this often becomes the rationale for needing context-specific solutions. (Zimmerman,
2010, p. 34)
However, Zimmerman made the point that many assessment tools, like traditional management
theory, tend to assume that they are acontextual and ahistorical (personal communication, 2010).
Initially, this presented me with a significant dilemma. As these conversations emerged, I realize
that there is much work to do in identifying the critical factors that contribute to emergence in as
many contexts as possible, while recognizing that such a framework will inevitably run afoul of
outlier situations and contexts.
Thus, I developed a preliminary set of organizational constructs of interest that encourage
emergence, based on practice experience, previous research, and a series of conversations and a
focus group, supported by the literature. As I reviewed the literature, examined my previous
studies, and conducted the focus group, I not only looked for clarity regarding the constructs of
interest but I also developed and refined a list of items for each of the constructs. The nine
constructs of interest that formed the survey included:
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1. Strategic Framework
2. Organizational Culture
3. Work Structures
4. CEO and Executive Team
5. Quality Control Systems
6. Accountability Framework
7. Learning Structures
8. Leadership Culture
9. Feedback Processes
The following chart on the maps the development of the constructs.
Table 3.1
Development of Constructs of Interest

4b. Designing the scale. Spector’s (1992) second step is designing the scale. There are
two parts to designing the scale: developing the items and deciding on response categories. In
developing the items, Spector suggested that no item should have a right or wrong answer and
that respondents be requested to answer each item. The online version of the Emergence Survey
contained no right or wrong answers but a range of agreement responses and required that all
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items be responded to before it would accept the submission, thus meeting this criterion. Spector
proposed five rules in writing good items: Items: (1) should be clear, well written, and contain a
single idea; (2) both positively and negatively worded items should be used; (3) jargon should
be avoided; (4) the language should be appropriate to the population with whom it will be used;
and (5) the use of negatives to reverse the wording of an item should be avoided (pp. 23-26).
The three most common response choices the respondents could be asked to make
include agreement, evaluation, and frequency (Spector, 1992). Agreement asks the respondents
to reveal the extent to which they agree with the item. Evaluation asks for an evaluative rating
for each of the items listed, whereas frequency asks for a judgment of how each item “has,
should, or will occur” (Spector, 1992, p. 19). Agreement responses are usually binary in nature,
often with a neutral middle point. Evaluation responses ask respondents to rate along a “goodbad dimension” (Spector, 1992, p. 21). These responses may range from excellent to terrible.
Frequency scales ask respondents how many times something has happened or will happen
(Spector, 1992). I chose an agreement response choice, using a six-point Likert scale in which 1
= strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = somewhat agree, 5 = agree, and 6
= strongly agree. The left to right movement to a higher level of agreement was intended to
reflect the respondent’s likely thought process of increasing approval. Examples of items that
were used for the construct Strategic Framework included: I understand how the mission and
values of our organization apply to my work; our group is conscious of aligning our decisions
with the strategic priorities of the organization; and my work serves a higher purpose. For
examples of all the items, see Appendix C.
4c. Pilot study. I then conducted a pilot study of the survey with a small number of
respondents who were asked to critique it. I created the Emergence Survey in Survey
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Monkey™, working closely with my methodology advisor to craft the introduction and the look
of the survey. I then sent the link to 26 individuals whom I knew to have some familiarity with
complexity theory. This included clients, the colleagues with whom I had had my initial
conversations, and four of my Antioch classmates. I received 15 responses. In addition to
catching typographical errors, their feedback was very helpful in exposing potential issues in the
survey as well as developing new items. I took specific note of comments that suggested the
questions reflect the characteristic or qualities of effective organizations overall and did not seem
to be specific to the phenomenon of emergence. One comment, for example, suggested that the
survey reflects many of the attributes of Daniel Pink’s Drive (2009) in which he described
empirical research studies demonstrating that people are less motivated by money than they are
by opportunities for autonomy, mastery, and connection to a higher purpose. While Pink did not
specifically connect his work to complex, adaptive systems theory, the examples he gave are
filled with stories of emergent phenomena, so the connection should not be unexpected. Another
comment linked the emphasis on the importance of “higher purpose” as one of the simple rules
consistent with Sinek’s (2009) research on human motivation. I had an extensive discussion
about this with my dissertation committee chair, Dr. Jon Wergin, who was one of the people who
made such a comment. Wergin (2003) has studied a wide range of academic departments and it
was, in fact, his work that guided the development of the construct related to quality frameworks.
We came to the conclusion that complex, adaptive systems theory may in fact provide a useful
theoretical framework within which to situate many forms of positive organizational
performance.
One challenge was finding the right terminology to describe a team or department. In
today’s work environment, there is an enormous variety in both the structure and the language

114
that people use to describe their working relationships. In the end, I added the following to the
introductory page of the survey:
Several places in the survey you will see the word “group” used. Given the variety of
different work structures that exist in many organizations, this is used to include formal
work teams as well as your network of colleagues, groups with shared interests, or
ongoing generative relationships. It is the primary group from whom you get, and to
whom you give feedback, ideas, or information on an ongoing basis.
I then added the following after any questions that contained items related to specific work
structures.
Where the word “group” is used it means the primary group from whom you get, and to
whom you give feedback, ideas, or information on an ongoing basis.
As a result of the comments on the initial survey, a total of five new items were added and one
was dropped. In general, comments from my pilot group were positive in terms of consistency,
simplicity, and clarity of language. At that point, I also added demographic questions to the
survey that were intended to be useful when answering research question 3.
5. Collecting data. The survey was administered to the 403 potential participants at the
study site as described under “Selection of Participants for Inclusion in the Study.” They were
people still employed at the study site who have completed the leadership development program
I facilitate. I coordinated with the Organizational Learning and Change Department at the study
site to send out the following email to all potential participants 48 hours prior to them receiving
an email generated automatically from Survey Monkey™. The following was the text of that
invitation:
SUBJECT: Invitation to Complete a Brief On-line Survey
Greetings:
Many of you know me from the Foundations of Leadership program. I am currently in
the final stages of a Ph.D. in Leadership and Change at Antioch University. As part of my
dissertation I am conducting a study to measure the presence or absence of organizational
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factors that contribute to emergent self-organization at Toronto East General. I define
emergence as unexpected outcomes, surprise innovations, and untraditional strategies.
Once the factor analysis is complete, a group of leaders at East General will have an
opportunity to review the results to examine potential correlations to organizational
performance.
I would like your help in participating in a confidential on-line survey that should take
15-20 minutes to complete. Your individual responses will be kept confidential. There is
no financial remuneration for participating in this study, but at your option you may enter
your name in a drawing to win an iPad.
If you have any questions before logging on, please don’t hesitate to contact me at
pdickens@antioch.edu or (905) 466-6340.
Within 48 hours you will receive a brief e-mail from Survey Monkey™ with a log on
code so that you can complete the survey.
A second reminder email was sent after two weeks and a third reminder was sent out two seeks
later.
6. Entered and cleaned data. Prior to analysis, the data were transferred electronically
from Survey Monkey™ to SPSS. Data were checked for accuracy through the use of data
summary techniques that revealed inconsistent, missing, or outlier items.
Some of the items were stated negatively and some positively. The negative responses
were reversed using SPSS data transformation procedures in order to ensure appropriate
interpretation of the data.
7. Analysis. The following describes the steps that were taken in order to analyze the
data from the completed surveys.
Validation. According to Spector (1992), the most challenging part of scale development
is actual validation. Abell, Springer, and Kamata (2009) described validity in the context of
needing to establish evidence. They describe the types of evidence as: face, content, factorial,
construct, and criterion (See Table 3.2 below).
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Table 3.2
Establishing Evidence of Scale Validity
Type of Evidence

Functional Questions

Face

Does the scale appear to measure what it
claims to measure?
Does item content reflect the construct
definition?
Does the scale measure the number of
constructs it claims?
Do variables that should correlate with the
scale do so?
Do scale scores that should not correlate with
the scale score not do so?
Do scale scores adequately categorize
respondents with known characteristics?

Content
Factorial
Construct: Convergent
Construct: Discriminant
Criterion:
Concurrent KnownGroups
Criterion:
Concurrent KnownInstruments
Predictive

Do categories based on new scale scores
adequately match those based on previous
standardized measures?
Do scale scores accurately predict future
behaviors or attitudes of respondents?

Note. Abell et al., 2009, p. 1001
Face validity refers to the correlation between what a test seems to measure to the testtaker and what the scale actually measures. Abell et al. (2009) cautioned against the dangers of
being overly reliant on face validity. They cite the work of Mosier who suggested that being
overly reliant on face validity was so potentially dangerous that the term should be “banished to
outer darkness” (p. 202). I established the face validity of the Emergence Survey through
feedback from 15 subject matter experts but accept that this has limited value.
Content validity describes a judgment regarding how well the scale items serve as a
representative sample of all the possible items. In other words, does the test cover the important
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aspects of the construct of interest? Again, feedback from my subject matter experts and the
initial focus group suggested that content validity appeared to be reasonable.
Factorial validity describes the degree to which the scale measures the number and type
of constructs it claims. Construct validity includes measures of convergent and discriminatory
validity. Convergent construct validity is an assessment of whether or not scales correlate with
other scales that are known to measure related constructs. Discriminatory validity assesses the
opposite: whether the scales do not correlate with scales that measure unrelated constructs.
Construct validity has been regarded as the unifying concept for all validity evidence. “All types
of validity evidence, including content and criterion-related validity, are forms of construct
validity” (Cohen & Swerdlik, 2010, p. 194).
Criterion-related validity is an assessment “regarding how adequately a test score can be
used to infer an individual’s most probable standing on some measure of interest—the measure
of interest being the criterion” (Creswell, 2009, p. 160). Concurrent and predictive validity
provides evidence for determining criterion-related validity. “Concurrent validity can be tested
by simultaneously collecting data from a sample of respondents on the scale of interest and on
criteria, hypothesized to relate to the scale of interest” (Spector, 1992, p. 48). Finding a
statistically significant relationship of the scale scores with hypothesized variables is taken as
support for validity (Spector, 1992). Predictive validity is a test that predicts future variables. It
is similar to concurrent validity, except that the data for the scale are collected before the
criterion variables. As an exploratory factor analysis, it was not the intent of this study to address
concurrent or predictive validity. Factor analysis was used to demonstrate factoral validity. The
focus groups addressed some issues related to convergent and divergent validity.
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7a. Conducting the item analysis. According to Spector (1992), the third step in scale
development is item analysis. For this study there were two relevant steps for the item analysis:
a review of measures of central tendency and a review of bivariate correlations. Descriptive
summaries of the variables including calculation and review of means, standard deviations,
ranges, frequency distributions, measures of skewness, measures of kurtosis, and histograms are
provided in the analysis. These classify how distributions differ from one another. Likert items
that had a measure of kurtosis >3.000 were eliminated, because the kurtosis is considered too
extreme and Likert items that do not have a statistically significant correlation of .30 with at least
one of the Likert items related to the same overarching construct of interest at the .05 level of
significance were excluded from further analysis. Although .30 is less than the .40 suggested by
Spector (1992), it is a generally accepted standard (Blaikie, 2003, p. 222).
7b. Principal component analysis. Spector’s fourth step is validation. Factor analysis
provides one form of validation. The overall purpose of factor analysis is to reduce the number
of items to a smaller number of underlying groups of items while retaining as much of the initial
item variance as possible (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). Factor analysis derives its factors
by analyzing the pattern of covariance or correlation among items related to a common construct
of interest. Items that interrelate relatively highly are assumed to reflect the same construct
while a low correlation would suggest different constructs (Spector, 1992, p. 54).
In an exploratory factor analysis such as completed for this study, two major questions
need to be addressed: (a) the number of factors that best represent the items and (b) the
interpretation of the factors (Spector, 1992, p. 54). The analysis also allowed for the reduction of
the number of items needed to measure the overall construct of emergence as well as the subconstructs that contribute to the phenomenon. While factor analysis has its genesis in a
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mathematical procedure, the answers to these questions required judgment and ongoing
conversation.
The analysis involved several iterative steps using SPSS software. PCA was conducted
for all the items taken as a whole in order to determine if the proposed nine separate constructs
within the overarching construct do, in fact, exist. As detailed in the following chapter, the
global assessment results showed that they did not, and thus I could not proceed with a
component level reliability analysis as originally defined. I then reviewed the nine constructs of
interest to see if there were natural “clusters” of two or three constructs that might make sense
together from a theoretical perspective. Since the global assessment showed a different
configuration, the components were labeled to reflect new concepts and reliability analysis was
done on these newly defined constructs. I argued that there were three such clusters: people and
culture, structures and frameworks; and systems and processes.
7b. (1) Decision rules for item reduction. There are several options for retaining certain
components. Kaiser (1960) suggested that all components with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0
should be considered. In fact:
Those researchers [in a PsychINFO search] who reported their criteria for deciding the
number of factors to be retained for rotation, the majority use the Kaiserian criterion.
While this represents the norm in the literature… it will not always yield the best results
for a particular data set. (Costello & Osborne, 2005, p. 1)
In an initial, unrotated solution, the eigenvalue can be used to measure the amount of the total
variance for which each factor accounts (Blaikie, 2003, p. 223). The higher the eigenvalue, the
greater the variance explained by the factor. “A common rule of thumb is to consider only
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0, although values as low as .70 are also recommended”
(Blaikie, 2003, p. 222). Alternatively, Cattell (1966) suggests that the graphical Scree plot
should be examined for the elbow in the graph, or the point at which the plot line stops dropping.
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The goal is to ensure that as many factors as possible are retained, provided they emerge from
the PCA and represent an identifiable construct. “Both overextraction and underextraction of
factors retained for rotation can have deleterious effects on the results” (Costello & Osborne,
2005, p. 2). In my analysis, I used a decision rule that retained items with an eigenvalue =>
1.000.
7b. (2) Rotation. The purpose of a rotation is to produce clusters of items based on
various mathematical criteria or to “simplify and clarify the data structure” (Costello & Osborne,
2005, p. 3). Varimax, which is an orthogonal rotation method that produces factors that are
uncorrelated, was used in this study. “Researchers use orthogonal rotations when the set of
factors underlying a given item set are assumed or known to be uncorrelated” (Worthington &
Whittaker, 2006, pp. 819-820). It should be noted that rotation does not improve the basic
aspects of the analysis, such as the amount of variance extracted from the items. Stevens (as cited
in Blaikie, 2003) recommended that only loadings of 0.40 and above should be taken seriously,
and that is the decision rule that I used.
7b. (3) Reliability analysis—Cronbach’s alpha for each construct. Salkind’s (2008) fifth
step is establishing reliability and norming. As stated earlier, establishing norms is beyond the
scope of this study; however, the sub-scales representing each construct were tested for
reliability. I then conducted a reliability analysis to establish Cronbach’s alpha for reach
component. Cronbach's alpha determines the internal consistency or average correlation of items
in a survey instrument to gauge its reliability.
Cronbach’s Alpha is an index of reliability associated with the variation accounted for by
the true score of the "underlying construct." Construct is the hypothetical variable that is
being measured. Alpha coefficient ranges in value from 0 to 1 and may be used to
describe the reliability of factors extracted from dichotomous (that is, questions with two
possible answers) and/or multi-point formatted questionnaires or scales (i.e., rating scale:
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1 = poor, 5 = excellent). The higher the score, the more reliable the generated scale is.
(Santos, 1999, Second Section)
Nunnally, 1979 p. 248) has indicated 0.7 to be an acceptable reliability coefficient but lower
thresholds are sometimes used in the literature. “Internal-consistency reliability is an indicator of
how well the individual items of a scale reflect a common, underlying scale” (Spector, 1992,
p. 65). Cronbach’s Alpha is the statistic most often used to assess internal consistency.
8. Making arrangements for the focus groups. In order to further interpret the findings
within the specific context of the study site, I conducted two focus groups with leaders at the
hospital. I worked with the sponsor’s administrative assistant to determine the optimum time
and location for each group. The focus groups were held on-site in a private meeting or
conference room. We sent out invitations to the target groups, based on the following email:
SUBJECT: Invitation to a Focus Group
Greetings:
As you are aware, I have been conducting a survey at (the hospital) to determine the
perceived presence or absence of organizational factors that facilitate emergent change
and self-organization. I hope you were one of the 162 managers, staff and physicians who
completed the survey.
I have completed gathering and analyzing the data, and would like to invite you to a
focus group to review the data and discuss if and how the results may or may not
correlate to (the hospital’s) performance. I hope that you will find this a useful strategic
discussion that may reveal some points of leverage that could increase the hospital’s
resilience, agility, and patient-centred care.
Please attend a focus group from (TBD) in Room (TBD). I have attached an Informed
Consent and would bring two signed copies to the focus group. I will sign both and return
one to you. I will keep my copy in a secure filing cabinet. Informed Consent is required
under (the hospital’s) REB approval. The session will be recorded, but all recordings,
transcriptions and my own notes will be kept in a secure fining cabinet off-site.
If you have any questions, please don’t hesitate to contact me at pdickens@antioch.edu or
(905) 466-6340.
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9. Conducting the focus groups. Focus groups have their origins in the field of consumer
research in the 1950s and 1960s. Powell and Single (1996) defined a focus group as “a group of
individuals selected and assembled by researchers to discuss and comment on, from a personal
perspective, the topic that is the subject of the research” (p. 499). “As a usual procedure, the
researchers recruited about a dozen consumers and interviewed them as a group to hear their
individual and collective judgments of a product or service they had tried” (Stufflebeam &
Shinkfield, 2007, p. 579). “Focus groups explicitly use group interaction as part of the method.
This means that instead of the researcher asking each person to respond to a question in turn,
people are encouraged to talk to one another: asking questions, exchanging anecdotes, and
commenting on each other’s experiences and points of view” (Kitzinger, 1995, p. 299). Another
way to put it would be to suggest that an effective focus group is, in itself, an example of an
emergent phenomenon. The interviewer initiates a conversation with an open-ended question
but does not try to control the direction or flow of the ensuing dialogue between participants.
Interestingly, Gibbs (1997) saw this as a disadvantage of focus groups, suggesting that the
researcher “has less control over the data produced” (p. 2). From a complex, adaptive systems
theory perspective, what gives the process coherence is not the researcher but a common focus
on a defined purpose that is shared by both researcher and participants. Not having control over
the data is, in this case, consistent with the underlying concepts of emergent, self-organization. In
this regard, it is important to note that the purpose of a focus group is to collect data that are of
interest to the researcher so it is important that the participants be similar to each other in a way
that is interesting to the researcher (Krueger & Casey, 2009). In this case, the participants were
employees of one hospital where I am well known as an outside facilitator and consultant. It is
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their participation in this program that is of interest to me because it means they have had some
exposure to complex adaptive systems theory.
Calder (1977) summarized the broad advantages of focus groups by suggesting that they
are an economical way of tapping the views of a number of people: they provide information on
the dynamics of attitudes and opinions in the context of the interaction that occurs between
participants; they may encourage a greater degree of spontaneity in the expression of views than
other methods of data collection; they can provide a safe forum for the expression of views since
respondents do not feel obliged to respond to every question; and participants may feel supported
and empowered by a sense of group membership. Gibbs (1997) added that focus groups allow
us to “gain insights into people’s shared understandings of everyday life and the ways in which
individuals are influenced by others in a group situation” (p. 1). In summarizing the benefits of
focus groups, Kitzinger (1994) identified ten ways in which interaction between participants is
useful. Three were of particular interest to me in the context of my research. Such interactions
highlight the respondents’ attitudes, priorities, language, and framework of understanding.
Second, they also encourage a great variety of communication from participants, tapping into a
wide range and form of understanding. Finally, the researcher can explore differences between
group participants in situ with them and, because participants reflect upon each other’s ideas,
ensure that the data are organic and interconnected (p. 116). It is the organic nature of language
development that will be particularly valuable to me.
The role of the moderator or researcher is important in terms of providing clear
explanations of the purpose of the group, helping people feel at ease, and facilitating interaction
between the group. During a meeting, the moderator’s role is to promote debate and to challenge
participants, especially to draw out people’s differences, and tease out a diverse range of meanings
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on the topic under discussion. Kitzinger (1994) found that the moderator has an important role,
“urging debate to continue beyond the [the conversational] stage it might otherwise have ended,
challenging people’s taken for granted reality and encouraging them to discuss the inconsistencies
both between participants and within their own thinking” (p. 106).
This emphasis on surfacing differences is consistent with two of the three conditions for
self-organization developed by Olson and Eoyang (2001). These conditions include identifying
significant differences, which determine the primary pattern of the system. “A difference
between two agents [in this case, focus group participants] may be reflected and reinforced by
other agents in the system, which then establishes a system-wide pattern” (p. 13). The second
condition that occurs in the context promoting debate is in the nature of transforming exchanges.
“As the resource [in this case, information] flows from agent to agent, each is transformed in
some way” (p. 14).
Gibbs (1997) raised an important point regarding the ethics of focus groups, indicating,
“researchers must ensure that full information about the purpose and uses of the participants’
observations is given” (p. 5). In addition, the researcher must consider the handling of sensitive
material and confidentiality given that there will always be more than one participant in the group.
Tolich (2009), an ethicist himself, expressed concern about the general consensus that focus
groups are in and of themselves harmless. It is for this reason that an IRB application for Antioch
was filed as well as an expedited Research Ethics Board (REB) approval with the research site
prior to conducting the focus groups, including the use of informed consent forms as well as a
predetermined interview guide and explicit procedural outline (see Appendix B).
I anticipated diverse responses from the focus groups. In order to mitigate any adverse
responses, I provided a graphic synopsis of the findings to indicate the relative presence or
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absence of each factor as derived from the data, as well as a synopsis of the narrative comments
for each of the constructs. My experience in working for several years with health care
professionals is that they are willing and able to quickly set aside their personal opinions and
even shared mythologies when presented with sound data. During both focus groups, the
participants readily saw links between the constructs of interest and organizational performance.
There was one member of the executive team in the first focus group, but he did not try to exert
any pressure on the discussion. This reflects my experience with the group members who have
demonstrated in other contexts that they work very collaboratively and demonstrate a genuine
desire to hear and respond to the ideas of all members of the organization.
10. Reviewing the focus group feedback. Once the focus groups were completed and
recorded comments were transcribed, the data were analyzed with a view to drawing narrative
correlations between the presence or absence of each of the nine constructs of interest and the
performance of the hospital. The performance variables that were used were determined in
collaboration with the study site, including NRC-Picker patient satisfaction results (the standard
measure for all hospitals in Ontario. See http://www.nrcpicker.ca/) as well as staff engagement
data. During the focus groups, the additional variable of wait times was also discussed. In an
acute care hospital, wait times refer to the length of time between when a patient is admitted
through the emergency department and the time that they are actually in a medical bed in the
hospital. In addition to an overall narrative that captured the observations of the focus groups
supported by direct quotes from the participants, I anticipated that I would be able analyze any
potential correlations by developing of a matrix with the derived factors on one axis and the
performance metrics on the other, however, neither focus group was able to contribute at that
level of specificity. I recognized the possibility that the conversations in the focus groups might
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not support the factors as I have configured them or might surface factors I have not considered;
however, that did not happen. Instead, participants affirmed that the constructs were, in theory,
both necessary and sufficient to improve organizational performance.
11. Combining quantitative and focus group data. Once the analysis of the focus group
data was completed, I combined the two sets of data to provide a discussion of the overall
findings and provide a meta-analysis of the relationship between the factors that emerged from
the quantitative data and the key themes from the focus groups. In Chapter IV, I review the
descriptive statistics for each of the nine constructs and provide rationale from the narrative and
focus group data to explain items with means that are outside of confidence interval. I hoped
that this would provide the opportunity to present some understanding of the implications for
organizational performance. In Chapter V, I have also identified specific areas where further
study would be beneficial.
12. Comparative analysis t-tests. Research question 3 was whether or not significant
differences from the derived component scores would be observed between clinical and nonclinical roles as well as between manager and non-manager. The third section of the survey was
intended to capture those data. The literature does not suggest that there are likely to be
differences in perception based on age, gender, position, levels of education, and location of
training. This is likely due to the lack of empirical studies regarding the phenomenon in
question. In this study, the relationship between demographic groups and the factors were
analyzed with t-tests. One-way ANOVA was considered but not completed because the limited
number of responses did not allow for more than two groups on any of the demographic
variables. One-way ANOVA has only one independent variable and looks for the differences
between the means of more than two groups (Salkind, 2008).
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The demographic factors had limited recodes. Current role had eight levels: clinical staff,
non-clinical staff, supervisor/manager, director, executive, physician leader, physician, and
volunteer; these were clustered into “clinical” and “non clinical” as well as “management” and
“staff.”
Limitations
This study was a starting point in trying to identify and validate a number of constructs that
are believed to facilitate emergent change. Given the lack of scholarly agreement on whether or
not such factors can even be discretely described, there was a high level of subjective decisionmaking in the definition of the factors, and the items for each of these factors. There are clear
limitations to the post-analysis validity of the factors, given this starting point.
The decision to use only those people who had completed the leadership development
program at the study site was a significant limitation. The rationale was to try and increase the
response rate and, while that worked in terms of the percentage of respondents, it likely meant that
the overall response number was too small and that the sample size was likely biased to provide
more favorable responses to the items in the survey. This limitation must be addressed in
subsequent studies.
There was no quantitative correlation planned to link the presence or absence of the
derived factors, to the performance of the organization under study. This is done through the
collective interpretation of those charged with leading the respective research sites and is subject
to their own biases.
Given these limitations, this study was not likely to prove definitive; however, if
practitioners are going to find ways to leverage the concepts emerging from CAS, it is hoped that
this study provides new ways of thinking about facilitating organizational change.
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Summary
In summary, prior to analyzing the data, a data file was set up in SPSS and the data was
cleaned. Statistical processes were facilitated and careful decision points were determined and
documented. Narrative correlation based on focus groups’ input provided initial links to
organizational performance.

129
Chapter IV: Findings
This chapter covers the description of respondents, data characteristics, and the findings
pertaining to the three research questions. Results reported are from item, correlational,
Principal Component, and comparative analyses. The results of the focus groups are also
covered.
Survey Respondent Characteristics
The survey was distributed to 403 staff and physicians at the study site, all of whom had
completed the Foundations of Leadership program and were still active at the site. Of the 174
completed surveys, 162 had valid responses for most items. The respondents were predominantly
female (85.6%) and 68.8% were between the ages of 40 and 59.
Table 4.1
Frequency and Distribution by Gender
Females
N
%
138
85.6%

Males
N
24

%
14.4%

Table 4.2
Frequency and Percentage Distribution of Respondents by Age Group
Age Group
Total
N
%
TOTAL
162
100%
20 - 29
9
5.6%
30 - 39
28
17.5%
40 - 49
63
38.8%
50 - 59
49
30%
60 - 69
12
7.5%
70 Plus
1
0.6%
About one-third (36.4%) had between 6 and 15 years of employment at the site, while 20.5% had
been there 5 years or less.
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Table 4.3
Frequency and Percentage Distribution of
Respondents by Years of Employment
Years of Employment
N
%
TOTAL
162
100%
1–5
33
20.5%
6 – 10
37
23%
11 – 15
26
16.1%
16 – 20
14
8.7%
21 - 25
34
21.6%
26 Plus
17
10.6%
Among respondents, 38.8% were in clinical roles, 35.3% were in on-clinical roles, and 31.3%
were in some form of leadership role. Only 12 physicians participated in the leadership program,
including the chief of staff, which helps to explain the lack of physician responses.
Table 4.4
Frequency and Percentage Distribution of
Respondents by Role
Role
N
%
TOTAL
162
100%
Clinical Staff
57
38.0%
Non-clinical Staff
33
35.3%
Manager/Supervisor
26
24.0%
Director
8
5.3%
Executive
3
2.0%
Physician Leader
1
0.7%
Physicians
0
0.0%
Volunteers
1
0.7%
Professional training was received in Canada by 94.9% of the respondents and 66.7% had a
university degree (21.4% had master’s degrees).
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Table 4.5
Frequency and Percentage Distribution of
Respondents by Education Level
Role
N
%
TOTAL
162
100%
High School
10
6.3%
Some College Courses
20
12.6%
Undergraduate Degree
72
45.3%
Some Graduate School
9
5.3%
Master’s Degree
34
21.4%
Doctorate
0
0.0%
MD
0
0.0%
Other Professional
14
8.8%
Degree
Overall, these demographic results are consistent with the employment characteristics of
the study site, based on data provided by Human Resources. According to them, 84% of FTEs
(Full Time Equivalents) are female and 58% are under 50 years of age.
Item Analysis
A review of the 174 survey responses required that 12 responses be eliminated because
they were substantially incomplete. Respondents whose surveys were incomplete had typically
stopped responding in the middle of the survey. That left 162 usable responses, four of which
were retained despite the fact that they had some demographic information missing. These 162
were then entered into SPSS© and all 22 negatively worded items were recoded with a tag
indicating their recode status. For example, Strategy 004, “I rarely think about the mission and
values of our organization,” became Stratrec 004, indicating a reversed item. Any item label that
ends in “rec” indicates a reversed item.
I then reviewed the measures of skewness and kurtosis, with the intent of eliminating any
items that had measures > + or - 3.00, indicating that they were not normally distributed. This
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resulted in the elimination of six items, Strategy 0001, 0002, and 003, Executive 0006,
Leadership 0006, and Accountability 0004.
Without these six items, I reviewed the bivarriate correlation for the remaining items,
looking for correlations <.30, indicating that they did not correlate with even one other item, and
thus did not contribute to the understanding of the overarching Emergence Scale Construct. This
resulted in the elimination of five additional items, Learning 0002, Culture Recode 0002,
Leadership Recode 0007, and Learning Recode 0007. Table 4.6 following includes all items
with measures of skewness and kurtosis < + or - 3.00 and correlation >.30.
Table 4.6
Mean and Standard Deviation of Survey Items With Skewness and Kurtosis < + or 3.00 and Correlation >.30.
Construct of Interest: Strategic Framework
Item Number
Item
Construct
Average
Strat0005
Strat0006
Strat0007
Strat0009

Stratrec0004
Stratrec0008

Our group is conscious of aligning our
decisions with the strategic priorities of
the organization.
My manager demonstrates commitment
to the mission and values of our
organization
My work serves a higher purpose.
Our organization is adept at adjusting
strategies in light of new external factors
(regulatory bodies, government, public
expectations, etc)
I rarely think about the mission and
values of the organization.
I am not sure what the strategic priorities
of our organization are.

Construct of Interest: Organizational Culture
Construct
Average
Culture0003
People rarely spend time trying to place

Mean
4.72

Standard
Deviation
1.04

4.78

.83

4.85

1.14

4.84
4.76

1.04
.86

4.29

1.18

4.77

1.16

4.41

1.09

3.17

1.19
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Culture0004
Culture0005
Culture0006
Culture0007
Culture0009
Culrec0008

blame when things go wrong.
I am willing to try new ideas out.
People are comfortable proposing
innovative ideas.
Our group looks for best practices from
other groups and organizations.
I feel safe telling the truth to my peers.
It is safe to challenge assumptions.
I seldom feel safe telling the truth to my
manager.

Construct of Interest: Work Structures
Construct
Average
Structure0001 I have opportunities to have input into
decisions that affect my work.
Structure0002 I feel comfortable providing input at our
group meetings.
Structure0004 We receive regular updates on our group’s
performance.
Structure0005 We have developed the skills to work
together as a group.
Structure0009 We value different ways of thinking in our
group.
Structure00010 New and challenging ideas are willingly
examined.
Strucrec0003
I work on my own and don’t interact with
others.
Strucrec0006
We seldom work well together as a team.
Strucrec0007
I have very little input into decisions in
our group.
Strucrec0008
Decisions that affect us seem to be made
higher up in the organization and are not
shared with our group until it is too late
for feedback and discussion.
Construct of Interest: CEO and Executive Team
Construct
Average
Exec0001
I feel like I know the CEO as a person.
Exec0003
I get encouragement from the members of
the executive team.
Exec0004
I feel like the executive team values the
work I do.
Exec0008
I regularly see our CEO engaged in

5.20
4.47

.70
1.02

4.73

.96

4.29
4.59
4.44

1.17
1.17
1.44

4.53

1.11

4.69

1.06

4.80

1.04

5.20

.70

4.55

.93

4.42

1.04

4.36

1.10

5.12

1.10

4.86
4.56

1.07
1.22

3.74

1.38

4.38

1.24

3.80
4.10

1.37
1.31

4.24

1.26

4.56

1.34
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Exec0009
Execrec0002
Execrec0005
Execrec0007

informal conversation with staff.
The executive team appears to genuinely
respect each other.
The executive team is not very visible in
our organization.
The CEO is seldom seen in our
organization.
The executive team primarily operates
behind closed doors.

Construct of Interest: Leadership Culture
Construct
Average
Leader0001
My organization has provided me with
opportunities to develop my leadership
skills.
Leader0002
I have had the opportunity to lead
different people.
Leader0003
I feel like a leader in our organization
Leader0005
Informal leadership is valued in our
organization.
Leadrec0004
Management typically takes control of
most initiatives.
Construct of Interest: Quality Control Systems
Construct
Average
Quality0001
My group has direct input into the way we
measure quality.
Quality0002
Our group monitors the quality of our
work.
Quality0004
Quality standards are valued in our
organization.
Quality0005
I understand how the quality of my own
work is evaluated.
Quality0006
Our group adjusts our quality expectations
on a regular basis.
Qualrec0003
Or organization uses the same quality
measures in every department.
Construct of Interest: Accountability Framework
Construct
Average
Acct0001
I am clear about the basis on which my
work is evaluated.

4.86

.90

4.31

1.36

4.93

1.10

4.21

1.27

4.31

1.22

3.80

1.16

4.24

1.26

4.24
4.57

1.26
1.14

4.86

1.36

4.41

1.11

4.25

1.10

4.47

1.10

4.84

.99

4.35

1.10

4.09

1.15

4.39

1.20

4.44

1.14

4.41

1.11
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Acct0002
Acct0003
Acct0006
Acctrec0005

I understand how my work contributes to
our group’s goals.
There is a clear sense of accountability in
our group.
I feel I am appropriately recognized for
my contributions.
People in our group are rarely held
accountable for their work.

Construct of Interest: Learning Structures
Construct
Average
Learn0001
Our group has regular opportunities to
share learning with our peers in other
groups.
Learn0004
I have access to the learning resources I
need.
Learn0006
I have the opportunity to attend a range of
courses and workshops
Learnrec0003
There are few formal learning
opportunities in our organization.
Learnrec0005
Our group rarely debriefs a project once it
is complete.
Construct of Interest: Feedback Processes
Construct
Average
Feed0001
We get data on our performance quickly.
Feed0002
In our group, we adjust work based on the
performance data we receive.
Feed0004
There is a commitment to constructive
feedback in our group.
Feed0005
The data we use in our work are reliable.
Feed0006
I get regular feedback on my performance.
Feed0007
We have processes in place to share ideas
and trends.
Feedrec0003
Our group has no real idea how well or
badly we are performing.
Feedrec0008
We seem to have the kind of data we
need.
Feedrec0009
We get very little data on how our group
is perceived in the organization.

4.93

.79

4.49

1.19

4.09

1.32

4.27

1.27

4.02

1.15

3.99

1.20

4.49

.88

4.17

1.19

3.80

1.23

3.65

1.26

4.01

1.12

3.89
3.87

1.09
1.11

4.15

1.11

4.32
3.74
4.29

.86
1.28
1.10

4.16

.97

4.18

1.29

3.48

1.23
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Taken as a whole, the descriptive statistics reflect a high mean, with standard deviations
indicating a range of about 4 to 4.5 points. The average mean of all items was 4.37, well above
3.50. As shown in Table 4.6, the highest average mean was for the items in the construct of
interest labeled Strategic Framework, where the mean was 4.71 and the lowest average mean was
for the construct of interest labeled Learning Systems, where the mean was 4.02. The average
standard deviation was1.10, with the highest average standard deviation for the construct of
interest labeled Leadership Culture (1.22) and the lowest for the construct of interest labeled
Organizational Culture (1.09). This would indicate that overall the respondents looked favorably
on the organization and had opinions that tended to range from Somewhat Disagree to Strongly
Agree; however, there is also no apparent “halo” effect, a tendency to answer positively to all
items. The range of means indicates that participants considered each item on its own merits and
were able to discriminate the positive from the negative. This is borne out in the narrative
comments that were provided for each of the constructs of interest. The following section
integrates an analysis of the descriptive statistics for each construct of interest, supported where
possible with the qualitative survey data.
Analysis of Narrative Survey Data
The survey allowed respondents to offer opinions on each of the nine theorized
constructs, covering: strategic framework; organizational culture; work and decision-making
structures; CEO and executive team; quality control systems; learning structures; and feedback
process. The following is a summary of that feedback, including an analysis of item means that
did not overlap with the others in a given construct and thus may be considered significantly
different. Where helpful, I have added specific comments from the focus groups to the narrative
comments provided on the survey itself. For a full discussion of the focus groups, see the

137
following section. Throughout this section, comments have been selected that are reflective of
the overall tone. Constructing a 95% confidence interval around item means provides a rough
estimate of statistical difference. Items with confidence intervals that overlap are not considered
significantly different.
Analysis of Strategic Framework, Including Narrative Comments (26 Responses)
The highest mean for this construct was 4.85 (Strategy 0006) with a standard
deviation of 1.14. A 95% confidence interval for this item is obtained by calculating the
standard error of the mean, which is the standard deviation divided by the square root of the
sample size, then constructing an interval of plus or minus 1.96 times that result. For this
item the confidence interval is 4.85 ± .11, or between 4.74 and 4.96. All means in this
construct fell within this interval, except Stratrec004, which is a recoded item: “I rarely
think about the mission and values of our organization.” This item’s status as an outlier
is supported by one narrative response that referred to the degree to which staff thinks
about the strategic framework. “My assumption is that I'm not sure that the mission and
values are completely understood at the point of care level, while the mission/values are
incorporated into projects they are not easily understood or visible in a meaningful way to
point of care staff.” Another expressed a similar concern when she commented, “I would
like to see a greater effort made towards making it matter for the front line staff... I feel like
they are still being excluded... and/or they don't see how their work is related to the [sic]
strat. plan. Often staff express to me that ‘they’ (the leaders) ‘make great plans’ and that the
workers at the front line ‘have to march to that tune for awhile until the song changes.’” In
the focus groups, one participant commented that “the elements of the Strategic
Framework were very broad, which can mean the staff and managers might find it difficult
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to focus.” Another suggested that, “regulated health professionals such as doctors and
nurses were guided more by their responsibilities to their respective colleges [Canada’s
equivalent to licensing boards in the United States].” These comments start to explain why
item 0004 was outside the confidence interval; however, several responses affirmed the
clarity and importance of the strategic framework, which supports those items within the
confidence interval. (Note: bulleted passages in italics are all direct quotes from the survey,
as it relates to the Strategic Framework.)


[The Survey Site’s] Strategic Framework provides an overarching road map that is not
simply just enforced by the senior management, but engrained within each department
through their specific contributions that are designed to align with the hospital's goals.

In this instance, the Strategic Framework at the study site is made up of the mission, vision, and
values of the organization as well as what are referred to as success factors. The Framework
emphasizes collaboration in pursuit of quality and cost-effective service.


The leadership makes measurement of the strategy meaningful at various levels of the
organization through strategies such as huddles.



Incorporated into different aspects of the work e.g. agenda's, minutes of meeting,
business plans.

Other components spoke to the visibility of the strategic framework in the organization:


I like the way it’s written all over the facility so that even patients are aware of our
vision and mission.



They are available for reading electronically. The organization uses staff to help develop
different ideas and strategies.

A few other responses spoke to the consultative way in which the strategic framework is used:
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Our organization is a community hospital... as the hospital seeks to expand and
undertake renovations, it also held a number of meetings at the civic centre inviting the
community to participate in the future developments. The hospital also invited
community groups to tour the hospital, which allowed others to see the current condition
of the hospital and help the community in better understanding the need for
improvement, which will result in some noise.



It is important to note that there is extensive consultation with front line and key
stakeholders when strategic framework is refreshed. This assists in awareness and buy in
across the organization.

Other responses offered critiques or suggestions for improvement:


These are displayed in the public elevators. However myself and many hospital staff
routinely and consciously use stairwells to allow patient stretchers, equipment, meal
carts and visitors more room in the elevators, as all patients, and the vast majority of
visitors take the elevators. Requests to have these important postings in the 1st to 2nd
floor landings have so far not been attended to.

This sample of responses suggests that the Strategic Framework is generally well understood
and appreciated by the respondents. The critique quoted seems to affirm the importance of the
framework as it suggests alternative ways to enhance its visibility.
Analysis of Organizational Culture, Including Narrative Comments (24 Responses)
The highest mean for this construct was 5.20 (Culture 0004) with a standard deviation of
.70. This provides a 95% confidence interval of 5.20 ± .88, or a range from 5.09 to 5.31. Only
Culture 0004 (“I am willing to try new ideas out.”) was within the range and could be viewed as
self-serving and very individualistic, resulting in a high mean. It does not necessarily reflect the
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impact of culture on that particular choice. By contrast, the lowest mean, Culture 0003
(“People rarely spend time trying to place blame when things go wrong”) was 3.17. One
narrative comment specifically challenged the idea of a blame-free culture when they suggested,
“It's a nice idea to think the organization promotes thinking outside of the box and that we work
in a no blame environment but it isn't always the way. It does depend on the person who has
made a mistake and the person who is ultimately responsible for it.” This sense of contextuality
is reflected in another comment that suggests, “I notice it is, you're in or you're out...kinda like
high school.” Another comment linked culture and power, suggesting that, “the safety of
‘telling the truth’ may depend on your perception of power in the organization. While the senior
leaders believe it is a non-punitive culture, this belief may not be held by all staff.” During one
of the focus groups, additional comments were made that suggested I would get a different
response from a more general audience, especially when it relates to the notion of “blame free.”
A broader distribution might clarify the contextual nature of individual’s experience with the
concept of culture.
Overall, slightly more than one-third of the statements related to Organizational Culture
affirmed the culture:


I work in an environment where if a mistake has been made, solution(s) are brought
forward. From these ideas, the best one that could prevent future mistakes is used.



Everybody's ideas are incorporated in our daily huddles.



The culture is not to place blame, to work together to fix the wrongs and make them
right. The organization attempts to help make people comfortable in proposing ideas and
the huddles seem a good idea as staff can place them on a board without having to come
out and say it.
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In direct contrast to the above comments, about one-third of the statements were critical of the
culture, suggesting that it is punitive in some way. This suggests that participants’ experience of
the culture is very contextual, reflecting their lived experience within a defined work structure.
These comments also speak to Item 0003.


With are [sic] new model of care redesign/Lean1 work we say its OK to fail but are often
called to task by managers so staff don't feel safe to try. There is still a lot of mistrust,
blaming and defensiveness when things don’t work the first time.



Nothing remains confidential in this organization. If you open your mouth you are
finished. They will make your life a living hell.



There is a hidden bullying going on. People use the threat of reporting others as being a
bully when they speak up for themselves or others.
A few of the narrative comments reflect the fact that there is no such thing as a mono-

culture in a complex organization. Pockets of culture, defined by the attitudes and behaviours
within a particular work team, can be slow to change, and this helps explain the wide range of
responses.


There are still people who have taken the FoL [Foundations of Leadership program] but
still spend time trying to place blame when things go wrong. These people unfortunately
still do exist even though they have gone through the training. I believe it stems from
their core inner selves who are not willing to change.



I am happy to work in an area of the hospital that has a very positive and supportive
culture. I am aware that there are pockets where this is not necessarily the case.

1

Lean methodology is a process improvement approach developed at Toyota that, as the name
suggests, emphasizes streamlining processes as much as possible in order to improve quality and
efficiency.
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These statements suggest that perceptions of organizational culture depend a great deal
on the individual relationship experiences on a particular unit or work team, which can be very
different across a large organization. This suggests that the fractal patterns of self-similarity
evident in determinist systems (Stacey, 1996, p. 21) may be much more difficult to maintain in
social systems when human interaction is so highly unpredictable.
Analysis of Work and Decision-Making Structures, Including Narrative Comments (17
Responses)
The highest mean for this construct was 5.12 (Structure Recode 0003) with a standard
deviation of 1.07. This leads to a 95% confidence interval of 5.12 ± 0.17, or a range from 4.95
to 5.29. Only Structure Recode 0003 (“I work on my own and don't interact with others.”) fell
within the interval. This suggests that respondents see their ability to work on their own as a
positive thing, which is contrary to the orientation intended for this construct. The lowest mean
(3.74) was for Structure Recode 0008 (“Decisions that affect us seem to be made higher up in
the organization and are not shared with our group until it is too late for feedback and
discussion.”). While the study site has made efforts to move to a care model that is focused on
localized control, there would seem to be a perception that respondents don’t believe they have
as much input as they would like in the decisions that affect them. This is also reflected in the
fact that narrative comments on work structures were more frequently negative than responses to
the other constructs of interest. Only one-quarter reflected well on the work and decisionmaking structures:


My current position is fairly new to our organization. I played a pivotal role in planning,
developing, and coordinating my work structure with other hospitals. Laying the
foundation and implementing this new position was challenging but I had the full support
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of manager and other multidisciplinary staff. Although there are no other employees,
Staff on the Oncology unit embraced me and support[ed] my role in making a difference
to the Oncology unit.


Open communication often allows for inclusive decision-making.

However, almost half were critical of the work and decision-making structures, suggesting that it
is punitive in some way:


Sometimes agreed decisions/procedures/policies are changed without review.



Our department is usually the last to be told of changes within the hospital, often leaving
us with a sense of not being a part of the group. Many of our staff feel under-valued, and
un-heard, leaving many bitter and angry. I feel like certain people are favorites and get
treated better, and it has nothing to do with work performance.



There is a senior tech [a lead person for a specific diagnostic modality, such as CT or
MRI.] in each area, a manager and a director. One of the senior techs is not a good
communicator and makes decisions and does not share the info very well until it is
implemented and then it is through email and not verbally in a meeting or shown.

A few statements reflect a transition in the way that innovation is viewed in the organization:
and the degree to which it is made a priority:


In terms of new ideas, I have often observed a clash between the ‘old’ way of doing
things, mainly by employees who have been with the organization for many years and
are not only confident that their way is correct, but stand by the past's experiences to
justify their actions. This is by no means a complaint against those individuals, however I
have seen it sometimes squander the new and passionate employees from getting their
ideas through.
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People are very busy with their individual accountabilities. We rarely pull ourselves
together to think about and create our local strategy. There is openness to the need to do
this, and the leadership ability to make this happen—we just don't seem to have enough
time.

These responses suggest that, like Organizational Culture, the effectiveness of Work and
Decision-Making Structures often depends on the individual agents active in the sub-system.
The constant state of change that is the result of self-organization means that the system, and the
subsystems within it, are fluctuating all the time between higher and lower states of order and
seeming chaos, representing a system that is highly fragile. Fractal patterns of self-similarity at
every level of a system can be quite consistent in deterministic systems, but they are seldom as
clean when various human factors, such as the nature of different leaders, are involved.
Analysis of CEO and Executive Team, Including Narrative Comments (24 Responses)
The highest mean for this construct was 4.93 (Executive Recode 0005) with a standard
deviation of 1.27. The resulting 95% confidence interval is 4.93 ± .17, or a range from 4.76 to
5.10. Only Executive Recode 0005 (“The CEO is seldom seen in our organization”) and
Executive 0009 (“The executive team appears to genuinely respect each other.”) are within the
confidence interval, although most of the items are clustered between 4.24 and 4.93. The lowest
mean was 3.80 for Executive 0001 (“I feel like I know our CEO as a person.”). This is a curious
response in this particular context, as the CEO is one of the most visible and connected hospital
leaders I have observed in my practice experience. A relationship mapping exercise conducted
at the study site for a positive deviance initiative put the CEO at the center of the map, indicating
an extremely high level of visibility; however, this low mean was reflected in some of the
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narrative comments. One-third of the responses were critical, and most of this criticism related
to the visibility of the executive team and one highlighted the CEO:


They hardly ever interact with us, especially in my Department.



While the executive team do a good job, it would be helpful to see them on the units on a
more regular basis. I only know the CEO & CNO by name and face, I don't know
anybody else.

That said, many of the narrative comments about the effectiveness and engagement of the CEO
and executive team were affirming:


[The CEO] is very down to earth and friendly. He engages all levels of staff in
conversation. He strives to make TEGH a leader in many innovative ways. [VP:
Program Support] is always interested in supporting his troops and is excellent at follow
up. [VP: Patient Care] is a leader in educational programs and speaks softly thus
engages all of her audience and is a pleasure to listen to. [VP: Finance] ensures the
coffers are kept balanced and has a good sense of humor. Hats off to the Executive
Team.



Ours is the best management team I've ever worked with and I've worked with quite a
few.



[I] Like the approach of asking questions, it makes them very open and approachable.
Like the transparency.

As with organizational culture, the nature and effectiveness of the executive team is subject to
change, especially when there is a change of personnel. One commentator suggested that the
“recent departure of [VP Patient Service] adds some skepticism about unity of executive team.
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Some strong personalities to compete with I imagine.” While the comment is speculative, it
does suggest concern about the actual and ongoing functionality of the executive team.
What is clear from all the comments is that individual reactions to or perceptions of the members
of the executive team are based on their individual interactions with members of the team. The
fact that many of the comments are very positive speaks well of this particular team at the
particular time of the survey, in terms of their ability to engage with staff; however, as the
survey group self-identified as leaders and as such would have increased opportunities to engage
with the executive team through Lean projects and other initiatives, a broader sampling might
reveal different perceptions.
Analysis of Leadership Culture, Including Narrative Comments (13 Responses)
The highest mean for this construct was 4.86 (Leader Recode 0004) with a standard
deviation of 1.14. The resulting 95% confidence interval is 4.86 ± .16, or a range from 4.65 to
5.07. All other items fell below that range. One explanation for the low mean for Leader
Recode 0004, “Management typically takes control of most initiatives,” is that the item is too
ambiguous. It contains two conditional words, which make it a difficult concept to quantify. At
what point would “typically” apply? At what point would “most” apply. It is reasonable to
think that, with that level of ambiguity, respondents would rate the item low as a matter of
convenience, resulting in a high mean when it is recoded. This is evident in the fact that
approximately one-third of the comments about the overall Leadership Culture were positive,
the three examples below support the high mean on Lead Recode 004:


A leader could be someone other than my boss who has knowledge and experience to
help me and support my work.
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Every instance does not require a manager’s presence. Day-to-day activities that fall
within the parameters of routine practices can be followed through by trained staff
members.



When a decision is made, it is based on the shared and collaborative decisions made by
the team members affected.

Slightly less than one-third of the comments on the Leadership Culture were somewhat
unfavorable:


Senior management or managers always have the final say and exercise their “powers”
especially when it involves issues that are tied to budgets, despite good rationale. It feels
like even when we do provide good ideas, they are put aside secondary to budget. So that
begs the question, “Why ask front line staff when you have an answer already?” Why
waste our time in meetings when we can spend it better providing patient care?



I think senior management is often too removed from the front-line staff when decisions
are being made about implementing change.



Some are quite transparent especially, the executive team. The purposes of some division
directors and managers still seem hidden and only open to an inner circle that is their
own informal system. At times decisions still seem reactive and rash (emotional, angry,
or even punitive or vengeful) instead of calmly thought through.



Management seems to have large portfolios, difficult sometimes to get as much time
dedicated from the manager to individual staff.

The theme of contextuality continues to develop. Individual perceptions do not reflect an
overall appreciation for the “leadership culture” of the organization, which has actually worked
very hard to develop a culture of distributed leadership. Rather, perceptions are largely shaped
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by the individual’s perception of the leadership style and abilities of the specific leaders with
whom the individual most immediately interacts. It is of note that only one comment reflected
on the respondents’ capacity for leadership, rather than a commendation or critique of the
leadership of others:


My organization has provided me with the opportunity to develop leadership skills
however, I have not had the opportunity to explore these skills beyond the foundations of
leadership course. I work in the capacity of a leader and look forward to growing
professionally in greater leadership roles.

Analysis of Quality Control Systems, Including Narrative Comments (10 Responses)
The highest mean for this construct was 4.84 (Quality 0002) with a standard deviation of
.99, leading to a 95% confidence interval of 4.84 ± .21, or a range from 4.81 to 5.05. All other
items fell below that range. Responses to Quality 002, “Our group monitors the quality of our
work” could be viewed as self-serving or self-evident, considering the respondents work in
highly regulated environments. Half the comments on Quality Control Systems were positive:


Working in the Operating Room quality is very important.



Recently, we had a tea-party in the lunch room which was held by a chapel leader on the
Oncology unit. We had the opportunity to discuss quality of work, supporting colleagues
with workloads, caring for Pts [patients] and the quality or service. Staff were allowed to
participate in feedback, quality of work, support, etc. It was concluded that the Oncology
unit had great support among each other, from the Manager, the hospital and even the
community who often gives thank you cards and other token of appreciation.
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Daily huddles have given us the opportunity to discuss quality—making every staff
member more aware (very transparent). When we are all working in the same direction
we are more prone to hit the target together.



Quality has become a key word at [the study site] in the past few years. Although it is
only emerging into my area(s) of work within the organization in a formal way, I have
seen it become increasingly important to the organization.

A few comments on Quality Control Systems were negative:


It seems that the quality of work is frequently measured on all the negative aspects and
complaints and rarely on positives.

Almost half the comments on Quality Control Systems contained both positive and negative
reflections:


Not clear if there are standard tools available organization-wide that we can adapt for
our clinical area.



There are some areas that are difficult to capture with “numbers” such as the number of
attendees in a training session... as this metric is too one dimensional and does not imply
quality of the training... just the quantity of attendees. In a unionized setting, it seems
that it is difficult to measure true knowledge acquisition and application... by rigorous
testing, re-testing, certification because when we have staff who fail... the process to deal
with it is arduous (performance management).

As issues related to antibiotic-immune infections continue to grow, quality is probably the most
significant issue in health care today. While the narrative comments support that importance,
what I found surprising was that no one commented on the importance of how quality measures
are determined. It was a fundamental premise of this construct of interest, based on Wergin’s
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(2003) work, that quality needed to be locally defined; however, as will be noted in the section
on the focus groups, a more open conversation confirmed that locally-defined quality measures
was central to the Lean methodology that is very prevalent in this and other hospitals.
Analysis of Accountability Framework, Including Narrative Comments (11 Responses)
The highest mean for this construct was 4.93 (Accountability 0002) with a standard
deviation of 79, leading to a 95% confidence interval of 4.85 (average mean) ± .12, or a range
from 4.81 to 5.05. Only Accountability 0002, “I understand how my work contributes to our
group’s goals,” was within the range and could also seen to be self-serving. It is worth noting
that all of the means for the five items in this construct were > 4.00. One-third of the comments
related to the Accountability Framework were positive:


We are all accountable to patients and families first.



We, in our department, are constantly looking at quality and accountability for our work.



When there is a situation that involves an individual's accountability, the situation is
discussed without finger-pointing or accusations; it is productive and with positivity.

Almost half of the comments related to the Accountability Framework were negative:


There are times where my colleagues do not show accountability for their work. This is
evident when I am schedule (sic) to work their shift the next day. Things may not be done
and there is no communication as to why things are not done.

As with other constructs, there are significant differences in individual perceptions. The last two
comments directly contradict each other, indicating that team or departmental experience guides
perceptions.
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Analysis of Learning Structures, Including Narrative Comments (16 Responses)
The highest mean for this construct was 4.49 (Learning 0004) with a standard deviation
of .88. The confidence interval for this item is therefore 4.49 ± .19, or a range from 4.30 to 5.07.
Only Learning 0004 was within the range. The lowest mean was for Learning Recode 0005,
“Our group rarely debriefs a project once it is complete,” which is interesting because the
organization puts a premium on such debriefing. There is a potential link to early comments on
the wide scope provided by the mission statement. This is an organization that takes on a great
many initiatives, and it may be that debriefing gets set aside in favor of moving on to other
projects. It should also be noted that three of the five items had means below 4.00, making it the
second lowest average mean. This negativity is reflected by the presence of only one positive
comment:


Great ICARE [on-line learning] learning courses are available. More day or half day
sessions offered at our facility would be great too.

There were ten negative comments, all of which focused on scheduling or reimbursement for
external courses. Samples include:


In order for me to use the learning resources available to staff, I would need to be
schedule (sic) to attend those courses or do them on my time off.



In-services and other learning opportunities are done while the nurse is at work, during
her dayshift. We are expected to stop whatever we are in the middle of, i.e., suctioning a
patient, to go through and learn something new. If we say we are too busy at the moment,
we are told that we are not meeting our learning objectives.



Sometimes difficult to get away, and I feel sometimes like I am abandoning other team
members because less help for them when I am away.

152


Finding time to access learning is a challenge.



In my role, we are individually responsible to update our registration requirements,
which require a certain number of hours per 3-year period of approved medical courses.
We are financially responsible ourselves, with [sic] menial coverage of $75 from our
hospital/ person. This hardly covers transportation to a Toronto-based course, much less
a course outside Toronto, requiring airfare, hotel, and course coverage. Other hospitals
cover these costs.

The importance of learning and formal learning opportunities is not questioned in the comments.
In fact, it is quite the opposite. People are frustrated by their inability to access available
learning opportunities.
Almost one-third of the comments seem to reflect an “insider-outside” perspective.
Learning is not equally accessible across the organization, so there is a sense of elitism when it
comes to learning.


It would be great if [leadership quarterly meetings] workshops could be made available
to other staff and not just the current membership.



The learning centre staff seem to just stay in their offices in the J-wing basement. It
would be more helpful to actual clinical staff if they could be more available to come for
brief visits to clinical areas. Their practical and conceptual expertise would speed along
projects that immediately benefit staff education (and directly affect patients).



As a manager I can work my time to accommodate learning opportunities. Front line
staff do not have the same opportunity to attend classes/workshops. I appreciate the
opportunities but feel that we cannot empower front line staff if they cannot take
advantage of courses. The hospital recently made an under-graduate program very
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accessible by offering courses at the hospital in the evenings. Many of us took advantage
of this opportunity, which moved approx. 10 of us on to successful completion of the
program. That would definitely not [have] been the case if courses had not been made
available and so convenient.


The format for re-imbursement for external courses is poorly outlined and counter
intuitive that you apply before you take a course. Lots of internal opportunities.

Learning appears to be highly valued in the organization, and there is evidence of desire for
more access and more equality in the way that access is made manifest in the system.
Analysis of Feedback Systems, Including Narrative Comments (8 Responses)
The highest mean for this construct was 4.32 (Feedback 0005) with a standard deviation
of .86. Its 95% confidence interval is 4.32 ± .17, or between 4.12 and 4.46. Feedback 0005,
“The data we use in our work is reliable,” appears problematic, given the generally negative
narrative comments. It could open up a discussion of the efficacy of the word, “reliable.” Is
something reliable because it is provably accurate, or is it reliable because it aligns with an
individual’s perceptions? This construct had the lowest average means of all the constructs,
with the lowest (Feedback Recode 0009) at 3.49. This is reflected by one comment on Feedback
Processes that could best be described as hopeful:


We are in the process of putting things in place to address these very issues, but they
aren't up and running in my work areas quite yet.

Almost two-thirds of the comments can be seen as negative and focused on timeliness and
accuracy:


Decision-support does not involve itself enough in providing their expertise to assist busy
front-line clinical areas like mine.
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Pharmacy daily workload measurement data is not reliable.



Data collection is an important piece in quality assessment. However, the data can be
somewhat dated when received so [it] is very difficult to remember what might have
caused a particular ‘blip.’ I have suggested recently that we discuss performance daily
so feedback can be given quickly. This will enhance trust within the staff to see that
issues get dealt with quickly. The data within the teletracking system [electronic medical
records] can be unreliable due to the human factor of inputting the data in a timely
manner. The reliability of this data is in question when you see info not being placed in a
timely fashion, which has impact on the data, which one eventually needs to justify. It
would be very interesting to gain feedback on how the medicine group is perceived in the
organization. I really have no idea.



Working in the eChart [electronic medical records] office and developing tools for
clinicians we are often seeking feedback and input from our peers and have access to a
lot of data. Having said that, the type of data available is not always what we need. Our
efforts are quickly recognized by our team but also from the clinicians.
The qualitative responses from the survey reflect some important themes that are

consistent with the realities of a health care setting as well as with the constructs of interest and
the outcomes of the principal component analysis. The relatively positive themes that emerge
from the narrative responses support the overall positive results of the quantitative data, as
evidenced by the high average means. These include the role of an engaged and supportive
executive team who give people the freedom and opportunity to take engage in quality
improvement and other initiatives. When those individuals engage, they find that they can offer
opinions and feel that they are heard and respected; however, in contrast, the negative comments
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suggest that there are others whose experience in the hospital are radically different. They
experience frustration with the attitudes and behaviors of their co-workers and managers whom
they see as punitive and quick to place blame. The rationale for using a hospital as a study site
is that they are among the most complex organizations in the world, as argued in Chapter III.
Hospitals in Canada typically run at or even over capacity. It is common to have as
many as 20-30 patients who require admission waiting in the emergency room for a bed on the
medical floors. These are referred to as “no bed admits” and they are a significant issue. “Wait
times” become public issues in the media, putting pressure on the politicians who in turn put
pressure on hospital administration. Several of the comments reflect this reality. It becomes
difficult to give staff the time to engage in activity that is not directly related to patient care.
This can extend to educational opportunities, as identified in the comments, as well collaborative
decision-making. The pressure on managers can cause them to resort to making decisions
without staff input. Several times in the comments there were references to “huddles.” These
are daily, short staff meetings intended to share key information. They typically occur at the
nursing station but are intended to be interprofessional in nature. Under time pressure, these can
become truncated. As with any work environment, people are likely to have mixed experiences
based on their individual context and at a specific time, and that is also reflected in the
comments. In one of the focus groups, a metaphor of a wave was used in reference to
organizational culture. The suggestion was that the quality of the culture, and peoples’
experience of the culture, rose and fell constantly. There are times when the culture feels very
positive and engaging; however, changes in the surrounding environment, or changes to
personnel, can change the experience of culture in a negative way, causing a trough.
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The literature on emergent systems puts a priority on relationships and the principal
component analysis also demonstrated the importance of collaboration when it comes to
decision-making, quality, and learning. The comments reinforce the importance of collaboration
and consultation. When it was present, respondents made note of it. This was suggested by the
narrative comments related to the Strategic Framework. When it was absent, there were also
comments, as reflected in the comments regarding work structures. The comments also
reinforce the vital role that the CEO and Executive Team play in shaping the culture of an
organization. Their visibility and evident support of people was affirmed several times in the
comments.
Reframing the Constructs of Interest
Based on my initial thinking from the literature review I wanted to consider all of the
items from the nine constructs as addressing the same overarching construct, namely
organizational strategies, structures, and processes that facilitate organizational emergence.
Given the limited sample size and possibly the lack of diversity in the sample, PCA looking at all
57 items together did not result in identifiable components.

Thus, I reviewed my original

thinking, taking into consideration the narrative statements made in the survey for each of the
nine constructs and regrouped them into the three categories defined below:
People and culture. This included three constructs of interest: organizational culture;
CEO and executive team; and leadership culture. These related to the relational aspects of a
system and included the way that the executive team may or may not set the tone.
Structure and frameworks. This included three constructs of interest: strategic
framework; work structures; and accountability framework. These all relate to the architecture
of the organization: how it is intentionally designed in a way that could be captured in a chart of
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some kind. Based on the narrative comments, structure and framework in and of themselves do
not constrain the system so much as they become a measuring system against which respondents
seem to judge others and, to a lesser extent, themselves.
Systems and processes. This included three constructs of interest: quality control
systems; learning structures; and feedback processes. This cluster initially seemed less obvious,
but the central thread seemed to be the mechanisms through which the system communicates (as
opposed to the relational nature of communication). Again, the narrative comments support this
cluster although one could argue reasonably that “learning” is as much about culture as it is
about process and certainly access to learning seems as contextual as the cultural elements. The
intent behind the items is the intentionality of learning not the culture of learning.
The initial plan was to complete the PCA and the demographic comparisons before the
focus group, but as discussed, the generalizability of these data was diminished by the small
sample size. At this point, scheduling at the study site became a problem, and, after consultation
with my Chair, I moved to complete the focus groups prior to the completion of the PCA, so the
focus groups became an opportunity to explore the initial nine constructs of interest and their
relative importance to organizational performance, rather than the specific results for the study
site. At the suggestion of my Chair, I also decided to use the focus groups as a sounding board
for these clusters and to determine if the participants saw other, more natural linkages before I
proceeded to do the revised Principal Component Analysis.
Focus Group Results
There were five attendees in the first focus group, comprised of one vice president and
four directors, including the study sponsor. I reviewed the purpose of the survey and pointed out
that the results were extremely positive, with only seven of the 64 item means less than 4.00. In
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addition, two of the items had mean scores over 5.00. One participant suggested that not only
were the participants self-selected by virtue of participating in the [name] course, but they were
supported in that decision by a manager who valued distributed leadership. That sort of positive
support might have influenced the participants’ lived experience of the organization.
We reviewed each factor to determine if there were any that the group felt could be
dropped, but there were none and all were deemed important. The performance measures
discussed included: patient satisfaction; staff engagement; National Quality Institute PEP Level 4
requirements (the study site is one of only four hospitals in Canada to have received this level of
certification); and the hospital’s key success factors of quality and value. The group suggested
two additional factors: safety as a critical aspect of quality and wait times and efficiency, which
they considered top-of-mind and internally was considered distinct from quality; however, none
of the items addressed these elements. This needs to be a consideration in future research when
using the survey in a health care setting.
When we discussed the relative importance of each factor, it was difficult to get the group
to focus on the importance of a specific factor conceptually rather than reflecting on its presence,
or absence, from their own facility. In discussing the importance of the strategic framework,
there was affirmation that the mission, vision, and values gave people a “line of sight;” however,
one participant commented that they are very broad, which can mean the staff and managers
might find it difficult to focus. This results in the organization taking on a lot of projects and
having difficulty establishing priorities. One participant commented, “We tend to take everything
on, which means things can be difficult to sustain over time.” A participant also pointed out that
nurses and other health professionals are equally guided by their college requirements. This
raised the question of physician alignment with the strategic framework. As they are not
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employees of the hospital, there was an expressed concern in the focus group that some
physicians might not feel a sense of accountability to the strategic framework.
When we discussed the importance of a safe-fail culture, it was particularly difficult to
get them to focus the importance of the factor, versus the culture of their own hospital. The
suggestion was made that this is a factor that would be skewed by the Foundations of Leadership
concentration of respondents, as these are likely people who are interested in these sorts of
topics. One of the participants suggested that I would get a different response from a more
general audience, especially when it relates to the notion of “blame free.” Other evidence that the
organization gathered during accreditation suggests a lack of trust in some venues and meetings;
however, their own data are also inconclusive; it was pointed out that feedback from focus
groups they have had contradicts their own survey data. When asked about the importance of a
blame-free culture, the entire group affirmed that it was “absolutely” vital but that it was not
always in evidence. This supports the comments made in the narrative portion of the survey.
Questions about decision-making structures, a distributed leadership culture, and clear
accountability each elicited long pauses in response time and then there was general agreement
that they were important. When I questioned the lack of discussion, it was suggested that the
importance of these constructs is self-evident and so much a part the culture of this particular
organization that there was really little to discuss. In other words, their relative silence did not
diminish the importance of these constructs, but, in fact, affirmed it.
In contrast, the discussion of CEO/Executive Team support elicited a higher level of
discussion, tempered by the fact that one of the vice presidents was in the room. It was
indicated that people want to feel safe and that an absence of a top-down approach was important
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when initiating change. It was also affirmed that as the complexity of issues increase, strong
executive support demonstrated that the organization was lined up behind the initiative.
The suggestion that local quality control systems were important was fully supported.
One participant made the comment that, “Lean methodology is all about defining quality
locally.” Another said that, after observing some of these Lean processes, the types of solutions
that come out are “100% different from what would have come out if you had management in
control. This leads to sustainability because those that are doing are proposing and owning the
work. They are generating sustainable creativity. Solutions are different when looked at from a
different lens, and we didn’t tap into that before, but it is clear that people at the grass roots are
the only ones who really understand their work.”
When I asked about the importance of learning structures, the discussion immediately
centered on the item relative to the availability of time for formal learning. During the PCA, the
item related to access consistently loaded on more than one other component, so it was removed.
Access to accurate, real-time data was identified as “really important.” “It reduces the
reliance on the decision support consultants. Now, we’re collecting in-the-moment data that is
good enough to make local change. We’re no longer paralyzed by wanting—and waiting for—
the ideal data set. This is kind of exciting. You may not get it right first time and you may need
to go back a few times and correct, but we’re in action.” This seems to reflect the essence of a
self-organizing system: the ability and willingness to adapt quickly, based on constantly updated
data. “Going live with CPOE and eMar [both are components of the overall electronic medical
records system], which were huge projects, we had two different feedback processes, including
on the screen in real time [and one through an asynchronous reporting system]. We also had
CPOE as a contributing factor for the on-line incident reporting system, which immediately
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flagged it for the implementation system, so this is also about qualitative data.” Finally, again in
recognition of the adaptive nature of the system, it was suggested, “you need to be able to access
the data you need on your own, so that you can move quickly.”
As a final step, I asked for their suggestions on how I might cluster different factors. I
found I had to offer a couple of suggestions of potential clusters, but even with that prompting,
there was very little in the way of suggestion.
On reflection, I do not feel that this was a particularly useful exercise. I found it to be far
too theoretical, and I believe that was a direct result of not having useful, organization-specific
data with which to work. The focus group data from the first group generally affirmed the data
from the survey in that, overall, there was a positive affirmation of the importance of the
constructs of interest, but there was an awareness of the variability of people’s experiences
across the organization. This is consistent with the distribution of narrative comments in the
survey; however, there was little discussion of the link between the results and current or future
organizational strategies. It is my hope that in future iterations of this approach, once the survey
has been validated and with more evenly distributed responses, the discussion will be more
practical in terms of how they might use the findings to adjust their own strategies.
The second focus group was much more engaged and interactive, and less reliant on the
facilitator to elicit discussion. Again, there were five attendees, including one manager and four
nursing practice leaders, who are analogous to nurse educators in other hospital settings. I
explained the purpose of the focus group, and commented on the skewed nature of the data.
Discussion of the strategic framework affirmed that the college of nurses might, in fact, be more
significant in terms of guiding behaviors. While there was affirmation in both focus groups of
the visual evidence of the framework, one participant commented that, “it needs to be alignment
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departmentally, because staff don’t see the connection.” It was further suggested, “staff are most
aligned with the values, because they are at the forefront of people’s minds.”
The importance of a safe-fail culture was affirmed: “we are beginning the work, but
we’re not there yet.” This comment elicited an interesting discussion, summarized by one
comment: “We’ve been there in the past, then we lost it, now it’s coming back, largely through
healthy [unit-based] counsels.” One participant framed it as a series of “waves of culture—we’re
now on a climbing edge of a new wave, which is exciting.”
When discussing decision-making structures, the feeling was that it was key, but “we
may be afraid to get or give balanced feedback.” Beyond that, there was little additional
discussion.
The engagement of CEO/Executive Team was “extremely critical.” [The CEO] “is an
octopus with many tentacles” but “we’ve learned to trust that they know where we are going and
we want be on the wave with them. There can be a sense of distrust when we’re in a trough in
terms of trust and culture, so it requires constant vigilance. Even the executive team showing up
in a department can trigger distrust from staff.” The fluctuating nature of adaptive systems
seems to be borne out in this discussion of the unpredictability of relationship dynamics. While
most staff would see value in the visibility of the CEO or members of the executive team and, in
the narrative comments on the survey criticized the executive team for their lack of visibility,
some people’s mental models might see the presence of the executive team as potentially
threatening. This underscores the fundamental difference between deterministic systems and
social systems: there is no distinction in individual perceptions in the former, whereas they can
cause all sorts of fluctuations in the latter.
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The construct related to distributed leadership generated a lot of excited discussion. The
group identified different perspectives between some of the older staff and some of the new
hires. “There’s a perception among new hires that ‘there’s lots of cool things you can do, get
involved or take a leadership role in’, which is great. Some of the older staff just want to be told
what to do.” Another added, “leadership is constantly being modeled” but “people have to be
willing to step up and step in.” I know the specific focus group participants well and I can affirm
they have each demonstrated a very high level of commitment to leadership, so they would be an
extreme example of the type of skewing that occurred with the data.
When discussing quality, it was suggested, “in the huddles, if teams can develop their
own metrics, there is evidence of a high level of self-organization.” Another commented,
“(quality metrics) need to be really close to the team to make them personal. [People in the]
huddles don’t care about quality indicators when they don’t matter to them. The huddles seem to
go very flat, and are one-way.” There were several examples of this offered. “If hand hygiene
was at 87% every day for the last 5 days, it becomes just a meaningless number—it feels like
something we’re doing, not who we are;” however, “when they define their own standards, staff
don’t treat ‘quality’ as another task to be accomplished as quickly as possible.” It was suggested
that, in the morning huddles, “stories also matter—post-discharge phone calls are an example,
and are particularly impactful when they reflect [the quality of care of] of specific care
providers.” The alternative was also addressed. “Fear of failure over-rides patient-centered care
when there is a sense of top-down measures.” The level and energy of this discussion seems to
affirm the importance of the quality factor.
Discussion of the accountability framework affirmed its importance but also suggested
that it should not be punitive in nature. “If my risk-taking works, I need [to] feel rewarded for
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that, not punished for failure.” One participant stressed the personal nature of accountability. “If
I don’t feel accountable, then there’s no way I’m going to put real effort and take risk.” It was
also affirmed, “role-modeling is really important” in ensuring accountability.
Intentional learning structures were described as “absolutely vital.” “When we ensure
protected time, adequate resources, and appropriate structures for learning, there is tremendous
growth, enhanced trust, and real leadership;” however, as pointed out in the first focus group,
“Staff don’t feel they have the time, so they feel left out.” This group linked learning and
feedback, stressing that the feedback had to be relevant and focused on new learning.
When I asked them to think about possible clusters, the group agreed that all the
constructs are relevant, and they could not identify new ones. As we discussed possible clusters
they started by agreeing that feedback, quality, and accountability could go together; however,
one participant began to doodle, connecting more and more items. Finally, she said, “I see them
all as a spider web, in terms of their connectiveness, each one connected to all other eight, some
by thick lines and others by thin, but all connected.” The discussion did not extend beyond that
to include the relatively tightness of certain linkages, which would have supported or challenged
the clusters I developed; however, it led another participant to suggest that “It is like a molecule,
where, if you drop one, then it simply isn’t the same and you’d be in trouble. It’s like a molecule
of water, with two hydrogen atoms and one of oxygen. If you remove one atom of hydrogen,
you have hydrous oxide, which is something completely different. It is still a ‘thing,’ but it is
definitely not water.” This is an obvious and organic metaphor consistent with complexity
theory, in which small initial changes to a system, such as the addition or subtraction of one atom
in a complex molecular structure changes the fundamental nature of the structure.
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As the group began to pack up, one of the more eager participants made an important
final comment. “It seems that emergent change only makes sense in the rear view mirror, just
like a molecule of water only makes sense once it is water.” For me, this validated the notion
that there were likely key “atoms” needed to facilitate the emergence of coherence in a system,
but, like all natural phenomena, this emergence was unpredictable and subject to significant
fluctuations based on relational dynamics.
The original intention of the focus groups was to focus on research question 2: the
relationship between the survey results and actual organizational performance. While the
analysis did not go as deep as it might have, the two discussions certainly affirmed the
importance of all of the factors in relationship to performance. If I were to characterize the
response of both groups when asked about the link, it would be that the correlation is a selfevident truth that needs little discussion. What we were not able to do was draw specific links
between one or more items and specific outcomes, which is, in fact, consistent with the concept
of emergent change. As the metaphor of the molecule would suggest, one cannot separate the
part from the whole, nor can the part be understood independent of the whole. The relevance of
each of the constructs was reinforced by the amount of discussion in each focus group about the
relative presence or absence of some of the constructs, such as a safe-fair culture or the access to
learning opportunities.
Perhaps the most useful insight from each of the focus groups was the fragility of the
culture that emerges from the presence of the constructs of interest. The metaphor of a wave was
used to help visualize that process. This reinforces the comments made by Dr. Zimmerman
during my interview with her that emergent, self-organizing systems are extremely contextual
and temporal in their nature. This is evident in the focus group data: staff would experience
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very different approaches and leadership style depending on their individual manager. This
means that the use of this survey is likely more of ephemeral than many other organizational
assessment tools and therefore needs to be approached with caution. Dr. Zimmerman cautioned
me early on in this study that most assessment approaches assume a situation to be acontextual
and atemporal, so future use of this survey, even once validated against larger, more diverse
population, needs to be approached with caution.
Principal Component Analysis
Following the focus groups, I proceeded with the PCA with all items, minus the 10 that
had been eliminated. I completed separate PCAs for each of the three clusters that I had
theorized. The quantitative responses (such as item correlations) and the narrative statements in
the survey helped justify these new clusters. These new clusters included:
PCA: People and Culture
This People and Culture cluster included the original constructs of: Organizational
Culture; CEO and Executive Team; and Leadership Culture. Prima facie, these three constructs
speak to the relational aspects of a system and the way that the executive team may or may not
set the tone for the nature of relationships.
After the first iteration of the PCA, six items were removed because they loaded on two
or more components: Culture 0007, Culture 0009, Leadership 0002, Leadership 0003,
Leadership 0005, and Leadership Recode 0007. (Refer to Table 4.6 on pages 147- 148 for a
review of the contents of each item).
After the second iteration, two items were removed because they loaded on two or more
components: Executive 0003 and Leadership 0001.
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After the third iteration, two items were removed because they loaded on two or more
components: Executive 0004 and Executive Recode 0007.
By the fourth iteration I had 11 items that had measures of skewness and kurtosis <3.0
and did not load on more than one component. The KMO-Bartlett measure of sampling adequacy
for this group of 11 items was .901, which is well above the accepted level of .700.
When I examined the total variance explained for eigenvalue => 1.0, three components
accounted for 57.9 % of the variance.
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Table 4.7
Total Variance Explained for People and Culture
Component
1
2
3

Total
3.931
1.404
1.040

Initial Eigenvalues
% of Variance
35.73%
12.77%
9.46%

Cumulative %
35.73%
48.50%
57.95

Table 4.8
Rotated Component Analysis for People and Culture
.
Item No.

Item

People rarely spend time
trying to place blame when
things go wrong.
Culture_0005
People feel comfortable
proposing innovative ideas.
Culture_0005
Our group looks for best
practices from other groups
and organizations.
Executive_0001 I feel like I know our CEO
as a person.
Executive_0008 I regularly see our CEO
engaged in informal
conversation with staff.
Executive_0009 The executive team appears
to genuinely respect each
other.
Cultrec_0002
You can try new things
provided they work the first
time.
Cultrec_0008
I seldom feel safe telling the
truth to my manager.
Execrec 0002
The executive team is not
very visible in our
organization.
Execrec_0005
The CEO is seldom seen in
our organization.
Leadrec_0004
Management typically takes
control of most initiatives.

Executive
Engagement
(alpha .785)

Component
Safe-Fail
Culture of
Culture
Experimentation
(alpha .733)
(alpha .500)

Culture_0003

.799
.799
.727
.614
.688
.677
.532
.564
.684
.798
.796

169
The three components (with the items included in the component), can be described as:
1. Executive Engagement (5 items). Executive Engagement refers to the degree to which
the CEO and other members of the executive team are seen as visible, relational, and supportive.
These five items taken together had a Cronbach’s Alpha of .785, above the acceptable level of
.700.


I feel like I know the CEO as a person



I regularly see our CEO engaged in informal conversation with staff



The executive team appears to genuinely respect each other



The executive team is not very visible in our organization (reverse coded for analysis)



The CEO is not often seen in the organization (reverse coded for analysis).

The importance of a highly engaged and supportive executive team was highlighted in the
narrative comments as well as the focus groups. One comment in particular stood out for me. It
was suggested in one of the focus groups that the absence of a top-down approach was important
in initiating change because it helps people feel safe. In a previous study I did at the same site,
which was related to issues of power (Dickens, 2010b), the non-interventional support of the
executive team was paramount in achieving significant performance improvement.
2. Safe-Fail Culture (3 items). Safe-Fail Culture refers to the degree to which people feel
safe to experiment and innovate without being criticized or blamed if their approach fails to meet
its objectives. These three items taken together had a Cronbach’s Alpha of .733, above the
acceptable level of .700.
 People rarely spend time trying to place blame when things go wrong
 People feel comfortable proposing innovative ideas
 Our group looks for best practices from other groups and organizations.
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Narrative and focus group comment support the need for a safe-fail culture, but it was also clear
from the comments that not all departments in the organization felt the same level of safety.
Some participants affirmed their experience of open discussions about mistakes that reflected a
solution-focused orientation while others spoke of high levels of distrust and bullying. The wide
range of comments related to this component suggests to me that people value a safe-fail culture
but do not always experience it. Since it is likely people complain about things they really care
about (Kegan & Lahey, 2009), then the evidence of these “complains” serves as an affirmation
of the component. The vital importance of a blame-free culture was also affirmed in the focus
groups, but they readily acknowledged that it was not always evident.
3. Culture of Experimentation (3 Items). The third component was more difficult to
name, so it is tentatively labeled “culture of Experimentation, indicating that it is safe to try out
new ideas and to speak the truth without fear of recrimination;” however, the three items taken
together had a Cronbach’s alpha of .500, well below the acceptable level of .700. Removal of
any of the items did not substantially change the alpha.


I seldom feel safe telling the truth to my manager (reverse coded for analysis)



You can try new things provided they work the first time (reverse coded for analysis)



Management typically takes control of most initiatives (reverse coded for analysis).

It should be noted that the first two items seem to fit better with the safe-fail component
and the third item, which had the strongest loading, does not seem to relate to the construct of a
culture of experimentation. Difficulty in naming the three items in this component combine with
the low reliability are indications that further testing is needed.
One of the narrative comments pointed out that there are often clashes between those who
want to experiment and those who want to continue with well established approaches. The very
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clear implication in the comment was that the unwillingness to experiment led to good ideas
being squandered. Again, the range of comments, and the firm conviction with which many of
them were made, only serves to affirm the importance of this component.
The result of the PCA for this cluster is that, while I started with three suggested
constructs of Organizational Culture, CEO and Executive Team, and Leadership Culture,
Leadership Culture did not emerge in this sample and further study is required to see if it is valid.
PCA: Structure and Framework
The Structures and Frameworks cluster included the constructs of: Strategic Framework;
Work Structures; and Accountability Framework. These all relate to the architecture of the
organization: how it is intentionally designed in a way that could be captured in a chart of some
kind.
After the first iteration of the PCA, four items were removed because they loaded on two
or more components: Strategy 0005, Accountability 0002 and 0006, Strat Recode 0007 and
Accountrec 0005. (Refer to Table 4.6 on pages 147-148 for a review of the contents of each
item).
After the second iteration, three more items were removed because they loaded on two or
more components: Accountability 0001 and 0003 and Strucrec 0006.
By the third iteration I had 7 items that had measures of skewness and kurtosis < 3.0 and
did not load on more than one component. The KMO-Bartlett measure of sampling adequacy for
this group of 7 items was .721, above the accepted level of .700. The Skree plot for these 7 items
showed that the elbow was on the second component. When I examined the total variance
explained for eigenvalue => 1.000, 2 components accounted for [52.7 %] of the variance. Table
4.9 shows the amount of variance explained by each component.
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Table 4.9
Total Variance Explained for Structures and Frameworks
Initial Eigenvalues
Component
Total
% of Variance
1
3.552
39.47%
2
1.450
11.42%

Cumulative %
39.47%
50.89%

Table 4.10
Rotated Component Analysis for Structure and Frameworks
.
Component
Item No.
Item
Collaborative
Purposeful
Decision
Orientation
Processes
(alpha .501)
(alpha .745)
Strategy_0007 My work serves a higher
purpose.
.509
Strategy_0009 Our organization is adept at
adjusting strategies in light of
.464
new external factors
(regulatory bodies,
government, public
expectations etc.)
Structure_0001 I have opportunities to have
input into decisions that affect
.856
my work.
Structure_0002 I feel comfortable providing
input at our group meetings.
.790
Structure_0004 We receive regular updates on
our group's performance.
.727
Stratrec_0004 I rarely think about the mission
and values of our organization.
.768
Strucrec_0003 I work on my own and don't
interact with others.
.677
The first component (with the items included in the component), can be described as:
1. Collaborative Decision Processes (3 items). Collaborative decision-making suggests
there are structures and processes that encourage input and engagement based on required
information current performance. These three items taken together had a Cronbach’s alpha of
.745, above the acceptable level of .700.
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I have opportunities to have input into decisions that affect my work.



I feel comfortable providing input into our group meetings.



We regularly receive updates on our group’s performance.

The importance of collaborative work structures is evident throughout the narrative comments
and focus group input: from the collaborative way in which the mission, vision, and values were
developed to the vital role of daily huddles on a unit-by-unit basis, the qualitative evidence was
clear. This is consistent with the movement toward collaborative care models across the
spectrum of health care providers and the study site has been a early adopter of this approach.
2. Purposeful Orientation (4 Items). The four items taken together had a Cronbach’s
Alpha of .501, well below the acceptable level of .700. Removal of any of the items did not
substantially change the alpha. The items were:


My work serves a higher purpose.



Our organization is adept at adjusting strategies in light of new external factors
(regulatory bodies, government, public expectations, etc.).



I rarely think about the mission and values of our organization (reverse coded for
analysis).



I work on my own and don't interact with others (reverse coded for analysis).

The narrative and focus group comments are less definitive regarding this construct. Many of
the comments relate to the visibility of the mission, vision, and values, but there was less
discussion about how these “came alive” at the departmental or team level. In fact, one of the
focus groups suggested that the mission was so broad that it encouraged taking on too many
initiatives, rather than providing focus.
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The fourth item does not seem to fit with the other three and is drawn from the original
construct of Work Structures, so it suggests that further study is required.
In summary, I developed a theoretical cluster that included the three constructs of
Strategic Framework; Work Structures; and Accountability Framework. The PCA, however,
indicates that there is one component that has sufficient alpha to be used, and that relates to
Work and Decision-Making Structures that put an emphasis on collaboration. The second factor,
related to Purposeful Orientation, will require further study.
PCA: Systems and Processes
The Systems and Processes cluster included the constructs of: Quality Control Systems;
Learning Structures; and Feedback Processes. The central theme of this cluster seems to be the
mechanisms through which the system communicates (as opposed to the relational nature of
communication). One could argue reasonably that “learning” is as much about culture as it is
about process, but the intent behind the items is the intentionality of learning structures, rather
than personal learning characteristics.
After the first iteration of the PCA, 11 items were removed because they loaded on two
or more components: Quality 0004 and 0005, Accountability 0001,0002,0005, 0006, and 0007,
Qualrec 0007, and Feedrec 0003. (Refer to Table 4.6 on pages 147-148 for a review of the
contents of each item).
After the second iteration I had 12 items that had measures of skewness and kurtosis <
3.0 and did not load on more than one component. KMO-Bartlett measure of sampling adequacy
for this group of 12 items was .883, well above the accepted level of .700. When I examined the
total variance explained for eigenvalue => 1.000, two components accounted for [55.7%] of the
variance.

175

Table 4.11
Total Variance Explained for Systems and Processes
Initial Eigenvalues
Component
Total
% of Variance
1
2

5.229
1.450

43.57%
12.08%

Cumulative
%
43.57%
55.66%

Table 4.12
Rotated Component Analysis for Systems and Processes
.
Component
Item No.
Item
Collaborative
Intentio
Quality (alpha
nal
.878)
Learnin
g
Processe
s
(alpha
.755)
Quality_0001 My group has direct input
into the way we measure
.795
quality.
Quality_0004 Quality standards are
valued in our organization.
.696
Quality_0006 Our group adjusts our
quality expectations on a
.812
regular basis.
Quality_0007 I feel comfortable
providing input at our
.790
group meetings.
Learning_00 Our group has regular
01
opportunities to share
.593
learning with our peers in
other groups.
Learning_00 I have access to the
04
learning resources I need.
.674
Learning_00 I have the opportunity to
06
attend a range of courses
.744
and workshops.
Feedback_00 There is a commitment to
04
constructive feedback in
.769
our group.
Learnrec_00 Our group rarely debriefs a
05
project once it is complete.
.544
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Feedrec_000
8
Feedrec_000
9
Learnrec_00
03

We seldom seem to have
the kind of data we need.
We get very little data on
how our group is perceived
in the organization.
There are few formal
learning opportunities in
our organization.

.523
.617
.735

These two components (with the items included in the component), can be described as:
1. Collaborative Quality (6 items). Collaborative quality, like collaborative decisionmaking, means a shared commitment to putting the quality of the work ahead of any personal
agenda and sharing feedback and information that will improve outcomes. These six items taken
together had a Cronbach’s Alpha of .878, above the acceptable level of .700.


My group has direct input into the way we measure quality.



Quality standards are valued in our organization.



Our group adjusts our quality expectations o a regular basis.



I feel comfortable giving feedback on quality in my group.



Our group has regular opportunities to share learning with our peers in other groups.



There is a commitment to constructive feedback in our group.

The importance of locally defined quality metrics was supported in the narrative feedback as
well as the focus groups. As one focus group participant suggested, “Lean [quality and process
improvement methodology] is all about defining quality locally.” Another commented on the
fact that, when the people doing the work define quality there is a much higher level of
ownership and sustainability. The study site is also a leading proponent of positive deviance
(Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2009), an approach to quality and outcome improvement that is
entirely predicated on local and often unique approaches to improvement.
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2. Intentional Learning Processes (6 items). As the original construct proposed, an
adaptive system requires constant learning in order to thrive. These six items taken together had
a Cronbach’s Alpha of .755, above the acceptable level of .700.
 I have access to the learning resources I need.
 I have the opportunity to attend a range of courses and workshops.
 Our group seldom debriefs a project once completed (reverse coded for analysis).
 We seldom have the kind of data we need (reverse coded for analysis).
 We get sufficient data on how our group is perceived in the organization (reverse coded
for analysis).
 There are many formal learning opportunities in our organization (reverse coded for
analysis).
The importance of learning structures and systems was supported by the narrative
comments and by the focus groups, but in an oddly paradoxical way. Comments from both
sources seemed to underscore the importance by emphasizing the issues related to time and
access. I inferred from those comments that people saw the importance of taking advantage of
learning opportunities but were frustrated by the fact that they were not always able to engage in
such learning. From my practice experience, I also know that the study site is unusual in the
depth and breadth to which they have extended leadership development courses, emotional
intelligence workshops, and other non-clinical learning opportunities.
I originally developed a theoretical cluster that included the three constructs of Quality
Control Systems; Learning Structures; and Feedback Processes. The PCA, however, indicates
that there are components that have eigenvalues => 1 and have an alpha measure of reliability
=>.70. These relate closely to the first two constructs, Quality Control Systems and Learning
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Structures. When it comes to quality, it seems that the key is less the formal system than it is the
intentionality of taking a collaborative approach supported by timely learning and feedback. The
emphasis in the learning component is on feedback and analysis, and having the systems in place
to encourage the learning.
Summary of PCA Results
Five components with reliability =>.70 emerged from the PCA.
1.

Executive Engagement (5 items)

2.

Safe-Fail Culture (3 items)

3.

Collaborative Decision Processes (3 items)

4.

Collaborative Quality (6 items)

5.

Intentional Learning Processes. (6 items)

Two other components with reliability <= .70 emerged from the PCA.
6.

Culture of Experimentation (3 items)

7.

Purposeful Orientation (4 items)

The final two require further study. If, after further study all seven components are considered
reliable, the scale would have a total of 30 items. I originally theorized nine organizational
constructs that would facilitate emergent change. After the PCA, seven remain that collectively
put a premium on collaboration, engagement, and learning. As I will discuss in Chapter V, this
is consistent with the literature and with the feedback from the focus groups. What is noticeable
to me is the absence of any overarching framework or container (Olson, 2001) for the system.
This too will be discussed in Chapter V.
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Relationship to Organizational Performance
The second research question asked, “What is the relationship between the presence, or
absence, of these factors and organizational performance?” As suggested during the discussion
of focus groups, there was confirmation of the importance of all nine of the constructs of interest
in terms of key performance indicators at the study site; however, there was no discussion or
analysis of the link between specific constructs and specific outcomes. From a practice
perspective, the study site is an organization that is very committed to aligning all their activity
behind their mission, values, and strategic priorities, and the success of this commitment can be
inferred from the high average mean for the construct Strategic Framework. It is also an
organization that has been very deliberate and intentional about collaborative work structures
that enhance quality. This has taken the form of staff councils for every department and unit,
where issues are discussed openly between staff and the manager of the unit. The organization
has also moved to a collaborative care model and has put significant resources into
interprofessional education. This is reflected in the high average mean for the constructs
Learning Structures and Accountability. At the same time, they were very successful in
implementing local quality improvement strategies as one of five Canadian hospitals involved in
a positive deviance pilot study; however, it would be an important consideration for any future
study using the same approach to make explicit links between the components of the survey and
specific performance indicators. It will be the link between an emergent, self-organizing
approach and performance that will be of benefit from a practioner perspective. At this point, we
have an intuitive and even anecdotal connection, but not a demonstrable one.
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Comparative Differences
The third research question was whether the derived component scores were significantly
different depending on organizational positions, age, and education level. Because of the sample
size, the decision was made to focus on two key comparisons: clinical versus non-clinical
respondents and manager versus non-manager respondents.
Clinical versus non-clinical. In this context, clinical was taken to be all those who
responded positively to the option “clinical staff” and non-clinical responded positively to the
option “non-clinical staff;” however, respondents were asked to click all responses that applied,
so if they self-identified as a manager, director or executive as well as clinical or non-clinical,
they were included in the N for that group. There were no respondents in the physician or
volunteer categories. Clinical staff would include nurses, physiotherapists, occupational
therapists, and others who provided direct, bed-side care or care in an out-patient clinic. Nonclinical would include all support services, such as porters, finance or IT staff, and food service
staff. The following table includes the N in each group for each component that had reliability
=>.70 and the mean for each group in each component.
Table 4.13
Group Statistics – Clinical versus Non-clinical
Component
Executive Engagement
Safe-Fail Culture
Collaborative Decisions
Collaborative Quality
Intentional Learning

Role
Clinical
Non-clinical
Clinical
Non-clinical
Clinical
Non-clinical
Clinical
Non-clinical
Clinical
Non-clinical

N
55
51
55
52
55
52
54
49
54
51

Mean
4.02
4.59
3.97
3.97
4.32
4.41
4.10
4.04
3.71
3.95
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The only component in which there was statistically significant difference was Executive
Engagement, t=-3.344 (104), p=<.001, indicating the non-clinical group is more likely to respond
positively to items related to the availability and visibility of the executive team. Possible
reasons for the difference are discussed in Chapter V.
Manager versus non-manager. Respondents were asked to click all response that
applied, so if they self-identified as a manager, director or executive they were included in N for
manager. There were no respondents in the physician or volunteer categories and 14 respondents
did not indicate which group they were in.
Table 4.14
Group Statistics – Manager versus Non-Manager
Component
Executive
Engagement
Safe-Fail
Culture
Collaborative
Decisions
Collaborative
Quality
Intentional
Learning

Role
Manager
Non-manager
Manager
Non-manager
Manager
Non-manager
Manager
Non-manager
Manager
Non-manager

N
46
102
45
103
45
103
45
99
44
102

Mean
4.94
4.27
4.46
3.96
5.01
4.33
4.71
4.09
4.27
3.83

There were statistically significant differences between the responses of the manager group and
the non-manager group, with the manager group more likely to respond positively to the items in
each of the components that the non-management group. Possible reasons for the difference are
discussed in Chapter V.
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Chapter V: Conclusions and Recommendations
In my end is my beginning.
T.S. Eliot. Four Quartets
Introduction
Chapter V addresses the conclusions and recommendations drawn from the research
study. The discussion starts with the conclusions and then moves on to the recommendations.
The above quote by T. S. Eliot is appropriate for two reasons. The first is that the results
of this study describe what are likely the very first, small steps toward what might be an
important new understanding of organizational dynamics. Many organizational leaders are
aware that in times of rapid, discontinuous change, historic, linear approaches to strategy and
organizational design are not serving them, so there is definitely a hunger for a new, well thought
out approach (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 2009). There is much work to be done in both
the research and practice realms in order to turn the research into a validated and useful approach
to rethinking organizational design. The second reason that the Eliot quote is appropriate is that
this study had its genesis in the work of Alaa (2009) and Lanham et al. (2009), who emphasize
the importance of individual connectivity in facilitating emergence and the results of this study
affirm the importance of creating organizational systems and structures that enable such
connectivity, so there is a sense of returning to where the line of inquiry began.
The research questions that framed this study were:
1.

What valid factors emerge from factor analysis of items on the Emergence Survey?

2.

What is the relationship between the presence, or absence, of these factors and
organizational performance?

3. Are there significant differences from the derived component scores across
organizational positions?
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Conclusions Regarding the PCA Results
Nine constructs of interest were theorized, based on a review of the literature, previous
research on organizational complexity, and my own practice experience. While there is much
more to be done to truly understand the factors that facilitate emergence in organizations, this
current research indicates that there are describable factors, although not necessarily the factors
originally theorized. What emerged from the study are seven distinct factors that all reflect the
importance of connectivity and relationship in an adaptive system. Two of the factors will need
further study to confirm their validity. A brief review of these factors is in order here.
The five items in the component called Executive Engagement are all drawn from the
original construct of interest labeled CEO and Executive Team. All five relate to the visibility
and “humanness” of the executive team. In this context, I use the term humanness to describe an
individual who is viewed and respected as an unique individual, rather than a member of the
faceless “management.” There is no sense of “us” and “them” but rather informal and respectful
dialogue between the executive team and the other members of the organization, as well as
among themselves. Anderson et al. (2003) indicate that “management practices that change how
people relate to one another, such as communication, participation in decision-making, and
relationship-oriented leadership, result in better outcomes” (p. 2). The patterns of behavior
indicated in the items within this component certainly suggest the relational practices indicated
in the above; however, it should be noted that changes in the executive team, which occurred just
prior the study period, created a void and thus a risk of instability that was alluded to in both the
narrative response in the survey and the focus groups. As one survey response indicated, “[The]
recent departure of [VP Patient Service] adds some skepticism about unity of executive team.
Some strong personalities to compete with I imagine.” While this comment is highly speculative,
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it does reveal the often transitory nature of the formal leadership structure. There is a certain
irony that the executives of high performing organizations often move on as they are in high
demand. In the case of the study site, the VP Patient Services was, in fact, hired away to serve as
the Executive Vice President at another Toronto-area hospital and twice the CEO has been
seconded by the Ministry of Health to take the lead in organizations that are experiencing
operational and financial problems. It speaks to the leadership capacity, but it can also lead to
sort of uncertainty suggested in the above quote.
While only three items remained in the construct labeled Safe-Fail Culture, they were all
drawn from the original construct of Organizational Culture. The three items, which had alpha
reliability of .733, speak to an organizational culture that puts a premium on innovation, whether
it is generated from within a work group or from an observed best practice in another
organization. There is little sense of the attitude of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” but rather a
desire for continuous improvement. One survey participant described the organization as “an
environment where, if a mistake has been made, solution(s) are brought forward. From these
ideas, the best one that could prevent future mistakes is used;” however, based on the often
contradictory nature of the narrative comments, it is important to recognize the contextual nature
of this attitude. Managers and directors who do not reflect the supportive nature of the executive
team can stifle this sort of culture in their own work teams or departments. One respondent put it
quite graphically when they said, “Nothing remains confidential in this organization. If you open
your mouth you are finished. They will make your life a living hell.” Another noted that there
were likely some pockets within the organization that were not necessarily positive and
supportive. The variability of staff perceptions about culture and risk affirms the need for
organizations to be very intentional about creating and supporting the kinds of “holding spaces”
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(Heifetz et al. , 2009) discussed in Chapter II. “Holding environments [that] give a group
identity and contain the conflict, chaos, and confusion often produced when struggling with
complex problematic realities” (p. 304). Emergent change inherently involves a significant
degree of risk-taking, and these holding places, these safe-fail environments, allow for that kind
of experimentation.
The component labeled Collaborative Decision Processes is closely aligned with the
Safe-Fail Culture in that they both speak to a work environment in which people feel
comfortable providing input, often because they are given updates on their group’s performance.
The three items in this component are all drawn from the original construct of Work and
Decision-Making Structures. As discussed in Chapter II, Holman et al. (2007) suggested that
“what keeps [a] system whole over time is a commitment to collaborative meaning making” (p.
12). The opportunities for such collaboration can happen by chance, but the organization itself
has a role in creating collaborative works structures and the items in this component affirmed
this. This concept of collaborative meaning making would also apply to the component labeled
Intentional Learning Structures.
The fourth component, referred to as Collaborative Quality, has four items from the
construct labeled Quality Control Systems, one item from the construct Learning Processes, and
one from the construct Feedback Processes, indicating the link of both learning and feedback to
quality. Taken as a whole, this component affirms the need to define and adjust quality at the
local level as Wergin (2003) suggested, rather than from an organization-wide perspective.
Closely linked to Collaborative Quality is the construct of Intentional Learning Processes,
which draws four items from the construct Learning Processes and two items from the construct
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Feedback Processes, suggesting learning occurs not just through formal learning opportunities,
which are important, but also from feedback data that allow the group to learn and adjust.
While the component Culture of Experimentation had alpha reliability < .70, the three
items in that construct were all recoded items that each suggest a culture that is not afraid to try
new things or to speak openly and honestly to management, without fear of reprisal or having
managers take control. The component Purposeful Orientation also had alpha reliability < .70,
but three of the four items in that component speak to the organization’s capacity to adapt to
changing conditions while maintaining a focus or orientation toward the collective understanding
of the shared purpose or mission. The fourth item speaks to collaborative work, rather than
individual efforts in pursuit of this purpose. Both these constructs require further study.
A recurring theme in the narrative responses to the survey and the focus groups was the
contextual delicacy of a self-organizing system. Minor changes in the system or behaviors that
are inconsistent with the larger aims and intentions of the systems, can create microsystems
within the larger system that are distinct in that they display the characteristics of a more
command-and-control, hierarchical approach to both structure and leadership. In the same way
that an ecosystem can be a very fragile construct, we need to accept and indeed anticipate the
cyclical nature of organizational culture.
As important as it is to understand the seven components that emerged from the PCA, it
is also important to reflect on the two constructs of interest that did not. In all cases, a careful
review of the items themselves will be important. The items themselves may not be appropriate
or useful in describing the construct of interest. Only two of the items under the construct called
Strategic Framework emerged in the final results, both in the component Purposeful Orientation,
which had alpha reliability < .70. This may be a result of the size and generally positive
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orientation of the group sampled so this needs to be validated through additional research, but it
suggests that clarity of mission and values may not be as important as originally theorized. The
answer may lie in a comment in one of the focus groups when it was suggested that the boundary
created by the current language is so broad that virtually any initiative could be argued as
supportive of the mission. This was a topic of conversation in the first focus group, initiated by
the comment, “We tend to take everything on, which means things can be difficult to sustain
over time.” There was general agreement that they tried to do too many things at once, which is
also a comment I heard regularly during the leadership development programs I facilitated. In
fact, it was because of this concern that the action learning projects that were part of the program
were integrated into existing Lean initiatives, so that the projects themselves were not perceived
as more work, but a new perspective on work that was already being done. It could also be
argued that, the higher the risk tolerance of the organization, the looser the missional boundaries
might be. Bowles et al. (2006) describe what they call a “poverty trap” in their description of
organizational ecosystems. This occurs when there are more options and possibilities than the
system can reasonably sustain, and some of those options need to be curtailed if the system as a
whole is to survive. Otherwise, resources become too thinly spread. The focus group comments
seem to allude to this failure to “trap” and starve some initiatives, as temping as they may be. It
may also mean that a self-organizing system is such an emergent phenomenon that anything that
suggests it can be pointed in a specific direction, as a mission statement is often intended to do, is
counter intuitive. A counter argument that I have made in the past is that the notion of mission,
which describes what an organization exists to be and do, could be considered consistent with the
concept of autopoiesis, which Jantsch (1980) described as “the characteristic of living systems to
continuously renew themselves and to regulate the process in such a way that the integrity of
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their structure is maintained” ( p. 7). If we accept that the meaning of structure here was
somewhat analogous to purpose, rather than the more formal or mechanistic meaning that is
often ascribed to it, then purpose becomes an important construct that would benefit from further
exploration.
The potential weakness of the Strategic Framework as a factor was indicated in the
discussion on the construct in Chapter II. While deterministic systems, such as Reynolds’
“boids” might respond to three simple rules, social systems are much more complex and
Richards’ (2008) warning of a seductive syllogism needs to be taken very seriously. Stacey’s
(2010) caution against the simplistic application of the concept of simple rules, a concept he had
earlier supported, seems to be well founded. He felt that the articulation of such simple rules is
deterministic and implied a role for management. The focus group comment about the lack of
limitation in the current strategic framework certainly could tempt leaders to interpret the
framework as they see fit, and thereby create limitations in order to make a project manageable,
which would indeed be a traditional management role. The question that remains unanswered is
whether this is the fault of the study site’s current language related to mission and vision or due
to the fact that this construct is less important to organizational design than I have argued. The
question will have to remain in abeyance until the survey items can be carefully reviewed and
modified in light of the current study’s findings and the survey can be administered and validated
through a larger sample size.
The second original construct of interest that did not have any items in the final result
was Leadership Culture. The theoretical argument here was that distributed leadership (Gronn,
2002) was a key lever in enabling an organization to develop capacity for change throughout the
organization. Again, this needs further validation, but the broad range of responses in the
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literature to the question, “What is leadership in a complex, adaptive system?” which was raised
in Chapter II may well make it very difficult to develop meaningful items for a construct that is
very ill-defined. Another possibility could be that the capacity for collaboration is in fact an
outcome of an intentional effort to develop leaders by engaging them in collaborative initiatives
as part of their development.
The third initial construct that did not seem useful was the Accountability Framework.
At the study site, this term would be viewed as an extension of the Strategic Framework, because
they are typically presented together, with the Accountability Framework flowing directly from
the Strategic Framework. The items in this construct tried to assess the impact of the existing
framework, in the context of whether or not people felt accountable, rather than the framework
itself. The first step in any future study would need to be a careful review and modification of
items after taking into consideration the results of this study. If initial constructs did not emerge,
it could be the fault of the items. If items were not retained for the PCA, or in the PCA process,
it is possible that modifications to the wording could help eliminate this problem. I believe that a
further analysis of the items may cause some of them to migrate to a different component, such
as collaborative decision-making and collaborative quality because effective collaboration
demands accountability. As I suggested in Chapter II, if we cannot predict the future, how, or
perhaps for what, then do we hold people accountable? The work of Patton (2010) on the
concept of developmental evaluation, which does not link itself to pre-determined outcomes,
often the basis on which accountability is assigned, may be a more useful approach. This was
certainly evident in the work coauthored by Patton and two respected complexity researchers,
Westley et al. (2007) and Zimmerman (2010).

190
The final construct that failed to emerge was Feedback Processes, but items from this
construct loaded on Intentional Learning Structures and Collaborative Quality, suggesting that
real-time data are important, but perhaps not as a stand-alone construct. In the discussion on
rapid, data-base feedback mechanisms in Chapter II, I suggested the emphasis on information as
a resource (Boal & Schultz, 2007) clearly argues for a steady flow of real-time information so
that ([emphasis added] the agents within the system can adapt to change. I emphasize “so that”
because the availability of data is crucial, but as a means to something else: in this case
collaboration and learning.
The discussion related to schools of thought in Chapter III spoke to the oversimplification advocated by the pragmatic school of thought who argued for an approach to
taking advantage of complexity through the application of a few basic rules (Kelly & Allison,
1998). At the other end of the continuum of approaches lies a completely phenomenological
approach that argues that there is no way to contain or manage complex, emergent patterns
(Stacey, 2010). The results of this study suggest that there is a middle ground that would argue
for the intentional design of collaborative work and decision-making structures and collaborative
learning processes, recognizing that there is no guaranteed outcome when these structures are in
place because the outcomes are very contextual; however, the presence of such factors,
supported by an engaged executive team, can lead to the innovation and resilience made possible
by a systems capacity for continuous renewal through self-organization.
It is worth reflecting on the comparative differences and possible reasons why there were
statistically significant differences, particularly when comparing managers and non-managers.
When comparing clinical to non-clinical responses, the only significant difference was for the
Construct Executive Engagement. On reflection, this makes sense. In my practice experience, I
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have come to understand that “bed-side care” is quite a literal thing and it is much harder for
clinical staff to leave their units and engage in system wide projects and other opportunities to
engage with senior leaders in the organization. This is a complaint that I have often heard voiced
in discussions with clinical staff. This is less of a challenge for non-clinical staff. It is less
difficult to understand why managers would have a higher mean for all components. During the
focus group with the vice president and the four directors, the point was made that they were
generally more aware of all of the changes in the organization and saw the rationale for structural
changes, such as collaborative care teams. As one of the directors put it, “We tend to spend
more time up on the balcony. It is the nature of our work,” making a specific and intentional
reference to Heifetz et al. (2009).
Emphasis on Collaboration
As mentioned, the second reason that the Eliot quote is appropriate is that this study had
its genesis in the work of Alaa (2009) and Lanham et al. (2009) who emphasize the importance
of individual connectivity in facilitating emergence. What this study adds to the literature is the
importance of intentional design that put agents within the system into work, decision-making,
and learning structures that then allow the individual’s capacity for self-organization to be
optimized. The literature related to emergence continuously returns to the theme of
relationships, especially between agents in a complex, adaptive organization. They have been
described as “an orienting value and core strategy” (Heifetz et al., 2009, p. 21). As Kelly and
Allison (1998) pointed out, “a stand alone object, no matter how well designed, has limited
potential for new weirdness” (p. 46). In other words, a stand-alone agent, isolated from its peers,
is likely to have limited capacity for the innovative possibilities of emergence. Stacey (2003)
argued for a move away from cognitive and humanistic psychology to what he called relational
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psychology in which “an individual is not an object that affects another, but that they are subjects
that interacting with each other. In their interaction, they form the experience of the other” (p.
347). The work of Ruth Anderson and her colleagues, cited frequently in this study, puts
relationships at the center of the systems capacity to self-organize in order to provide enhanced
patient care.
Research Recommendations
At the end of her dissertation, Baron (2003) suggests that “two parallel roads lie ahead—
one is the research path and the other the application path. Just as straight roads merge in the
distance in a visual perspective, these two roads need to also be heading toward a common goal”
(p. 166). The same is also true of this current research. The point of convergence in the future
would be a better understanding of how organizations can assess and then improve their capacity
to facilitate emergence in pursuit of increased resilience and adaptability in the face of change.
It is clear that the results of this study are a tentative first step, in that they only begin to
assess the validity of constructs of interest for a defined group of people in one specific setting.
Future research questions should focus on validation of the factors facilitating organizational
emergence in multiple settings. The first step, a careful review of the items in the original
constructs of interest with other subject matter experts to determine why an item worked or
didn’t work in the PCA. This would result in a modified survey. Following that review, a
retesting of the modified survey with a larger, more diverse data pool is required. The sample in
this study was drawn from staff at the study site who had self-identified as leaders and had likely
been nurtured in their leadership development by supportive managers. In retrospect, this was a
convenience sample that may have skewed the results, again impeding the PCA. A future study
should put a priority on a larger, less homogenous sample size. The resulting PCA would then
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allow for the validation or potential expansion of both the number of validated factors and the
underlying items. In addition, future research questions should focus on further verification of
the factors across borders into other health care contexts as well as contexts other than health
care. In order to enhance the application of the survey, more questions need to be asked about the
link between the factors and organizational performance. This research question was not fully
answered in the current study.
Practice Recommendations
While research proceeds, application can also proceed. Given the results of this study,
there can be little doubt that certain factors do facilitate emergence, particularly those that
increase collaboration and relationship. When organizational leaders can identify and understand
these factors, they can be intentional about creating structures that increase connections. This is
an important link between the concept of self-organization and the movement toward
interprofessional models of care (D'Amour & Oandasan, 2005; Skjørshammer, 2001; Engel,
1989) in the health care sector.
The long-term goal, which I intend to pursue, is that a validated survey can be used
across a variety of sectors that will enable organizational leaders who recognize the potential
benefits of embracing an adaptive systems perspective to identify key points of leverage within
their organization. This would be identified through the administration and evaluation of the
survey. Strategies could then be developed to enhance their organization’s capacity for selforganization, along with the relational skills needed to be effective within that construct. Based
on this initial study, those skills are likely to focus on collaboration, communication, and
relationship building, consistent with the more relational factors identified by Alaa (2009) and
Lanham et al. (2009).
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Appendix A
Subject Informed Consent Form – Focus Group

Study Title: Facilitating Emergence in a Canadian Hospital Context: Complex Adaptive
Systems Theory and the Shape of Change

Principal Investigator:
Co-Investigator:

Marla Fryers, Chief Nursing Officer
xxx-xxx-xxxx
Peter Dickens, The Iris Group
(905) 466-6340

You have been asked to participate in a research study in which Marla
Fryers will be the Principal Investigator. This research is being conducted under
Marla’s supervision by Peter Dickens in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
Peter’s Ph.D. in Leadership and Change at Antioch University in Ohio.
The study involves, your participation in a 90-minute focus group that will
be facilitated by Peter. The purpose of the focus group is to review the results of
an on-line survey that was conducted by Peter at [the study site]. The survey
asked participants to identify the presence or absence of specific organizational
factors that contribute to emergent self-organization. All related research
materials such as transcriptions of the focus group, Peter’s notes and the Informed
Consent will be kept in a secure file cabinet. The results from this focus group
may be incorporated into Peter’s doctoral dissertation.
It is our hope that through this focus group we will be able to identify
specific factors that may correlate to organizational performance and thereby
identify specific points of leverage to improve [The study site’s] capacity for
innovation and creative change. The risks to you are considered minimal;
although unlikely, there is a chance that you may experience some discomfort in
completing the survey. In addition, you may withdraw from this study at any time
without negative consequences. Should you withdraw, your data will be
eliminated from the study.
There is no financial remuneration for participating in this study.
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If you have any questions about any aspect of this study or your involvement, please
contact:
Peter Dickens
The Iris Group
92 Timpson Drive
Aurora, ON L4G5N4
(905) 466-6340
peter@theirisgrouponline.com
If you have concerns or questions about your rights as a research participant in the study you
may contact Dr. Donald Borrett, Chair of the [Study Site’s Research Ethics Board at xxx-xxx-xxxx.
By signing the present form, I expressly consent to the collection and use of my personal
data in accordance with this document.
SIGNATURES
1. I carefully read the information in this Consent Form. I was given time and opportunity to
ask questions about the study. All my questions were answered to my satisfaction.
2. I voluntarily consent to take part in this research study.
3. I will be given a copy of this signed and dated Consent Form.
_____________________
____________________
_______________
Subject’s Name (Print)
Subject’s Signature Date
I confirm that I have explained the nature, purpose and foreseeable effects of the study to the
participant whose name is printed above. The participant consented to take part in this study by
signing and dating this form.
_____________________
Name (Print)

____________________
_______________
Signature
Date
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Appendix B
Facilitating Emergence in a Canadian Hospital Context: Complex, Adaptive Systems
Theory and the Shape of Change
Protocol
This study is the second step in identifying specific factors within an organization that contribute
to “emergence.” The first step was a series of interviews and focus groups at [Study Site] that
surfaced factors and potential items that could be used in this survey. Emergence is the term used
in complex, adaptive systems theory to describe an unanticipated outcome, a novelty, or a
surprise that occurs outside of the parameters of an articulated strategy or process. The
researcher has developed an initial scale of related items and this step is intended to allow for
principal component analysis that will establish the validity of the survey. Once the survey
results have been analyzed, they will be presented to senior leaders at [Study Site] with the intent
of looking for correlation between these factors and organizational performance.
[Study site] staff who have participated in the Foundations of Leadership program will be invited
to complete the survey. That is the sole basis for their inclusion because it will mean that they
have had some exposure to the complex, adaptive system theory that is described in Module 6 of
that program.
Participants will be invited to participate through email. They will be asked to respond directly to
Peter via email at which time they will be provided with an online link to the survey.
It is anticipated that the survey will take 15 – 20 minutes to complete. The survey makes a series
of statements and asks the participant to indicate their level of agreement with the statement,
based on a six-point Likert-like scale. Participants also have the opportunity to make individual
qualitative comments. There will be no attribution of any specific statements to any individual or
to [Study Site]. The results of the survey will be described in the dissertation Peter will submit in
partial fulfillment of his Ph.D. in Leadership and Change at Antioch University. Neither
individuals nor [Study Site] will be specifically identified in the dissertation or in any subsequent
use of the information gathered through the focus group.
Following the administration of the survey, Peter will facilitate a focus group with senior leaders
from [Study Site]. The purpose of the focus group is to review the results of the online survey.
All related research materials such as transcriptions of the focus group, Peter’s notes and the
Informed Consent will be kept in a secure file cabinet. The results from this focus group may be
incorporated into Peter’s doctoral dissertation. It is our hope that through this focus group we
will be able to identify specific factors that may correlate to organizational performance and
thereby identify specific points of leverage to improve [Study Site] capacity for innovation and
creative change.
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Facilitating Emergence in a Canadian Hospital Context: Complex, Adaptive Systems
Theory and the Shape of Change

Focus Group Interview Guide
The focus group is intended to be a conversation between all of the participants, so people are
invited to comment on each other’s experiences. Following a brief description of the survey
results and a clarification of key terminology, the conversation will be framed by the following
questions:







Do the factors that have been identified resonate with your own experience of emergent
change?
Which factors do you think correlate with key organizational performance metrics (e.g.,
staff engagement, patient satisfaction, NQI, etc.)?
Why do you think that correlation exists?
What would you consider key points of leverage for the organization moving into the
future?
What specific strategies or ideas for organizational change emerge from this discussion?
What do you see as the role for senior leadership in moving these strategies forward?
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Appendix C
Factors That Contribute to Organizational Emergence
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